5 September 2018 in Policy Sciences
1 October 2023 in Social Networks
21 December 2022 in Review of Policy Research
The National Climate Initiative (NKI) in Germany provides a strong incentive for local governments to apply for funding to engage in climate protection activities. Yet, the latest evaluation of the NKI confirms that there is a great disparity in the distribution of funding across regions. Taking this regional fragmentation as a starting point, we ask the following: How can we explain disparity in the amount of funding across counties and cities? We draw on climate policy literature pointing to the role of socioeconomic and political determinants and the settlement structure to answer this question. We study all 400 cities and counties to test hypotheses concerning disparity in the likelihood and amount of climate funding, using data from the German Ministry for the Environment and further regional statistics. Running different multilevel regression models, we show that local climate funding is more likely in cities and more urbanized counties than in rural counties with less population and oftentimes also with less young and educated people. We argue that despite the increasing number of local governments getting active in climate protection in Germany, there is important unused potential for climate change mitigation in rural counties. Therefore, we conclude by proposing a new research agenda focusing on climate change mitigation in rural areas.
17 January 2021 in Policy Studies Journal
1 April 2020 in Policy & Politics
Policy positions are used extensively to explain coalition formation, advocacy success and policy outputs, and government consultations and stakeholder surveys are seen as important means of gathering data about policy actors’ positions. However, we know little about how accurately official consultations and stakeholder surveys reflect their views. This study compares advocacy organisations’ publicly stated positions in their responses to official consultations with their positions expressed in confidential surveys conducted by the authors. It compares three decision-making processes in Switzerland – in energy, climate and water protection – to analyse responses via two different types of data gathering methods. The results show a substantial divergence between official and private expressions of policy positions. Specific types of policy actors (losers), instruments (persuasive measures) and subsystems (collaborative network) produce more divergent positions. This has important methodological implications for comparative policy studies that use different data gathering methods and focus on different policy domains.
25 May 2021 in International Studies Quarterly
Differential treatment is a key norm in multilateral environmental agreements. Its main objective is to increase compliance and reduce the free-rider problem by apportioning the costs and benefits of implementation more equitably across the parties in an agreement. The question of how to differentiate those burdens is inextricably linked to national interests, and while in some instances differential treatment is well designed and facilitates cooperation, in other cases a rigid divide—or cleavage—leads to a stalemate and constant conflict. This article studies the consequences of differential treatment as institutionalized under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Previous research has shown that the separation of UNFCCC parties into two opposing groups has deepened the polarization in the negotiations. We identify two causal mechanisms that may have driven this polarization, namely socialization through material incentives and the formation of group identity. We draw on an original dataset that records (dis)agreements between country pairs, coded from negotiation summaries between 1995 and 2013. Using a relational events model, we show that the division of UNFCCC parties into Annex I (with obligations) and non-Annex I (without obligations) is related primarily to material incentives and less to group identity formation.El trato diferenciado es una norma fundamental en los acuerdos ambientales multilaterales. Su principal objetivo es aumentar el cumplimiento y reducir el problema de los oportunistas distribuyendo los costos y los beneficios de la implementación de forma más equitativa entre las partes de un acuerdo. La cuestión de cómo diferenciar esas cargas está inextricablemente vinculada a los intereses nacionales y mientras que en algunos casos el trato diferenciado está bien diseñado y facilita la cooperación, en otros casos, una división rígida o escisión conduce a un estancamiento o un conflicto constante. En este artículo se estudian las consecuencias del trato diferenciado institucionalizado en la Convención Marco de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Cambio Climático (CMNUCC). Investigaciones anteriores han demostrado que la separación de las partes de la CMNUCC en dos grupos opuestos ha profundizado la polarización en las negociaciones. Identificamos dos mecanismos causales que pueden haber impulsado esta polarización; a saber, la socialización a través de incentivos materiales y la formación de la identidad de grupo. Nos basamos en un conjunto de datos original que registra los (des)acuerdos entre pares de países, codificados a partir de resúmenes de negociación entre 1995 y 2013. Utilizando un modelo de eventos relacionales, demostramos que la división de las partes de la CMNUCC en Anexo I (con obligaciones) y no Anexo I (sin obligaciones) está relacionada principalmente con los incentivos materiales y no tan relacionada con la formación de la identidad de grupo.Le traitement différencié est une norme clé des accords environnementaux multilatéraux. Son principal objectif est d'accroître la conformité et de réduire le problème de bénéficiaire sans contrepartie en répartissant plus équitablement les coûts et les avantages de la mise en œuvre d'un accord entre les parties qui y sont impliquées. La question de savoir comment différencier ces « fardeaux » est inextricablement liée aux intérêts nationaux, et bien que dans certains cas, le traitement différencié soit bien conçu et facilite la coopération, dans d'autres cas, une séparation rigide—ou clivage—conduit à une impasse et à un conflit permanent. Cet article étudie les conséquences du traitement différencié tel qu'il est institutionnalisé dans la Convention-cadre des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques (CCNUCC). Une recherche précédente a monté que la séparation des parties de la CCNUCC en deux groupes opposés avait accru la polarisation des négociations. Nous avons identifié deux mécanismes causaux qui peuvent avoir entraîné cette polarisation: la socialisation par incitations matérielles et la formation d'une identité de groupe. Nous nous appuyons sur un jeu de données original retraçant les (dés)accords entre paires de pays, qui ont été codés à partir des résumés des négociations qui sont intervenues entre 1995 et 2013. Nous utilisons un modèle d’événements relationnels et montrons que la séparation entre parties de la CCNUCC en pays de l'Annexe I (avec obligations) et pays hors Annexe I (sans obligations) est principalement davantage associée à des incitations matérielles qu’à une formation d'identité de groupe.