Mohammed Mohi Uddin

Mohammed Mohi Uddin

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Mohammed Mohi Uddin

University of Illinois Springfield

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 August 2022 in Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MUMohammed Mohi Uddin
Mohammed Mohi Uddin
MIMohammad Tazul Islam
Mohammad Tazul Islam
Omar Al FarooqueOmar Al Farooque
Omar Al Farooque
Purpose: In this study, the authors explore the effects of politically controlled boards on bank loan performance in both state-owned commercial banks (SCBs) and private sector commercial banks (PCBs) in Bangladesh.Design/methodology/approach: The data consist of 409 bank-year observations from 46 sample SCBs and PCBs of Bangladesh for the period 2008–17. The authors apply ordinary least squares pooled regression with year fixed effect for baseline econometric analyses and generalized method of moments regression for robustness tests after addressing the endogeneity issue.Findings: The regression results reveal that the presence of bank “boards controlled by politically affiliated directors” (PA) have significant positive effects on non-performing loans (NPLs). Similarly, the presence of “boards controlled by politically affiliated directors without substantial ownership interests” (PAWOI) show positive association with NPLs. In contrast, the presence of “boards controlled by politically affiliated directors with substantial ownership interests” (PAOI) exhibit an inverse relationship with NPLs. These findings support ‘agency conflict’ arguments and document that both PA and PAWOI are detrimental to bank loan performance in Bangladesh, while PAOI do not have significant effect on increasing NPLs.Originality/value: This study contributes to the existing bank governance literature by providing evidence from an emerging economy perspective, where politically affiliated directors (PADs) exploit their positions for personal and/or political gain at the cost of other stakeholders by taking advantage of relaxed regulatory oversights and investor protections.

14 April 2026 in VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MUMohammed Mohi Uddin
Mohammed Mohi Uddin
CCCarolyn Cordery
Carolyn Cordery
It is undeniable that nongovernmental organization (NGO) beneficiaries should have their interests protected, especially when investing in and borrowing from a microfinance provider. Yet, prior literature highlights the patchy nature of beneficiary accountability when NGOs prioritize funders’ and donors’ accountability and commercialization. In this longitudinal case study on a large development microfinance NGO, multi-actor collaboration between donors, funders, and regulators to impose accountability requirements helps protect the interests of NGO beneficiaries. New institutional rules and accountability norms were developed to create dialogs between NGOs and their beneficiaries. Coercive mechanisms were established to sanction situations where beneficiary interests were not upheld in a type of surrogate accountability. Our longitudinal study integrates institutional theory and the stakeholder collaboration concept to show how donors and funders can work with government regulators to increase their effectiveness and protect beneficiaries. However, cultural issues limit full surrogate accountability.