We investigate the interplay of search and switching costs in determining suboptimal market outcomes. Relying on the theoretical framework provided by Wilson (2012), we test whether search or switching costs have a greater detrimental impact on competition and on the mechanisms behind it. Our results show that market outcomes crucially depend on buyers’ strategy, and that, unlike theoretical predictions, switching costs may impact prices and welfare more than search costs under some circumstances.
This study investigates prosocial behavior in chains of donations using variations of the dictator game. We explore how the possibility of direct and indirect giving influences generosity and welfare. Our results reveal that individuals are more generous when their actions benefit multiple recipients, even indirectly, despite the risks of reduced effectiveness due to intermediaries. Still, the indirect recipient obtains a lower welfare outcome than the direct recipient as the intermediate recipient deliberately withholds part of the dictator’s giving, passing on less than expected by the initial donor.
1 January 2025 in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, an institutional mechanism designed to enhance cooperation. In this mechanism, contributors have the option to voluntarily contribute to the public good and decide whether to join a (sub)group where partners equally share the contribution cost. Theoretically, stable cost-sharing partnerships enhance efficiency since their partners fully contribute, while outsiders would free-ride. Our data reveal that individual joining and contribution behaviors do not always align with benchmark predictions: partnerships are not always formed, and when they are, they are not always of the optimal size; partners often contribute less than maximally, and outsiders more than minimally. Nonetheless, we document systematic evidence of partnership formation and significantly improved provision of public goods across rounds.