Irene Maria Buso

Irene Maria Buso

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Irene Maria Buso

Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 May 2024 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
IBIrene Maria Buso
Irene Maria Buso
LFLorenzo Ferrari
Lorenzo Ferrari
WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth
LLLuisa Lorè
Luisa Lorè
LSLorenzo Spadoni
Lorenzo Spadoni

6 October 2026 in Italian Economic Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
IBIrene Maria Buso
Irene Maria Buso
DCDaniela Di CAGNO
Daniela Di CAGNO
JHJohn Hey
John Hey
We investigate the interplay of search and switching costs in determining suboptimal market outcomes. Relying on the theoretical framework provided by Wilson (2012), we test whether search or switching costs have a greater detrimental impact on competition and on the mechanisms behind it. Our results show that market outcomes crucially depend on buyers’ strategy, and that, unlike theoretical predictions, switching costs may impact prices and welfare more than search costs under some circumstances.

19 March 2026
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
IBIrene Maria Buso
Irene Maria Buso
Luca CorazziniLuca Corazzini
Luca Corazzini

24 August 2026 in Theory and Decision
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LBLeonardo Becchetti
Leonardo Becchetti
IBIrene Maria Buso
Irene Maria Buso
Luca CorazziniLuca Corazzini
Luca Corazzini
VPVittorio Pelligra
Vittorio Pelligra
This study investigates prosocial behavior in chains of donations using variations of the dictator game. We explore how the possibility of direct and indirect giving influences generosity and welfare. Our results reveal that individuals are more generous when their actions benefit multiple recipients, even indirectly, despite the risks of reduced effectiveness due to intermediaries. Still, the indirect recipient obtains a lower welfare outcome than the direct recipient as the intermediate recipient deliberately withholds part of the dictator’s giving, passing on less than expected by the initial donor.

1 January 2025 in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IBIrene Maria Buso
Irene Maria Buso
DCDaniela Di CAGNO
Daniela Di CAGNO
WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth
LSLorenzo Spadoni
Lorenzo Spadoni
We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, an institutional mechanism designed to enhance cooperation. In this mechanism, contributors have the option to voluntarily contribute to the public good and decide whether to join a (sub)group where partners equally share the contribution cost. Theoretically, stable cost-sharing partnerships enhance efficiency since their partners fully contribute, while outsiders would free-ride. Our data reveal that individual joining and contribution behaviors do not always align with benchmark predictions: partnerships are not always formed, and when they are, they are not always of the optimal size; partners often contribute less than maximally, and outsiders more than minimally. Nonetheless, we document systematic evidence of partnership formation and significantly improved provision of public goods across rounds.