Maxime Bros

Maxime Bros

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Maxime Bros

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 March 2025
Verified
Report
Closed access
GAGorjan Alagic
Gorjan Alagic
MBMaxime Bros
Maxime Bros
PCPierre Ciadoux
Pierre Ciadoux
DCDavid Cooper
David Cooper
QDQuynh Dang
Quynh Dang
NWNoah Waller
Noah Waller
The National Institute of Standards and Technology is selecting public-key cryptographic algorithms through a public, competition-like process. The new public-key cryptography standards will specify additional digital signatures, public-key encryption, and key-establishment algorithms to supplement Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-5, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), as well as NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, and SP 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Using Integer Factorization Cryptography. It is intended that these algorithms will be capable of protecting sensitive information well into the foreseeable future, including after the advent of quantum computers. After three rounds of evaluation and analysis, NIST announced the selection of the first algorithms to be standardized \cite {NISTIR8413}. The public-key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) selected for standardization was CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM). The digital signatures selected were CRYSTALS-Di lithium (ML-DSA), Falcon (FN-DSA), and SPHINCS+ (SLH-DSA). In August 2024, NIST published the first three post-quantum cryptography standards based on these algorithms \cite {FIPS203, FIPS204, FIPS205}. Four candidate algorithms for key establishment have continued to be studied in a fourth round of analysis: BIKE, Classic McEliece, HQC, and SIKE. This report describes the evaluation and selection process of these fourth-round candidates based on public feedback and internal review. The report summarizes each of the candidate algorithms and identifies those selected for standardization. The only key-establishment algorithm that will be standardized is HQC. NIST will develop a standard based on HQC to augment and diversify its key-establishment portfolio.

24 October 2024
Verified
Report
Closed access
GAGorjan Alagic
Gorjan Alagic
MBMaxime Bros
Maxime Bros
PCPierre Ciadoux
Pierre Ciadoux
DCDavid Cooper
David Cooper
QDQuynh Dang
Quynh Dang
NWNoah Waller
Noah Waller
NIST is in the process of evaluating public-key digital signature algorithms for potential standardization to protect sensitive information into the foreseeable future, including after the advent of quantum computers. Any signature scheme that is eventually selected would augment FIPS 204, Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard; FIPS 205, Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard; FIPS 186-5, Digital Signature Standard (DSS); and SP 800-208, Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes. This report describes the evaluation criteria and selection process of the First Round of the Additional Digital Signatures for the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Standardization Process. Based on public feedback and internal reviews of the first-round candidates, NIST selected14 candidate algorithms to move forward to the second round of evaluation: CROSS, FAEST, HAWK, LESS, MAYO, Mirath (merger of MIRA/MiRitH), MQOM, PERK, QR-UOV, RYDE, SDitH, SNOVA, SQIsign, and UOV.

1 December 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LBLoïc Bidoux
Loïc Bidoux
PBPierre Briaud
Pierre Briaud
MBMaxime Bros
Maxime Bros
PGPhilippe Gaborit
Philippe Gaborit
In this paper, we revisit the Rank Quasi-Cyclic (RQC) (Melchor et al., IEEE IT, 2018) encryption scheme by proposing three possible variations for its design. Our first improvement relies on the introduction of Augmented Gabidulin codes, a new family of decodable codes exploiting the concept of support erasure for the rank metric. Following the work of Melchor et al. (PQCrypto, 2022), our second improvement uses multiple syndromes to increase the weight of the error to be decoded. As pioneered in Melchor et al. (NIST PQC, 2020), our third variation considers non-homogeneous error weights in order to decrease the parameters. These improvements can be combined together to design schemes offering various trade-offs in term of security and size. Our Multi-UR-AG (multiple syndromes, unstructured, augmented Gabidulin) scheme achieves a size of 11kB (public key + ciphertext) for 128 bits of security while featuring a conservative design as it relies on pure random instances without any ideal structure. Besides, our NH- Multi-RQC-AG (non-homogeneous error, multiple syndromes, ideal structure, augmented Gabidulin) achieves a size of 2.7 kB for 128 bits of security, namely a 50 % improvement with respect to classical RQC. Our second and third variations respectively rely on the security of the $\textsf {RSL} $ and $\textsf {NHRSD} $ problems (or $\textsf {NHRSL} $ when considered together). In this paper, we also provide new security analysis and attacks for these problems. While these results are important for our new schemes, they are of independent interest as well. Our security analysis for the $\textsf {RSL} $ problem provides an improvement on the recent algebraic attacks for some instances. In addition, we show that the $\textsf {RSL} $ problem can be solved in polynomial time when $N \geq (k+1) r\frac {m}{m-r}$ , this improves the best known combinatorial attack (Gaborit et al., Crypto, 2017). We also propose the first combinatorial attack against the $\textsf {NHRSD} $ problem along with a precise complexity analysis of the algebraic attack described Melchor et al. (NIST PQC, 2020). At last, we combine these analysis to provide an attack against the $\textsf {NHRSL} $ problem.

15 December 2021
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
NANicolas Aragon
Nicolas Aragon
MBMaxime Bros
Maxime Bros
PGPhilippe Gaborit
Philippe Gaborit

2 January 2026
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
PBPierre Briaud
Pierre Briaud
MBMaxime Bros
Maxime Bros
RPRay Perlner
Ray Perlner
DSDaniel Smith-Tone
Daniel Smith-Tone

21 May 2024 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
PBPeter Bajcsy
Peter Bajcsy
MBMaxime Bros
Maxime Bros
This work addresses the problem of planting and defending cryptographic-based backdoors in artificial intelligence (AI) models. The motivation comes from our lack of understanding and the implications of using cryptographic techniques for planting undetectable backdoors under theoretical assumptions in the large AI model systems deployed in practice. Our approach is based on designing a web-based simulation playground that enables planting, activating, and defending cryptographic backdoors in neural networks (NN). Simulations of planting and activating backdoors are enabled for two scenarios: in the extension of NN model architecture to support digital signature verification and in the modified architectural block for non-linear operators. Simulations of backdoor defense against backdoors are available based on proximity analysis and provide a playground for a game of planting and defending against backdoors. The simulations are available at https://pages.nist.gov/nn-calculator