This paper presents a taxonomy that allows defining the fault tolerance regimes fail-operational , fail-degraded , and fail-safe in the context of automotive systems. Fault tolerance regimes such as these are widely used in recent publications related to automated driving, yet without definitions. This largely holds true for automotive safety standards, too. We show that fault tolerance regimes defined in scientific publications related to the automotive domain are partially ambiguous as well as taxonomically unrelated. The presented taxonomy is based on terminology stemming from ISO 26262 as well as from systems engineering. It uses four criteria to distinguish fault tolerance regimes. In addition to fail-operational , fail-degraded , and fail-safe , the core terminology consists of operational and fail-unsafe . These terms are supported by definitions of available performance , nominal performance , functionality , and a concise definition of the safe state . For verification, we show by means of two examples from the automotive domain that the taxonomy can be applied to hierarchical systems of different complexity.
While current automotive safety standards provide implicit guidance on how unreasonable risk can be avoided, manufacturers are required to specify risk acceptance criteria for Automated Driving Systems (SAE Level 3 and higher). However, the ‘unreasonable’ level of risk of Automated Driving Systems is not yet concisely defined. Solely applying current safety standards to such novel systems could potentially not be sufficient for their acceptance. As risk is managed with implicit knowledge about safety measures in existing automotive standards, an explicit alignment with risk acceptance criteria is challenging. Hence, we propose an approach for an explicit representation and management of risk, which we call the Risk Management Core. The proposal of this process framework is based on requirements elicited from current safety standards and is applied to the task of specifying safe behavior for an Automated Driving System in an example scenario.
1 May 2020 in Proceedings of the Design Society: DESIGN Conference
Complex new functionalities and dissimilar stakeholder groups pose challenges to the requirement analysis for driverless vehicles. To overcome these challenges, we propose a value-oriented reference process for innovative functionalities of an autonomous family vehicle. The value-oriented measures are taken from the approach of Value Sensitive Design. In our application, we have found that the consideration of the human values involved is of great importance for the identification of stakeholders and the management of their potentially conflicting interests throughout the development process.
The complex functional structure of driverless vehicles induces a multitude of potential malfunctions. Established approaches for a systematic hazard identification generate individual potentially hazardous scenarios for each identified malfunction. This leads to inefficiencies in a purely expert-based hazard analysis process, as each of the many scenarios has to be examined individually. In this contribution, we propose an adaptation of the strategy for hazard identification for the development of automated vehicles. Instead of focusing on malfunctions, we base our process on deviations from desired vehicle behavior in selected operational scenarios analyzed in the concept phase. By evaluating externally observable deviations from a desired behavior, we encapsulate individual malfunctions and reduce the amount of generated potentially hazardous scenarios. After introducing our hazard identification strategy, we illustrate its application on one of the operational scenarios used in the research project UNICARagil.
26 July 2019 in Proceedings of the Design Society: International Conference on Engineering Design
Structuring the early design phase of automotive systems is an important part of efficient and successful development processes. Today, safety considerations (e.g., the safety life cycle of ISO 26262) significantly affect the course of development. Preliminary designs are expressed in functional system architectures, which are required to form safety concepts. Thus, mapping tasks and work products to a reference process during early design stages is an important part of structuring the system development. This contribution describes the systematic creation and notation of the functional safety concept within the concept phase of development of an unmanned protective vehicle within the research project aFAS. Different stages of preliminary design and dependencies between them are displayed by the work products created and used. The full set of functional safety requirements and an excerpt of the safety argument structure of the SAE level 4 application are presented.
Zusammenfassung Um bereits in der Konzeptphase autonomer Fahrzeuge einen fundierten Eindruck bestehender Risikopotenziale zu erhalten, werden im Zuge von deduktiven und induktiven SOTIF-Analysen mögliche auslösende Umstände für gefährliches Verhalten untersucht. In diesem Zusammenhang wird in der ISO 21448 die Durchführung einer systemtheoretischen Prozessanalyse (STPA) vorgeschlagen. In diesem Beitrag führen wir deutsche Terminologie für SOTIF-Betrachtungen ein und setzen uns im Zuge einer Anwendung kritisch mit der STPA-Theorie auseinander, wobei wir begleitend methodische Ergänzungen anregen.