18 September 2018 in Environmental and Resource Economics
3 July 2017 in Journal of Media Economics
CHChristina Hofmann-Stölting
Christina Hofmann-Stölting
Managers predict the sales of new entertainment products prior to their release using comparables, such as similar books from the same author or movies with the same actors. In this study, the authors analyze whether diffusion models for media products provide helpful support in the management task of predicting prelaunch sales of the first distribution channel for three different product categories. They compare the performance of predictions based on (a) simple success factor regressions (OLS) and (b) diffusion models against real management predictions. Based on samples covering the German music, film, and the literary market, we show that model-based forecasts outperform the forecasts of management teams for the majority of the products. In contrast, management is superior in forecasting top sellers. This is due to unobserved factors arising from more management attention attached towards super stars. The authors do not find substantial prediction differences between simple success factor regressions and more complex diffusion models. Thus, managers interested in total sales estimates can easily rely on OLS based success factor predictions. Advertising and product differentiation factors with respect to quality (e.g., star power, critics, or country of origin) are across all 3 industries highly relevant for sales predictions, whereas others variables (e.g., price, distribution power, season, or competition) differ across industries.
1 January 2010 in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
1 February 2022 in Experimental Economics
We investigate a number of canonical predictions that arise from relational contract theory. Employing an experimental design with endogenous choice of contract type, we find considerable experimental support for several well-established predictions, including the importance of self-enforcement and individual rationality constraints for contractual performance; a preference for informal agreements when third-party verification of performance is coarse; and a tendency toward strategic ambiguity (Bernheim and Whinston Am Econ Rev 88(4):902–932, 1998). However, two findings that appear to be inconsistent with theory are that (1) contractually specified performance levels do not appear to respond to the discount factor though realized performance does; and (2) subjects often apply inefficient punishments following a deviation. By providing evidence on the strengths and weaknesses of standard relational contract theory, our study shows where there is room for improvement. We conjecture that incorporating social preferences and semi-grim strategies (Breitmoser Am Econ Rev 105(9):2882–2910, 2015) can potentially address the observed weaknesses.
1 January 2012 in SSRN Electronic Journal
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an incentive effect from raising the winner's prize. However, we also observed several empirical puzzles that appeared to contradict theory. Controlling for social preferences did not resolve the puzzles, although social preferences do influence behavior. It turns out that the puzzles can be explained by the canonical model once the textbook assumption of separable agent utility is relaxed.
1 January 2009 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Experimental studies have consistently shown that cooperative outcomes can emerge even in finitely repeated games. Such outcomes are justified by existing reputation building models, which suggest that cooperative outcomes can be sustained if some subjects have other-regarding preferences. While the existence of other-regarding preferences is typically used to justify experimental outcomes, we are unaware of empirical studies that explicitly examine the interaction between cooperators (those with other-regarding preferences) and selfish subjects in sustaining cooperation. In this paper, we classify subjects as either selfish or cooperative using simple social preference games and then test for behavioral differences between the two types in a finitely-repeated labor market with unenforceable worker effort. Theory predicts, and our data confirms, that (1) selfish players mimic the actions of cooperators when trading partners can track the individual reputation of past partners and (2) selfish and cooperative types act differently when individual reputations cannot be tracked.