Mingming Zhang

Mingming Zhang

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Mingming Zhang

Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
27 February 2023 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MZMingming Zhang
Mingming Zhang
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
JLJianyu Lu
Jianyu Lu
YZYiming Zhang
Yiming Zhang
XZXiaofeng Zheng
Xiaofeng Zheng
Public hosting services provide convenience for domain owners to build web applications with better scalability and security. However, if a domain name points to released service endpoints (e.g., nameservers allocated by a provider), adversaries can take over the domain by applying the same endpoints. Such a security threat is called "hosting-based domain takeover''. In recent years, a large number of domain takeover incidents have occurred; even well-known websites like the subdomains of microsoft.com have been impacted. However, until now, there has been no effective detection system to identify these vulnerable domains on a large scale. In this paper, we fill this research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. Compared with previous work, HostingChecker expands the detection scope and improves the detection efficiency by: (i) systematically identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) effectively detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. We evaluate the effectiveness of HostingChecker and eventually detect 10,351 subdomains from Tranco Top-1M apex domains vulnerable to domain takeover, which are over 8× more than previous findings. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors, like Amazon and Alibaba, and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed implementation of domain ownership validation. Following responsible disclosure processes, we have reported issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation.

19 November 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
MZMingming Zhang
Mingming Zhang
ZXZuyao Xu
Zuyao Xu
FMFasheng Miao
Fasheng Miao
YQYuqi Qiu
Yuqi Qiu
DFDunqiu Fan
Dunqiu Fan

11 December 2025 in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JXJiacheng Xu
Jiacheng Xu
SJShihao Jiang
Shihao Jiang
HSHe Sun
He Sun
QWQinying Wang
Qinying Wang
MZMingming Zhang
Mingming Zhang
JCJiming Chen
Jiming Chen
The Operating System (OS) kernel is foundational in modern computing, especially with the proliferation of diverse computing devices. However, its development comes with vulnerabilities that can lead to severe security breaches. Kernel fuzzing, a technique used to uncover these vulnerabilities, poses distinct challenges when compared to user-space fuzzing. These include the complexity of configuring the testing environment and addressing the statefulness inherent to both the kernel and the fuzzing process. Despite the significant interest from the community, a comprehensive understanding of kernel fuzzing remains lacking, hindering further progress in the field. In this paper, we present the first systematic study focused specifically on OS kernel fuzzing. We begin by outlining the unique challenges of kernel fuzzing, which distinguish it from those in user space. Following this, we summarize the progress of 107 academic studies from top-tier venues between 2017 and 2025. To structure this analysis, we introduce a stage-based fuzzing model and a novel fuzzing taxonomy that highlights nine core functionalities unique to kernel fuzzing. Each of these functionalities is examined in conjunction with the methodological approaches employed to address them. Finally, we identify remaining gaps in addressing challenges and outline promising directions to guide forthcoming research in kernel security.

26 June 2023 in ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MZMingming Zhang
Mingming Zhang
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
JLJianYu Lu
JianYu Lu
YZYiming Zhang
Yiming Zhang
XZXiaofeng Zheng
Xiaofeng Zheng
Public hosting services offer a convenient and secure option for creating web applications. However, adversaries can take over a domain by exploiting released service endpoints, leading to hosting-based domain takeover. This threat has affected numerous popular websites, including the subdomains of microsoft.com. However, no effective detection system for identifying vulnerable domains at scale exists to date. This paper fills the research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. HostingChecker expands detection scope and improves efficiency compared to previous work by: (i) identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. It discovers 10,351 vulnerable subdomains under Tranco Top-1M apex domains, which is over 8× more than previous findings, demonstrating its effectiveness. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors (e.g., Amazon, Alibaba) and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed domain ownership validation implementation. In the end, we have reported the issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation. The full paper is provided in [2].

19 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MZMingming Zhang
Mingming Zhang
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
JLJianYu Lu
JianYu Lu
YZYiming Zhang
Yiming Zhang
XZXiaofeng Zheng
Xiaofeng Zheng
Public hosting services offer a convenient and secure option for creating web applications. However, adversaries can take over a domain by exploiting released service endpoints, leading to hosting-based domain takeover. This threat has affected numerous popular websites, including the subdomains of microsoft.com. However, no effective detection system for identifying vulnerable domains at scale exists to date. This paper fills the research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. HostingChecker expands detection scope and improves efficiency compared to previous work by: (i) identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. It discovers 10,351 vulnerable subdomains under Tranco Top-1M apex domains, which is over 8× more than previous findings, demonstrating its effectiveness. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors (e.g., Amazon, Alibaba) and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed domain ownership validation implementation. In the end, we have reported the issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation. The full paper is provided in [2].