Xiang Li

Dr. Xiang Li

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
WXWei Xu
Wei Xu
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
CLChaoyi Lu
Chaoyi Lu
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
TWTao Wan
Tao Wan
In this paper, we present a new DNS amplification attack, named TsuKing. Instead of exploiting individual DNS resolvers independently to achieve an amplification effect, TsuKing deftly coordinates numerous vulnerable DNS resolvers and crafted queries together to form potent DoS amplifiers. We demconstrate that with TsuKing, an initial small amplification factor can inrease exponentially through the internal layers of coordinated amplifiers, resulting in an extremely powerful amplification attack. TsuKing has three variants, including DNSRetry, DNSChain, and DNSLoop, all of which exploit a suite of inconsistent DNS implementations to achieve enormous amplification effect. With comprehensive measurements, we found that about 14.5% of 1.3M open DNS resolvers are potentially vulnerable to TsuKing. Real-world controlled evaluations indicated that attackers can achieve a packet amplification factor of at least 3,700X (DNSChain). We have reported vulnerabilities to affected vendors and provided them with mitigation recommendations. We have received positive responses from 6 vendors, including Unbound, MikroTik, and AliDNS, and 3 CVEs were assigned. Some of them are implementing our recommendations.

27 February 2023 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MZMingming Zhang
Mingming Zhang
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
JLJianyu Lu
Jianyu Lu
YZYiming Zhang
Yiming Zhang
XZXiaofeng Zheng
Xiaofeng Zheng
Public hosting services provide convenience for domain owners to build web applications with better scalability and security. However, if a domain name points to released service endpoints (e.g., nameservers allocated by a provider), adversaries can take over the domain by applying the same endpoints. Such a security threat is called "hosting-based domain takeover''. In recent years, a large number of domain takeover incidents have occurred; even well-known websites like the subdomains of microsoft.com have been impacted. However, until now, there has been no effective detection system to identify these vulnerable domains on a large scale. In this paper, we fill this research gap by presenting a novel framework, HostingChecker, for detecting domain takeovers. Compared with previous work, HostingChecker expands the detection scope and improves the detection efficiency by: (i) systematically identifying vulnerable hosting services using a semi-automated method; and (ii) effectively detecting vulnerable domains through passive reconstruction of domain dependency chains. The framework enables us to detect the subdomains of Tranco sites on a daily basis. We evaluate the effectiveness of HostingChecker and eventually detect 10,351 subdomains from Tranco Top-1M apex domains vulnerable to domain takeover, which are over 8× more than previous findings. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth security analysis on the affected vendors, like Amazon and Alibaba, and gain a suite of new insights, including flawed implementation of domain ownership validation. Following responsible disclosure processes, we have reported issues to the security response centers of affected vendors, and some (e.g., Baidu and Tencent) have adopted our mitigation.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZZZhenrui Zhang
Zhenrui Zhang
GHGeng Hong
Geng Hong
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
ZFZhuoqun Fu
Zhuoqun Fu
JZJia Zhang
Jia Zhang
MYMin Yang
Min Yang
Cryptocurrency mining is a crucial operation in blockchains, and miners often join mining pools to increase their chances of earning rewards. However, the energy-intensive nature of PoW cryptocurrency mining has led to its ban in New York State of the United States, China, and India. As a result, mining pools, serving as a central hub for mining activities, have become prime targets for regulatory enforcement. Furthermore, cryptojacking malware refers to self-owned stealthy mining pools to evade detection techniques and conceal profit wallet addresses. However, no systematic research has been conducted to analyze it, largely due to a lack of full understanding of the protocol implementation, usage, and port distribution of the stealth mining pool. To the best of our knowledge, we carry out the first large-scale and longitudinal measurement research of stealthy mining pools to fill this gap. We report 7,629 stealthy mining pools among 59 countries. Further, we study the inner mechanisms of stealthy mining pools. By examining the 19,601 stealthy mining pool domains and IPs, our analysis reveals that stealthy mining pools carefully craft their domain semantics, protocol support, and lifespan to provide underground, user-friendly, and robust mining services. What's worse, we uncover a strong correlation between stealthy mining pools and malware, with 23.3% of them being labeled as malicious. Besides, we evaluate the tricks used to evade state-of-the-art mining detection, including migrating domain name resolution methods, leveraging the botnet, and enabling TLS encryption. Finally, we conduct a qualitative study to evaluate the profit gains of malicious cryptomining activities through the stealthy pool from an insider perspective. Our results show that criminals have the potential to earn more than 1 million USD per year, boasting an average ROI of 2,750%. We have informed the relevant ISPs about uncovered stealthy mining pools and have received their acknowledgments.

24 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FZFenglu Zhang
Fenglu Zhang
YZYunyi Zhang
Yunyi Zhang
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
EAEihal Alowaisheq
Eihal Alowaisheq
LYLingyun Ying
Lingyun Ying
MZMin Zhang
Min Zhang
Leveraging DNS for covert communications is appealing since most networks allow DNS traffic, especially the ones directed toward renowned DNS hosting services. Unfortunately, most DNS hosting services overlook domain ownership verification, enabling miscreants to host undelegated DNS records of a domain they do not own. Consequently, miscreants can conduct covert communication through such undelegated records for whitelisted domains on reputable hosting providers. In this paper, we shed light on the emerging threat posed by undelegated records and demonstrate their exploitation in the wild. To the best of our knowledge, this security risk has not been studied before. We conducted a comprehensive measurement to reveal the prevalence of the risk. In total, we observed 1,580,925 unique undelegated records that are potentially abused. We further observed that a considerable portion of these records are associated with malicious behaviors. By utilizing threat intelligence and malicious traffic collected by malware sandbox, we extracted malicious IP addresses from 25.41% of these records, spanning 1,369 Tranco top 2K domains and 248 DNS hosting providers, including Cloudflare and Amazon. Furthermore, we discovered that the majority of the identified malicious activities are Trojan-related. Moreover, we conducted case studies on two malware families (Dark.IOT and Specter) that exploit undelegated records to obtain C2 servers, in addition to the masquerading SPF records to conceal SMTP-based covert communication. Also, we provided mitigation options for different entities. As a result of our disclosure, several popular hosting providers have taken action to address this issue.

6 February 2026 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ZXZuyao Xu
Zuyao Xu
YQYuqi Qiu
Yuqi Qiu
LSLu Sun
Lu Sun
FMFaSheng Miao
FaSheng Miao
FWFubin Wu
Fubin Wu
JLJiaji Liu
Jiaji Liu
Citations provide the basis for trusting scientific claims; when they are invalid or fabricated, this trust collapses. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), this risk has intensified: LLMs are increasingly used for academic writing, yet their tendency to fabricate citations (``ghost citations'') poses a systemic threat to citation validity. To quantify this threat and inform mitigation, we develop CiteVerifier, an open-source framework for large-scale citation verification, and conduct the first comprehensive study of citation validity in the LLM era through three experiments built on it. We benchmark 13 state-of-the-art LLMs on citation generation across 40 research domains, finding that all models hallucinate citations at rates from 14.23\% to 94.93\%, with significant variation across research domains. Moreover, we analyze 2.2 million citations from 56,381 papers published at top-tier AI/ML and Security venues (2020--2025), confirming that 1.07\% of papers contain invalid or fabricated citations (604 papers), with an 80.9\% increase in 2025 alone. Furthermore, we survey 97 researchers and analyze 94 valid responses after removing 3 conflicting samples, revealing a critical ``verification gap'': 41.5\% of researchers copy-paste BibTeX without checking and 44.4\% choose no-action responses when encountering suspicious references; meanwhile, 76.7\% of reviewers do not thoroughly check references and 80.0\% never suspect fake citations. Our findings reveal an accelerating crisis where unreliable AI tools, combined with inadequate human verification by researchers and insufficient peer review scrutiny, enable fabricated citations to contaminate the scientific record. We propose interventions for researchers, venues, and tool developers to protect citation integrity.

10 February 2026 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
XLXiang Li
Xiang Li
ZXZixuan Xie
Zixuan Xie
LSLu Sun
Lu Sun
YQYuqi Qiu
Yuqi Qiu
ZXZuyao Xu
Zuyao Xu
Zheli LiuZheli Liu
Zheli Liu
XMap is an open-source network scanner designed for performing fast Internet-wide IPv4 and IPv6 network research scanning. XMap was initially developed as the research artifact of a paper published at 2021 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN '21) and then made available on GitHub. XMap is the first tool to support fast Internet-wide IPv6 network scanning in 2020. During the last five years, XMap has made substantial impact in academia, industry, and government. It has been referenced in 52 research papers (15 published at top-tier security venues and 11 in leading networking societies), received over 450 GitHub stars, featured in multiple news outlets, and deployed or recommended by international companies up to date. Additionally, XMap has contributed to the implementation of RFC documents and the discovery of various vulnerabilities. This paper provides fundamental details about XMap, its architecture, and its impact.