Why are some communities able to come together to improve their collective lot while others are not? Looking at variation in local government performance in decentralized West Africa, this book advances a novel answer to this question: communities are better able to coordinate around basic service delivery when their formal jurisdictional boundaries overlap with informal social institutions, or norms. This book identifies the precolonial past as the driver of striking subnational variation in the present because these social institutions only encompass the many villages of the local state in areas that were once home to precolonial polities. Drawing on a multi-method research design, the book develops and tests a theory of institutional congruence to document how the past shapes contemporary elite approaches to redistribution within the local state. Where precolonial kingdoms left behind collective identities and dense social networks, local elites find it easier to cooperate following decentralization.
Despite increasingly programmatic politics and competitive elections, political clientelism remains an enduring feature of African politics. More so, while politicians rarely deliver on political promises, citizens continue to demand and participate in patron–client relations. While moral economy and instrumentalist accounts offer insight into the puzzling persistence of political clientelism, we offer an additional framework based on demands for social recognition. Beyond expectations of materialist exchange or the performance of cultural norms, citizens expect their political leaders to recognize them as dignified human beings and members of an identity group. Drawing on evidence from three diverse African contexts—urban Ghana, rural Senegal, and coastal Kenya—we argue that citizens engage in political clientelism as a vehicle for demanding three dimensions of social recognition: (i) To be seen and heard by leaders, (ii) to be respected as agents in the political process, and (iii) to be politically included and protected from harm. By providing new insights into the enduring logics of clientelism, citizen strategies amidst unequal power relationships, and the role of emotions in democratic politics, we aim to reconcile existing approaches and bring them into a more unified framework.
8 October 2020 in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
A number of studies have found that British colonialism — specifically its policy of indirect rule — improved local economic development relative to the French policy of direct rule. There is less consensus, however, as to why indirect rule would produce better economic outcomes. This article proposes three mechanisms linking indirect rule to development: the devolution of power to local communities, the empowerment of traditional authorities, and the reification of ethnic identities. Using a geographic regression discontinuity research design on Cameroon’s internal anglophone-francophone border, a legacy of the country’s dual colonial heritage, the article finds the most evidence for the first mechanism, that citizens on the anglophone side of the border are more likely to act locally and, indeed, see their local institutions as more legitimate. In contrast, we find mixed evidence for the other two mechanisms regarding the power of chiefs and ethnic identities.
1 September 2023 in The Journal of Modern African Studies
This paper seeks to broaden the framework for understanding the many different roles that traditional leaders play in their communities in sub-Saharan Africa. Using data from an original public opinion survey along the Ghana–Togo border, we find that one of the most important roles of the chieftaincy is to maintain law and order: resolving disputes and keeping the community safe from crime. However, we also find considerable variation in what chiefs are expected to do, how effective they are performing their various tasks, and how much authority they wield in doing so – both over their own subjects as well as over local government officials. We explore several potential sources for this variation, finding that chiefs in Ghana, a former British colony, are expected to do more jobs, are perceived to be more effective, and hold more upward power over local state officials compared with their counterparts in Togo, a former French colony.
The global rise of political polarization has generated new insights into how polarization affects political behavior. But political polarization may also shape the dynamics of researching such behavior in the first place. This paper argues that in polarized contexts, asking about party identification (PID) during academic surveys can be highly sensitive. We demonstrate this in sub-Saharan Africa, using three forms of evidence. First, a survey of enumerators in Côte d’Ivoire shows that over 50% feel uncomfortable asking about PID, linking their discomfort to the polarized political climate. Enumerators also believe that such questions reduce honest responses and influence the research encounter itself. Second, data from the Afrobarometer reveals that respondents in polarized countries often self-censor on PID questions more than on traditionally sensitive topics like clientelism, violence, or identity. Finally, interviews and focus groups with Ivorian citizens support these findings, highlighting the sensitivity around PID. These results emphasize that in politically polarized environments, partisanship questions may be uniquely sensitive and impact data quality and the research experience in addition to holding ramifications for political behavior. We conclude with a discussion of implications for survey design and analysis as well as a general call for political scientists to consider what is sensitive, in what context, and for whom when designing surveys.