1 April 2003 in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
EZEvelien P. H. Zeggelink
In this paper we both describe and analyze the meeting process and the evolution of a friendship network among sociology freshmen in the Netherlands. We develop a theory that explains how changes in the network structure depend on one or more of four main effects: proximity, visible similarity, invisible similarity, and network opportunity. We formulate expectations with regard to what factors are important at what stages of the friendship development, making a distinction between 'meeting' and 'mating.' To some extent, the results confirm our expectations. The proximity and visible similarity variables determine change in network structure in the early stages, whereas network opportunity is important during all stages. Unfortunately, no significant effects of invisible similarity are found.
1 March 2004 in European Journal of Political Research
1 April 1996 in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
EZEvelien P. H. Zeggelink
We will show that these base models and some intermediate ones result in fundamentally different network structures and predicted outcomes. Moreover, we will show that the policy driven models do fundamentally better than the power driven models. In policy networks actors use access relations to influence preferences of other actors. Establishment and shifts of access relations and their consequences for outcomes of decisions are the main focal points in this paper. Unlike most policy network studies, we therefore do not take the network and its relations as given and constant. Instead we device computer simulation models to account for the dynamics in policy networks. We compare different models and investigate the resulting network structures and predicted outcomes of decisions. The choice among the alternative models is made by their correspondence with empirical network structures and actual outcomes of decisions. In our models, we assume that all relevant actors aim at policy outcomes as close as possible to their own preferences. Policy outcomes are determined by the preferences of the final decision makers at the moment of the vote. In general, only a small fraction of the actors takes part in the final vote. Most actors have therefore to rely on access relations for directly or indirectly shaping the preferences of the final decision makers. For this purpose actors make access requests to other actors. An access relation is assumed to be established if such a request is accepted by the other actor. Access relations require time and resources. Actors are therefore assumed to be restricted in the number of access requests they can make and the number of requests they can accept Moreover, due to incomplete information and simultaneous actions by other actors, actors have to make simplifying assumptions in the selection of their “best” requests and learn by experience. We device two base models that correspond to two basic views on the nature of political processes. In the first view politics is seen as power driven. Corresponding to this view, actors aim at access relations with the most powerful actors in the field. They estimate their likelihood of success by comparing their own resources with those of the target actors. Power also determines the order in which actors accept requests. In the second view, policy matters and actors roughly estimate the effects access relations might have on the outcome of decisions. Actors select requests to “bolster” their own preference as much as possible.
1 June 2007 in European Union Politics
Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results. Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum, Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data — a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of member states, but only in the final stages of decision-making.
1 June 1988 in Social Networks
2 September 2012 in The American Review of Public Administration
Many local councils aim to (re)connect citizens to public planning. This article presents the Collaborative Communities through Coproduction (3C) method as a way to establish cooperation between residents and professionals in improving neighborhood livabiliy. The authors describe common challenges to citizen participation and identify the dilemma of sustainable cooperation as an additional challenge for citizen participation efforts that aim to establish coproduction. To deal with this dilemma, the 3C method was designed as a continuous, circular process of plan making, plan implementation, and plan evaluation. The authors describe the implementation of the 3C method in two neighborhoods in the Netherlands. Findings from the two case studies demonstrate workable solutions to the dilemmas of citizen participation. Nonetheless, the study findings show that shifting council priorities pose an additional risk to the sustained continuation of coproduction efforts.