Brian Campbell

Brian Campbell

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Brian Campbell

University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 March 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
TBThomas Bauereiss
Thomas Bauereiss
BCBrian Campbell
Brian Campbell
TSThomas Sewell
Thomas Sewell
AAAlasdair Armstrong
Alasdair Armstrong
LELawrence Esswood
Lawrence Esswood
PSPeter Sewell
Peter Sewell
Memory safety bugs continue to be a major source of security vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure. The CHERI project has proposed extending conventional architectures with hardware-supported capabilities to enable fine-grained memory protection and scalable compartmentalisation, allowing historically memory-unsafe C and C++ to be adapted to deterministically mitigate large classes of vulnerabilities, while requiring only minor changes to existing system software sources. Arm is currently designing and building Morello, a CHERI-enabled prototype architecture, processor, SoC, and board, extending the high-performance Neoverse N1, to enable industrial evaluation of CHERI and pave the way for potential mass-market adoption. However, for such a major new security-oriented architecture feature, it is important to establish high confidence that it does provide the intended protections, and that cannot be done with conventional engineering techniques.In this paper we put the Morello architecture on a solid mathematical footing from the outset. We define the fundamental security property that Morello aims to provide, reachable capability monotonicity, and prove that the architecture definition satisfies it. This proof is mechanised in Isabelle/HOL, and applies to a translation of the official Arm specification of the Morello instruction-set architecture (ISA) into Isabelle. The main challenge is handling the complexity and scale of a production architecture: 62,000 lines of specification, translated to 210,000 lines of Isabelle. We do so by factoring the proof via a narrow abstraction capturing essential properties of arbitrary CHERI ISAs, expressed above a monadic intra-instruction semantics. We also develop a model-based test generator, which generates instruction-sequence tests that give good specification coverage, used in early testing of the Morello implementation and in Morello QEMU development, and we use Arm’s internal test suite to validate our model.This gives us machine-checked mathematical proofs of whole-ISA security properties of a full-scale industry architecture, at design-time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that that is feasible, and it significantly increases confidence in Morello.

1 January 2009
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
BCBrian Campbell
Brian Campbell
Hofmann and Jost have presented a heap space analysis [1] that finds linear space bounds for many functional programs. It uses an amortised analysis: assigning hypothetical amounts of free space (called potential) to data structures in proportion to their sizes using type annotations. Constraints on these annotations in the type system ensure that the total potential assigned to the input is an upper bound on the total memory required to satisfy all allocations. We describe a related system for bounding the stack space requirements which uses the depth of data structures, by expressing potential in terms of maxima as well as sums. This is achieved by adding extra structure to typing contexts (inspired by O’Hearn’s bunched typing [2]) to describe the form of the bounds. We will also present the extra steps that must be taken to construct a typing during the analysis.

17 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
VZVadim Zaliva
Vadim Zaliva
KMKayvan Memarian
Kayvan Memarian
RARicardo Almeida
Ricardo Almeida
JCJessica Clarke
Jessica Clarke
BDBrooks Davis
Brooks Davis
PSPeter Sewell
Peter Sewell
Memory safety issues are a persistent source of security vulnerabilities, with conventional architectures and the C codebase chronically prone to exploitable errors. The CHERI research project has shown how one can provide radically improved security for that existing codebase with minimal modification, using unforgeable hardware capabilities in place of machine-word pointers in CHERI dialects of C, implemented as adaptions of Clang/LLVM and GCC. CHERI was first prototyped as extensions of MIPS and RISC-V; it is currently being evaluated by Arm and others with the Arm Morello experimental architecture, processor, and platform, to explore its potential for mass-market adoption, and by Microsoft in their CHERIoT design for embedded cores. There is thus considerable practical experience with CHERI C implementation and use, but exactly what CHERI C's semantics is (or should be) remains an open question. In this paper, we present the first attempt to rigorously and comprehensively define CHERI C semantics, discuss key semantics design questions relating to capabilities, provenance, and undefined behaviour, and clarify them with semantics in multiple complementary forms: in prose, as an executable semantics adapting the Cerberus C semantics, and mechanised in Coq. This establishes a solid foundation for CHERI C, for those porting code to it, for compiler implementers, and for future semantics and verification.

12 May 2023 in Formal Methods in System Design
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AAAlasdair Armstrong
Alasdair Armstrong
BCBrian Campbell
Brian Campbell
BSBen Simner
Ben Simner
CPChristopher Pulte
Christopher Pulte
PSPeter Sewell
Peter Sewell
Architecture specifications such as Armv8-A and RISC-V are the ultimate foundation for software verification and the correctness criteria for hardware verification. They should define the allowed sequential and relaxed-memory concurrency behaviour of programs, but hitherto there has been no integration of full-scale instruction-set architecture (ISA) semantics with axiomatic concurrency models, either in mathematics or in tools. These ISA semantics can be surprisingly large and intricate, e.g. 100k $$+$$ + lines for Armv8-A. In this paper we present a tool, Isla, for computing the allowed behaviours of concurrent litmus tests with respect to full-scale ISA definitions, in the Sail language, and arbitrary axiomatic relaxed-memory concurrency models, in the Cat language. It is based on a generic symbolic engine for Sail ISA specifications. We equip the tool with a web interface to make it widely accessible, and illustrate and evaluate it for Armv8-A and RISC-V. The symbolic execution engine is valuable also for other verification tasks: it has been used in automated ISA test generation for the Arm Morello prototype architecture, extending Armv8-A with CHERI capabilities, and for Iris program-logic reasoning about binary code above the Armv8-A and RISC-V ISA specifications. By using full-scale and authoritative ISA semantics, Isla lets one evaluate litmus tests using arbitrary user instructions with high confidence. Moreover, because these ISA specifications give detailed and validated definitions of the sequential aspects of systems functionality, as used by hypervisors and operating systems, e.g. instruction fetch, exceptions, and address translation, our tool provides a basis for developing concurrency semantics for these. We demonstrate this for the Armv8-A instruction-fetch and virtual-memory models and examples of Simner et al.

10 January 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
VZVadim Zaliva
Vadim Zaliva
KMKayvan Memarian
Kayvan Memarian
BCBrian Campbell
Brian Campbell
RARicardo Almeida
Ricardo Almeida
NFNathaniel Filardo
Nathaniel Filardo
PSPeter Sewell
Peter Sewell
Memory safety concerns continue to be a major source of security vulnerabilities. The CHERI architecture, as instantiated in prototype CHERI-RISC-V cores, the Arm Morello system, and Microsoft's CHERIoT embedded core, provides fine-grained memory access control through unforgeable hardware capabilities. The impact of CHERI on spatial memory safety is well understood. This paper systematically examines temporal memory safety within CHERI C -- a dialect of the C programming language for CHERI -- and proposes a formal approach to defining and ensuring it. In particular: 1) we examine the impact of five existing capability revocation mechanisms on CHERI C semantics and present a specialised object memory model tailored to CHERI C; 2) we introduce a new CHERI-specific pointer provenance tracking scheme; and 3) we formally define the security guarantees provided by this memory model, supported by a Coq proof of their correctness, expressed as invariants of the memory state.

20 June 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
BSBen Simner
Ben Simner
AAAlasdair Armstrong
Alasdair Armstrong
TBThomas Bauereiss
Thomas Bauereiss
BCBrian Campbell
Brian Campbell
OKOhad Kammar
Ohad Kammar
PSPeter Sewell
Peter Sewell