1 January 2025 in Marketing Science
This paper examines how AI-driven matching technology impacts influencer competition and platform profitability, revealing nuanced effects on campaign pricing and platform revenue.
24 September 2023 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
9 November 2020 in SSRN Electronic Journal
This paper studies the role of market structure in regulatory compliance through a unique empirical example: censorship via content removal by three major live-streaming platforms in China. Adopting an event study approach, this paper exploits the unexpected occurrence of 30 salient events over two years and shows that platforms of different sizes censor a different number of keywords with notably different delays. This paper then develops a structural model where the platform’s profit depends on its own censorship action as well as that of its competitors, induced by the switching behavior of users with heterogeneous preferences for censorship. By complying with the government’s censorship request, platforms may lose users who prefer to evade censorship by switching out. By not complying, platforms incur a cost imposed by the government that is positively correlated with their sizes, but it also allows them to attract new users from their competitors that obey the censorship requests. The model predicts that while large platforms censor more often than their small competitors due to higher political cost, centralizing market power via merging or shutting down small platforms does not necessarily generate more censorship in the marketplace.
16 September 2018 in SSRN Electronic Journal
In this paper, we incorporate incomplete information about consumer wealth and presence of high-quality counterfeits to investigate when a consumer may engage in moderate as opposed to excessive or conspicuous consumption to signal his/her wealth. Past literature has shown that when wealth is not observable, the wealthy are motivated to outspend the unwealthy to signal their wealth. We show in a single model, however, that when high-quality counterfeits exist, conspicuous consumption as a signal for wealth may no longer be effective. Instead, the wealthy may purposefully restrain from consumption of luxury goods to separate themselves from the rest and hence less can be more in signaling wealth. Our analysis delimits the conditions under which such loud and quiet equilibria exist. We draw managerial implications for luxury brands under both equilibria.
5 October 2016 in SSRN Electronic Journal
We study how luxury brands can use product line expansion as a strategy when facing a threat from the counterfeit market. Consumers who are status-conscious consider the benefits and costs of buying luxury items in order to strengthen the beliefs of others about their status. Our findings suggest that product line expansion strategy serves these high-end consumers and their motives to strengthen their status image. In a market with counterfeiters, consumers have an incentive to buy additional products in order to reduce the uncertainty of their status signals. Increasing consumption makes it harder for others to imitate status when authentic brands signal quality and status with higher precision compared to counterfeits. Since each luxury item purchased contributes to one's status in a marginally declining fashion, it is rational for a luxury brand to expand its product line such that it maintains its core product and introduces peripheral products with lower status signalling benefits and prices. We further show that an increasing counterfeit market share can increase status-conscious consumers' willingness to pay for luxury goods. As a result, presence of counterfeiters can increase the profit of a luxury brand.
15 November 2021 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy