Amro Awad

Amro Awad

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Amro Awad

University of Oxford

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2019 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HAHisham Alfuhaid (formerly Alasmary)
Hisham Alfuhaid (formerly Alasmary)
AKAminollah Khormali
Aminollah Khormali
AAAfsah Anwar
Afsah Anwar
JPJeman Park
Jeman Park
JCJinchun Choi
Jinchun Choi
AMAziz Mohaisen
Aziz Mohaisen
The steady growth in the number of deployed Internet of Things (IoT) devices has been paralleled with an equal growth in the number of malicious software (malware) targeting those devices. In this work, we build a detection mechanism of IoT malware utilizing Control Flow Graphs (CFGs). To motivate for our detection mechanism, we contrast the underlying characteristics of IoT malware to other types of malware—Android malware, which are also Linux-based—across multiple features. The preliminary analyses reveal that the Android malware have high density, strong closeness and betweenness, and a larger number of nodes. We show that IoT malware samples have a large number of edges despite a smaller number of nodes, which demonstrate a richer flow structure and higher complexity. We utilize those various characterizing features as a modality to build a highly effective deep learning-based detection model to detect IoT malware. To test our model, we use CFGs of about 6,000 malware and benign IoT disassembled samples, and show a detection accuracy of ≈99.66%.

27 March 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Shaahin AngiziShaahin Angizi
Shaahin Angizi
Zhezhi HeZhezhi He
Zhezhi He
AAAmro Awad
Amro Awad
DFDeliang Fan
Deliang Fan
In this paper, we propose MRIMA, as a novel magnetic RAM (MRAM)-based in-memory accelerator for nonvolatile, flexible, and efficient in-memory computing. MRIMA transforms current spin transfer torque magnetic random access memory (STT-MRAM) arrays to massively parallel computational units capable of working as both nonvolatile memory and in-memory logic. Instead of integrating complex logic units in cost-sensitive memory, MRIMA exploits hardware-friendly bit-line computing methods to implement complete Boolean logic functions between operands within a memory array in a single clock cycle, overcoming the multicycle logic issue in contemporary processing-in-memory (PIM) platforms. We present practical case studies to demonstrate MRIMA's acceleration for binary-weight and low bit-width convolutional neural networks (CNNs) as well as data encryption. Our device-to-architecture co-simulation results on CNN acceleration demonstrate that MRIMA can obtain 1.7× better energy-efficiency and 11.2× speed-up compared to ASICs, and 1.8× better energy-efficiency and 2.4× speed-up over the best DRAM-based PIM solutions. As an advanced encryption standard (AES) in-memory encryption engine, MRIMA shows ~77% and 21% lower energy consumption compared to CMOS-ASIC and recent domain-wall-based design, respectively.

28 August 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MAMazen Alwadi
Mazen Alwadi
KZKazi Zubair
Kazi Zubair
DMDavid Mohaisen
David Mohaisen
AAAmro Awad
Amro Awad
Emerging Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs) bring a unique challenge to the security community, namely persistent security. As NVM-based memories are expected to restore their data after recovery, the security metadata must be recovered as well. However, persisting all affected security metadata on each memory write would significantly degrade performance and exacerbate the write endurance problem. On the other hand, relying on encryption counters recovery scheme would take hours to rebuild the integrity tree, and will not be sufficient to rebuild the Tree-of-Counters (ToC). Due to intermediate nodes dependencies it is not possible to recover this type of trees using the encryption counters. To ensure recoverability, all updates to the security metadata must be persisted, which can be tens of additional writes on each write. In this paper, we propose Phoenix, a practical novel scheme which relies on elegantly reproducing the cache content before a crash, however with minimal overheads. Our evaluation results show that Phoenix reduces persisting security metadata overhead writes to 3.8% less than a write-back encrypted system without recovery, thus improving the NVM lifetime by 8x. Overall Phoenix performance is better than the baseline.

30 March 2020
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZGZhishan Guo
Zhishan Guo
KYKecheng Yang
Kecheng Yang
FYFan Yao
Fan Yao
AAAmro Awad
Amro Awad
With the increasing number of cores in processors, shared resources like caches are interfering task execution behaviours more heavily and often render global scheduling approaches infeasible in practice. While partitioned scheduling alleviates such interference, in most existing partitioned approaches, constant WCET, which potentially includes all possible interference, must be statically pre-determined prior to the partitioning processes. In this paper, we show that by taking inter-task interference into consideration when making scheduling decisions, resource efficiency can be significantly improved in both temporal and spatial domains for multi/many-core real-time systems. In particular, we propose the inter-task interference matrix (ITIM) to model the inter-task cache/memory interference in a pair-wise manner. Focusing on the problem of interference-aware partitioned scheduling with ITIM, we formalize it as a mixed integer linear program (MILP), which can be solved to achieve optimal solution at the cost of high computational complexity. Meanwhile, we also provide several polynomial-time algorithms to solve the problem approximately. We extensively profile a set of WCET benchmark programs on x86-based multiprocessor server to collect ITIM. The algorithms are evaluated comprehensively, and the evaluation results demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed approaches under various settings.

8 November 2019 in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
VKVamsee Reddy Kommareddy
Vamsee Reddy Kommareddy
BZBaogang Zhang
Baogang Zhang
FYFan Yao
Fan Yao
RERickard Ewetz
Rickard Ewetz
AAAmro Awad
Amro Awad
Memristors are emerging Non-Volatile Memories (NVMs) that are promising for building future memory systems. Unlike DRAM, memristors are non-volatile, i.e., they can retain data after power loss. In contrast to DRAM where each cell is associated with a pass transistor, memristor cells can be implemented without such transistor, and hence enable high density ReRAM systems. Moreover, memristors leverage a unique crossbar architecture to improve the density of memory modules. Memristors have been considered to build future data centers with both energy-efficiency and high memory capacity goals. Surprisingly, we observe that using memristors in multi-tenant environments, e.g., cloud systems, entails new security vulnerabilities. In particular, the crossbar contents can severely affect the write latency of any data cells within the same crossbar. With various memory interleaving options (to optimize performance), a single crossbar might be shared among several applications/users from different security domains. Therefore, such content-dependent latency can open new source of information leakage. In this article, we describe the information leakage problem in memristor crossbar arrays (MCAs), discuss how they can be potentially exploited from application level. Our work highlights the need for future research to mitigate (and potentially eliminate) information leakage in crossbar memories in future computing systems.

3 June 2021 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HAHisham Alfuhaid (formerly Alasmary)
Hisham Alfuhaid (formerly Alasmary)
AAAfsah Anwar
Afsah Anwar
AAAhmed Abusnaina
Ahmed Abusnaina
AAAbdulrahman Alabduljabbar
Abdulrahman Alabduljabbar
MAMOHAMMED ABUHAMAD
MOHAMMED ABUHAMAD
DMDavid Mohaisen
David Mohaisen
The Linux shell is a command-line interpreter that provides users with a command interface to the operating system, allowing them to perform various functions. Although very useful in building capabilities at the edge, the Linux shell can be exploited, giving adversaries a prime opportunity to use them for malicious activities. With access to Internet of Things (IoT) devices, malware authors can abuse the Linux shell of those devices to propagate infections and launch large-scale attacks, e.g., Distributed Denial of Service. In this work, we provide a first look at the tasks managed by shell commands in Linux-based IoT malware toward detection. We analyze malicious shell commands found in IoT malware and build a neural network-based model, ShellCore, to detect malicious shell commands. Namely, we collected a large data set of shell commands, including malicious commands extracted from 2891 IoT malware samples and benign commands collected from real-world network traffic analysis and volunteered data from Linux users. Using conventional machine and deep learning-based approaches trained with a term- and character-level features, ShellCore is shown to achieve an accuracy of more than 99% in detecting malicious shell commands and files (i.e., binaries).