Minghao Lin

Minghao Lin

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Minghao Lin

Independent Researcher, Los Angeles, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JZJiaxun Zhu
Jiaxun Zhu
MLMinghao Lin
Minghao Lin
TYTingting Yin
Tingting Yin
ZCZechao Cai
Zechao Cai
YWYu Wang
Yu Wang
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
Modern computing systems increasingly utilize XPUs, such as GPUs and NPUs, for specialized computation tasks. While these XPUs provide critical functionalities, their security protections are generally weaker than those of CPUs, making them attractive attack targets. In particular, Apple silicon optimizes memory usage by adopting a unified memory architecture (UMA), which employs shared memory regions (termed cross-XPU memory) to facilitate communication between CPUs and XPUs. Although the cross-XPU memory enhances performance, it also introduces a new attack surface. Unfortunately, the difficulty in identifying effective shared memory regions and generating valid payloads makes fuzzing cross-XPU memory a challenging problem that cannot be resolved effectively by existing fuzzing techniques. Therefore, we propose CrossFire, the first fuzzer targeting Apple silicon XPU by fuzzing cross-XPU memory, to evaluate this new attack surface. Initially, we conduct an in-depth cross-XPU memory analysis to investigate the challenges of fuzzing XPU. To address these challenges, CrossFire introduces two novel techniques to pinpoint effective fuzzing regions in cross-XPU memory and trace kernel execution information to extract data constraints. Leveraging these techniques, we develop CrossFire based on the m1n1 hypervisor to monitor cross-XPU memory accesses and perform grey-box hooking-based fuzzing. We further evaluate CrossFire on macOS Ventura, where it has identified 15 new zero-day bugs, 8 of which have been confirmed by Apple.

30 June 2026 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MCMingjie Chen
Mingjie Chen
TZTiancheng Zhu
Tiancheng Zhu
MZMingxue Zhang
Mingxue Zhang
YHYiling He
Yiling He
MLMinghao Lin
Minghao Lin
KRKui Ren
Kui Ren
Binary code similarity detection (BCSD) serves as a fundamental technique for various software engineering tasks, e.g., vulnerability detection and classification. Attacks against such BCSD models have therefore drawn extensive attention, aiming at misleading the models to generate erroneous predictions. Prior works have explored various approaches to generating semantic-preserving variants, i.e., adversarial samples, to evaluate the robustness of the models against adversarial attacks. However, they have mainly relied on heuristic criteria or iterative greedy algorithms to locate salient code influencing the model output, which often leads to inefficient search and high computational cost. Moreover, when processing programs with high complexities, such attacks tend to be time-consuming. In this work, we unveil the fragility of BCSD models through a novel attack framework guided by model explanations. In particular, we focus on targeted attacks where the attack goal is to mislead the model’s predictions to a specific target. Our attack leverages explainers to pinpoint critical code snippet for perturbations, reducing the exploration overhead. The evaluation results demonstrate that the proposed attacks effectively improve the attack efficiency, while maintaining comparable or higher success rates. Importantly, the speedup for perturbation target selection achieves up to 63.66×, demonstrating the practical value of explanation-guided localization. Our real-world case studies on vulnerability detection and classification further demonstrate the security implications of our attacks, highlighting fundamental robustness limitations in current BCSD models, and the urgent need for more robust designs.


19 November 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MLMinghao Lin
Minghao Lin
JZJiaxun Zhu
Jiaxun Zhu
TYTingting Yin
Tingting Yin
ZCZechao Cai
Zechao Cai
GWGuanxing Wen
Guanxing Wen
MLMengyuan Li
Mengyuan Li