Nanzi Yang

Nanzi Yang

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Nanzi Yang

Xidian University, Xi'an, China and University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
NYNanzi Yang
Nanzi Yang
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
JLJinku Li
Jinku Li
XLXunqi Liu
Xunqi Liu
XGXin Guo
Xin Guo
JMJianfeng Ma
Jianfeng Ma
As the dominant container orchestration system, Kubernetes is widely used by many companies and cloud vendors. It runs third-party add-ons and applications (termed third-party apps) on its control plane to manage the whole cluster. The security of these third-party apps is critical to the whole cluster but has not been systematically studied so far. Therefore, this paper analyzes the security of third-party apps and reveals that third-party apps are granted excessive critical permissions, which can be exploited by an attacker to escape from the worker node and take over the whole Kubernetes cluster. Even worse, excessive permissions of different third-party apps can be chained together to turn non-critical issues into severe attack vectors. To systematically analyze the exploitability of excessive permissions, we design three strategies based on different attacking paths. These three strategies can steal the cluster admin permission with the DaemonSet of a third-party app directly, or via the same app's or another app's critical component indirectly. We investigate the security impact of excessive permission attacks in real production environments. We analyze all third-party apps in CNCF and show that 51 of 153 (33.3%) ones have potential security risks. We further scan Kubernetes services provided by the top four cloud vendors. The results show that all of them are vulnerable to excessive permission attacks. We report all our findings to the corresponding teams and get eight new CVEs from communities and a security bounty from Google.

22 May 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WSWenbo Shen
Wenbo Shen
YWYifei Wu
Yifei Wu
YYYutian Yang
Yutian Yang
QLQirui Liu
Qirui Liu
NYNanzi Yang
Nanzi Yang
JMJianfeng Ma
Jianfeng Ma
OS-level virtualization (a.k.a. container) has become a fundamental technology in cloud computing due to the efficiency provided by the shared-kernel design. However, this design results in containers sharing thousands of kernel variables and data structures (termed abstract resources ), which are prevalent but under-protected. Without exploiting other kernel vulnerabilities, a non-privileged container can easily exhaust abstract resources to cause DoS attacks against other containers. Even worse, our experiments demonstrate that abstract resource attacks are a broad class of attacks that affect Linux, FreeBSD, Fuchsia, and all shared-kernel container environments on the top four cloud vendors. To defend against the abstract resource attack, we automatically analyze vulnerable abstract resources in the Linux kernel and detect 501 container-exhaustible resources. To confine these abstract resources dynamically, we propose two new techniques: the flexible in-kernel attachment for flexible resource consumption attachment and the tree-based resource accounting for efficient usage retrieval. Based on these two techniques, we design and implement a fl exible a bstract re s ource confinement framewor k , named Flask, to achieve flexible and efficient abstract resource confinement. Our evaluation shows Flask can efficiently limit abstract resource usage with less than 0.6% performance overhead.



14 November 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
BCBowen Cai
Bowen Cai
NYNanzi Yang
Nanzi Yang
WBWeiheng Bai
Weiheng Bai
YLYoushui Lu
Youshui Lu
YZYajin Zhou
Yajin Zhou
KLKangjie Lu
Kangjie Lu