Carl Henrik Knutsen

Carl Henrik Knutsen

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Carl Henrik Knutsen

University of Oslo

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
20 June 2017 in Comparative Political Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CKCarl Henrik Knutsen
Carl Henrik Knutsen
MRMagnus Rasmussen
Magnus Rasmussen
In this article, we argue that autocratic regimes are no less likely than democracies to adopt old-age pensions, although autocratic programs are less universal in their coverage. Our theoretical argument focuses on the strong incentives that autocratic regimes have for enacting and maintaining such programs to ensure regime survival. Autocratic pension programs can be considered club goods that (a) are targeted to critical supporting groups and (b) solve credible commitment problems on promises of future distribution, thereby mitigating probability of regime breakdown. We test three implications from the argument, drawing on a novel dataset on welfare state programs and including 140 countries with time series from the 1880s. First, we find that autocracies are no less likely than democracies to have old-age pension programs. But, second, autocracies have less universal pension programs than democracies. Third, pension programs effectively reduce the probability of autocratic breakdown.

12 April 2020 in Comparative Political Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ACAgnes Cornell
Agnes Cornell
CKCarl Henrik Knutsen
Carl Henrik Knutsen
JTJan Teorell
Jan Teorell
We revisit the hypothesis that a Weberian bureaucracy enhances economic growth. Theoretically, we develop arguments for why such a bureaucracy may enhance growth and discuss plausible counterarguments. Empirically, we use new measures capturing various Weberian features in countries across the world, with some time series extending back to 1789. The evidence base from previous large-N studies is surprisingly thin, but our extensive data enable us to move beyond the problematic cross-country correlations used in previous studies. Hence, we conduct tests that control for country-specific characteristics while ensuring sufficient variation on the slow-moving bureaucracy variables to enable precise estimation. Our analysis suggests that previous cross-country regressions have vastly overstated the strength of the relationship. While this casts uncertainty on the proposition that there is an effect of Weberian bureaucracy on growth, our further analysis suggests that—if an effect exists—it may operate in the short term and be stronger in recent decades.

11 January 2024 in PS: Political Science & Politics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CKCarl Henrik Knutsen
Carl Henrik Knutsen
KMKyle L. Marquardt
Kyle L. Marquardt
BSBrigitte Seim
Brigitte Seim
MCMichael Coppedge
Michael Coppedge
AEAmanda B. Edgell
Amanda B. Edgell
SLStaffan I. Lindberg
Staffan I. Lindberg
During the past decade, analyses drawing on several democracy measures have shown a global trend of democratic retrenchment. While these democracy measures use radically different methodologies, most partially or fully rely on subjective judgments to produce estimates of the level of democracy within states. Such projects continuously grapple with balancing conceptual coverage with the potential for bias (Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Przeworski et al. 2000). Little and Meng (L&M) (2023) reintroduce this debate, arguing that “objective” measures of democracy show little evidence of recent global democratic backsliding.1 By extension, they posit that time-varying expert bias drives the appearance of democratic retrenchment in measures that incorporate expert judgments. In this article, we engage with (1) broader debates on democracy measurement and democratic backsliding, and (2) L&M’s specific data and conclusions.

10 January 2011 in The Journal of Development Studies
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CKCarl Henrik Knutsen
Carl Henrik Knutsen
This article investigates how political regimes influence property rights. The article reviews arguments for and against the hypothesis that democracy enhances property rights protection, and then conducts empirical tests. Democracy is likely endogenous to property rights protection. The analysis takes this into account by utilising an innovative instrument for democracy. The results, based on data from 1984 to 2004 for over 120 countries, show that democracy enhances property rights protection, even when controlling for endogeneity and country-specific characteristics.


1 May 2019 in Journal of Peace Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
CKCarl Henrik Knutsen
Carl Henrik Knutsen
JTJan Teorell
Jan Teorell
TWTore Wig
Tore Wig
ACAgnes Cornell
Agnes Cornell
JGJohn Gerring
John Gerring
BSBrigitte Seim
Brigitte Seim
The Historical Varieties of Democracy dataset (Historical V-Dem) contains about 260 indicators, both factual and evaluative, describing various aspects of political regimes and state institutions. The dataset covers 91 polities globally – including most large, sovereign states, as well as some semi-sovereign entities and large colonies – from 1789 to 1920 for many cases. The majority of the indicators come from the Varieties of Democracy dataset, which covers 1900 to the present – together these two datasets cover the bulk of ‘modern history’. Historical V-Dem also includes several new indicators, covering features that are pertinent for 19th-century polities. We describe the data, coding process, and different strategies employed in Historical V-Dem to cope with issues of reliability and validity and ensure intertemporal and cross-country comparability. To illustrate the potential uses of the dataset we describe patterns of democratization in the ‘long 19th century’. Finally, we investigate how interstate war relates to subsequent democratization.