In this paper, we present a fully distributed bisection algorithm for the economic dispatch problem (EDP) in a smart grid scenario, with the goal to minimize the aggregated cost of a network of generators, which cooperatively furnish a given amount of power within their individual capacity constraints. Our distributed algorithm adopts the method of bisection, and is based on a consensus-like iterative method, with no need for a central decision maker or a leader node. Under strong connectivity conditions and allowance for local communications, we show that the iterative solution converges to the globally optimal solution. Furthermore, two stopping criteria are presented for the practical implementation of the proposed algorithm, for which sign consensus is defined. Finally, numerical simulations based on the IEEE 14-bus and 118-bus systems are given to illustrate the performance of the algorithm.
22 December 2015 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
This paper focuses on the procurement of load shifting service by optimally scheduling the charging and discharging of PEVs in a decentralized fashion. We assume that the energy flow between PEVs and the grid is bidirectional, i.e., PEVs can also release energy back into the grid as distributed generation, which is known as vehicle-to-grid (V2G). The optimal scheduling problem is then formulated as a mixed discrete programming (MDP) problem, which is NP-hard and extremely difficult to solve directly. To get over this difficulty, we propose a solvable approximation of the MDP problem by exploiting the shape feature of the base demand curve during the night, and develop a decentralized algorithm based on iterative water-filling. Our algorithm is decentralized in the sense that the PEVs compute locally and communicate with an aggregator. The advantages of our algorithm include reduction in computational burden and privacy preserving. Simulation results are given to show the performance of our algorithm.
29 October 2014 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) are expected to become widespread in the near future. However, high penetration of PHEVs can overload the distribution system. In smart grid, the charging of PHEVs can be controlled to reduce the peak load, known as demand-side management (DSM). In this paper, we focus on the DSM for PHEV charging at low-voltage transformers (LVTs). The objective is to flatten the load curve of LVTs, while satisfying each consumer's requirement for their PHEV to be charged to the required level by the specified time. We first formulate this problem as a convex optimization problem and then propose a decentralized water-filling-based algorithm to solve it. A moving horizon approach is utilized to handle the random arrival of PHEVs and the inaccuracy of the forecast nonPHEV load. We focus on decentralized solutions so that computational load can be shared by individual PHEV chargers and the algorithm is scalable. Numerical simulations are given to demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm.
23 June 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
This paper proposes five market models for the procurement of flexibility by transmission (TSO) and distribution system operators (DSOs), based on several TSO-DSO coordination schemes, including a disjoint distribution, disjoint transmission, common, fragmented, and multi-level market. The properties of these models are then analyzed. In particular, we prove that the common market is more efficient than the other market models. Then, different methods are proposed to adequately price TSO/DSO interface flows, when procuring cross-grid flexibility. We show that when interface flows are optimally priced, the fragmented and multi-level market solutions converge to those of the common market. To prevent the need for any network information sharing in the coordination schemes, decomposition methods based on bi-level programming and the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) are proposed. A developed case study, considering an interconnected transmission-distribution system, corroborates the greater efficiency of the common market, the effect of adequate interface pricing on reducing procurement costs, and the capability of the decomposition methods to reach optimal market solutions with limited information exchange.
In this paper, a transmission-distribution systems flexibility market is introduced, in which system operators (SOs) jointly procure flexibility from different systems to meet their needs (balancing and congestion management) using a common market. This common market is, then, formulated as a cooperative game aiming at identifying a stable and efficient split of costs of the jointly procured flexibility among the participating SOs to incentivize their cooperation. The non-emptiness of the core of this game is then mathematically proven, implying the stability of the game and the naturally-arising incentive for cooperation among the SOs. Several cost allocation mechanisms are then introduced, while characterizing their mathematical properties. A case study is then presented, considering an interconnected system composed of the IEEE 14-bus transmission system and the Matpower 18-bus, 69-bus, and 141-bus distributions systems. The numerical results showcase the cooperation-induced reduction in system-wide flexibility procurement costs, and identify the varying costs borne by the different SOs under different cost allocations methods.
20 December 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Priority service pricing is a promising approach for mobilizing residential demand response, by offering electricity as a service with various levels of reliability. Higher levels of reliability correspond to higher prices. The proper pricing guarantees that consumers self-select a level of reliability that corresponds to the reliability that the system can offer. However, traditional theory for menu design is based on numerous stringent assumptions, which may not be respected in practice, such as a well-behaved convex cost functions. In this paper, we design a priority service menu as the equilibrium solution to a Stackelberg game, which is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem involving the aggregator and consumers. We reformulate the equilibrium as a mixed-integer problem. As a consequence of this approach, we can integrate the menu design problem within a day-ahead unit commitment model. This allows us to design a menu which exactly meets the profit requirements of a firm. The approach is illustrated on a toy numerical example as well as a large-scale model of the Belgian power market.