Hélène Le Cadre

Hélène Le Cadre

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Hélène Le Cadre

UMR Inria Univ. Lille CNRS Centrale Lille 9189 CRIStAL F-59000 Lille France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 February 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Verified
Journal Article
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HHHanspeter Hoschle
Hanspeter Hoschle
HCHélène Le Cadre
Hélène Le Cadre
YSYves Smeers
Yves Smeers
APAnthony Papavasiliou
Anthony Papavasiliou
RBRonnie Belmans
Ronnie Belmans
Uncertainty in electricity markets introduces risk for investors. High fixed cost and increased dependency on infrequent and uncertain price spikes characterize investments. The risk-averse behavior of investors might lead to poor decision-making and undermines generation adequacy. Electricity market models rarely treat the interaction of market design and risk aversion. The representation of capacity mechanisms in modeling approaches focusing on risk aversion is limited. Our contribution addresses two problems. First, we propose a stochastic market equilibrium model. Investors are represented as risk-averse agents. The conditional value-at-risk is used as risk measure. Second, we propose an algorithm based on the alternating direction method of multipliers to compute a risk-averse equilibrium. We benchmark our approach with a state-of-the-art solver relying on a mixed complementarity problem reformulation. We show that for larger case studies our proposed approach is preferable. The algorithm converges in all cases while conventional solvers fail to compute a risk-averse equilibrium. The methodology is transferable to other risk-averse equilibrium models. With reference to capacity markets, we conclude that they are more beneficial in a risk-averse market. Capacity markets result in lower total cost, while avoiding expected energy not served. This statement still holds with increased price caps in energy-only markets.

23 June 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
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Journal Article
Open access
LMLuciana Marques
Luciana Marques
ASAnibal Sanjab
Anibal Sanjab
YMYuting Mou
Yuting Mou
HCHélène Le Cadre
Hélène Le Cadre
KKKris Kessels
Kris Kessels
This paper proposes five market models for the procurement of flexibility by transmission (TSO) and distribution system operators (DSOs), based on several TSO-DSO coordination schemes, including a disjoint distribution, disjoint transmission, common, fragmented, and multi-level market. The properties of these models are then analyzed. In particular, we prove that the common market is more efficient than the other market models. Then, different methods are proposed to adequately price TSO/DSO interface flows, when procuring cross-grid flexibility. We show that when interface flows are optimally priced, the fragmented and multi-level market solutions converge to those of the common market. To prevent the need for any network information sharing in the coordination schemes, decomposition methods based on bi-level programming and the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) are proposed. A developed case study, considering an interconnected transmission-distribution system, corroborates the greater efficiency of the common market, the effect of adequate interface pricing on reducing procurement costs, and the capability of the decomposition methods to reach optimal market solutions with limited information exchange.

11 April 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
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Journal Article
Open access
ASAnibal Sanjab
Anibal Sanjab
HCHelene Le Cadre
Helene Le Cadre
YMYuting Mou
Yuting Mou
In this paper, a transmission-distribution systems flexibility market is introduced, in which system operators (SOs) jointly procure flexibility from different systems to meet their needs (balancing and congestion management) using a common market. This common market is, then, formulated as a cooperative game aiming at identifying a stable and efficient split of costs of the jointly procured flexibility among the participating SOs to incentivize their cooperation. The non-emptiness of the core of this game is then mathematically proven, implying the stability of the game and the naturally-arising incentive for cooperation among the SOs. Several cost allocation mechanisms are then introduced, while characterizing their mathematical properties. A case study is then presented, considering an interconnected system composed of the IEEE 14-bus transmission system and the Matpower 18-bus, 69-bus, and 141-bus distributions systems. The numerical results showcase the cooperation-induced reduction in system-wide flexibility procurement costs, and identify the varying costs borne by the different SOs under different cost allocations methods.

25 October 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MDMandar Datar
Mandar Datar
EAEitan Altman
Eitan Altman
HCHélène Le Cadre
Hélène Le Cadre
We consider a marketplace in the context of 5G network slicing, where Application Service Providers (ASP), i.e., slice tenants, providing heterogeneous services, are in competition for the access to the virtualized network resource owned by a Network Slice Provider (NSP), who relies on network slicing. We model the interactions between the end users (followers) and the ASPs (leaders) as a Stackelberg game. We prove that the competition between the ASPs results in a multi-resource Tullock rent-seeking game. To determine resource pricing and allocation, we devise two innovative market mechanisms. First, we assume that the ASPs are pre-assigned with fixed shares (budgets) of infrastructure, and rely on a trading post mechanism to allocate the resource. Under this mechanism, the ASPs can redistribute their budgets in bids and customise their allocations to maximize their profits. In case a single resource is considered, we prove that the ASPs’ coupled decision problems give rise to a unique Nash equilibrium. Second, when ASPs have no bound on their budget, we formulate the problem as a pricing game with coupling constraints capturing the shared resource finite capacities, and derive the market prices as the duals of the coupling constraints. In addition, we prove that the pricing game admits a unique variational equilibrium. We implement two online learning algorithms to compute solutions of the market mechanisms. A third fully distributed algorithm based on a proximal method is proposed to compute the Variational equilibrium solution of the pricing game. Finally, we run numerical simulations to analyse the market mechanism’s economic properties and the convergence rates of the algorithms.


13 August 2009 in NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking
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Journal Article
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HCHélène Le Cadre
Hélène Le Cadre
MBMustapha Bouhtou
Mustapha Bouhtou
BTBruno Tuffin
Bruno Tuffin