Michael J. Garvin

Michael J. Garvin

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Michael J. Garvin

Virginia Tech

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2011 in Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JTJohn E. Taylor
John E. Taylor
CDCarrie Sturts Dossick
Carrie Sturts Dossick
MGMichael Garvin
Michael Garvin
The case-study research method is popular across various disciplines; however, critics of the method argue that results from this form of research are applicable only to the case studied and cannot be generalized further. In the field of construction engineering and management (CEM), the number of papers employing case-study research methods over the past decade has increased substantially. As the method proliferates, the question arises: are CEM case studies being performed with sufficient validity and reliability to meet the burden of proof to generalize from the case-study findings? Meeting the burden of proof is particularly critical in CEM because of the unique, site-based nature of the projects and industry. This paper presents a review of 156 papers employing case studies published in the Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, of which the writers identified 33 theory-building case-study-method papers. This subset of theory-building papers was examined to induce a set of requirements a...

1 April 2010 in Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MGMichael J. Garvin
Michael J. Garvin
Public-private partnerships (PPP) for infrastructure development and management have received significant attention in academic, institutional, and political circles over roughly the last two decades. This attention was prompted, to a great extent, by early experiments with PPP-type arrangements in Australia, Canada, and the United States coupled with the United Kingdom’s Private Finance Initiative policy—not to mention the experience of other parts of the world such as Asia, continental Europe, and South America. PPP policies and practices have evolved in other world regions, but the United States remains a relatively slow mover in this market. While varying explanations for this circumstance are plausible, the situation can play to America’s advantage since the nation can capitalize upon the tested experience of its international counterparts. Drawing upon data and information collected from two principal sources: (1) case histories of PPP projects in North America to date and (2) a scanning tour of Australia, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom in 2008, misconceptions regarding PPPs are clarified, contemporary international policies and practices are characterized, and recommendations for implementing PPPs for transportation infrastructure are made. The principal intent of this paper is to trigger a dialogue about PPPs and how they might improve America’s infrastructure assets.

20 October 2010 in Construction Management and Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LSLiang Shan
Liang Shan
MGMichael J. Garvin
Michael J. Garvin
RKRaman Kumar
Raman Kumar
The revenue risk is of great importance to ensure the success of a real toll public–private partnership (PPP) transportation project. Past research has proposed a revenue guarantee put option as an alternative way to quantify and potentially manage this risk. A practical, or commercial, limitation of this type of option is its requirement for an upfront premium payment, and a concessionaire is likely to shy away from additional monetary requirements. A collar option, which is a combination of a put and call option, not only overcomes this barrier but it also provides other benefits. Modifications to the basic collar’s structure can redistribute downside losses and upside profits to fulfil stakeholders’ needs and thus improve the effectiveness of risk management. The terms, applicability and limitations of a collar option are discussed, and a numerical example is developed to illustrate how to determine the strike prices of a collar option.

1 May 2018 in Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DNDuc A. Nguyen
Duc A. Nguyen
MGMichael J. Garvin
Michael J. Garvin
EGEdwin E. Gonzalez
Edwin E. Gonzalez
Risk is often discussed in connection with public-private partnerships (P3s), and risk allocation is likely a determinant of P3 success or failure. Despite being central to the delineation and allocation of risks, contracts have not been used directly to examine risks in P3s, particularly in the United States. Employing a systematic content analysis framework, the allocation of 31 risks in 21 U.S. highway P3 contracts was determined. These contracts represent the entire population of U.S. highway P3 projects from 2004 through first quarter of 2016 with the exception of one project whose contract was not made available. The results were internally validated through interrater testing and externally validated using bond offering statements. Hence, the investigation is unique in its approach and comprehensive scope. The allocation results demonstrate that some risks were retained by the public sector, but the majority of the 31 risks were either transferred to the private sector or shared. The former outcome is not unexpected because risk transfer is generally viewed as fundamental to the P3 value proposition; however, the prevalence of sharing in the United States market is greater than that conveyed in the literature examining risk allocation in other large markets such as Australia and the United Kingdom. Risk sharing arrangements uncovered ranged from deductible schemes to event mechanisms with the latter employed quite frequently; hence, contract designers rely on ex post remedies to address risks once an event, such as a change in law, occurs. Parametric analysis did not reveal any dominant trends in risk allocation, but examination by the most active jurisdictions (Florida, Texas, and Virginia) and source of risk (exogenous versus endogenous) illustrated that project context influences risk allocation. While some consistency was found in the treatment of the 31 risks, the variation in allocation is further evidence that project-specific factors and environments will continue to challenge efforts to create uniformity in P3 contractual provisions. Additionally, with the U.S. P3 market still evolving, the results provide practitioners implementing P3s or considering their implementation a comprehensive overview of risk allocation practices and contractual language across a variety of project characteristics. Consequently, the results can inform practitioner decisions regarding risk allocation and contract design.

5 June 2019 in Construction Management and Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GDGeert Dewulf
Geert Dewulf
MGMichael J. Garvin
Michael J. Garvin
Despite the awareness that uncertainty impacts projects with long time horizons, public-private partnership (PPP) research has not extensively examined the operations phase of such projects where interactions between public and private counterparties will be frequent and long-term while subject to a changing environment. Accordingly, two distinct but related investigations examining how governance strategies can address uncertainty in PPP projects are presented. The first identified contractual mechanisms for risk sharing formed during the shaping phase of a broad set of PPP projects; a majority of these mechanisms were strategically designed to address risks as they unfold so counterparty project managers can rely on current information and circumstances during risk resolution. The second explored the emergence of relational mechanisms over time, which revealed that project managers had to consistently adjust established relational approaches to respond to unforeseen events in PPPs. The findings of both studies illustrate the necessity for responsiveness and complementarity of contractual and relational mechanisms in PPPs. Further, the mechanisms uncovered demand project management agility and flexibility as well as improved relational strategies, which is aligned with the emphasis on learning and adaptation in the broader, contemporary project management literature. Consequently, principles from project management 2.0 such as empowering competent project managers and shared global awareness are likely to enhance responsive PPP governance and warrant further exploration.

1 December 2017 in Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TLTing Liu
Ting Liu
MBMichael Bennon
Michael Bennon
MGMichael J. Garvin
Michael J. Garvin
SWShouQing Wang
ShouQing Wang
The allocation and management of revenue risk is a critical issue in the development of public-private partnership (PPP) concessions for new roadways. In order to attract financing, governments often provide fiscal support ranging from availability payments (APs) to minimum revenue guarantees (MRGs) to flexible-term contracts when demand and thus the financial viability of a project are uncertain. However, a government’s inability to evaluate these alternatives can lead to either surplus fiscal support ex ante or unexpected liabilities ex post. The authors propose a quantitative methodology to guide governments’ decisions when choosing among the fiscal support mechanisms. Based on a comprehensive literature review, we establish a two-dimensional framework to evaluate fiscal support alternatives by comparing their effects on the financing costs of a project and the risk retained by a procuring government. We use a stochastic revenue projection model to quantify the revenue risk and the framework’s measurable indicators. We apply our framework using a hypothetical case study. The case results demonstrate that flexible-term contracts do little to increase project leverage, MRGs are most applicable to projects with significant revenue volatility, and APs are more appropriate in projects with lower revenue volatility. The framework allows governments to make more informed decisions about revenue risk sharing mechanisms to improve public budgeting and deficit control.