Henrik Sandberg

Henrik Sandberg

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Henrik Sandberg

KTH Royal Institute of Technology

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 June 2008 in Optimal Control Applications and Methods
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HSH. Sandberg
H. Sandberg
RMR. M. Murray
R. M. Murray

10 February 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
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Farhad FarokhiFarhad Farokhi
Farhad Farokhi
HSHenrik Sandberg
Henrik Sandberg
In this paper, batteries are used to preserve the privacy of households with smart meters. It is commonly understood that data from smart meters can be used by adversaries to infringe on the privacy of the households, e.g., figuring out the individual appliances that are being used or the level of the occupancy of the house. The Cramér-Rao bound is used to relate the variance of the estimation error of any unbiased estimator of the household consumption from the aggregate consumption (i.e., the household plus the battery) to the Fisher information. Subsequently, optimal policies for charging and utilizing batteries are devised to minimize the Fisher information (in the scalar case and the trace of the Fisher information matrix in the multi-variable case) as a proxy for maximizing the variance of the estimation error of the electricity consumption by adversaries (irrespective of their estimation policies). The policies are chosen to respect the physical constraints of the battery regarding capacity, initial charge, and rate constraints. The results are demonstrated on real power measurement data with non-intrusive load monitoring algorithms.

25 June 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
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XHXingkang He
Xingkang He
XRXiaoqiang Ren
Xiaoqiang Ren
HSHenrik Sandberg
Henrik Sandberg
KJKarl Henrik Johansson
Karl Henrik Johansson
In this article, we study how to secure distributed filters for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noise under false-data injection attacks. A malicious attacker is able to arbitrarily manipulate the observations for a time-varying and unknown subset of the sensors. We first propose a recursive distributed filter consisting of two steps at each update. The first step employs a saturation-like scheme, which gives a small gain if the innovation is large corresponding to a potential attack. The second step is a consensus operation of state estimates among neighboring sensors. We prove the estimation error is upper bounded if the filter parameters satisfy a condition. We further analyze the feasibility of the condition and connect it to sparse observability in the centralized case. When the attacked sensor set is known to be time-invariant, the secured filter is modified by adding an online local attack detector. The detector is able to identify the attacked sensors whose observation innovations are larger than the detection thresholds. Also, with more attacked sensors being detected, the thresholds will adaptively adjust to reduce the space of the stealthy attack signals. The resilience of the secured filter with detection is verified by an explicit relationship between the upper bound of the estimation error and the number of detected attacked sensors. Moreover, for the noise-free case, we prove that the state estimate of each sensor asymptotically converges to the system state under certain conditions. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate the developed results.

9 September 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
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JMJezdimir Milosevic
Jezdimir Milosevic
HSHenrik Sandberg
Henrik Sandberg
KJKarl Henrik Johansson
Karl Henrik Johansson

21 June 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
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MWMoritz Wiese
Moritz Wiese
Tobias OechteringTobias Oechtering
Tobias Oechtering
KJKarl Henrik Johansson
Karl Henrik Johansson
PPPanagiotis Papadimitratos
Panagiotis Papadimitratos
HSHenrik Sandberg
Henrik Sandberg
MSMikael Skoglund
Mikael Skoglund
We study the problem of securely estimating the states of an unstable dynamical system subject to nonstochastic disturbances. The estimator obtains all its information through an uncertain channel which is subject to nonstochastic disturbances as well, and an eavesdropper obtains a disturbed version of the channel inputs through a second uncertain channel. An encoder observes and block-encodes the states in such a way that, upon sending the generated codeword, the estimator's error is bounded and such that a security criterion is satisfied ensuring that the eavesdropper obtains as little state information as possible. Two security criteria are considered and discussed with the help of a numerical example. A sufficient condition on the uncertain wiretap channel, i.e., the pair formed by the uncertain channel from encoder to estimator and the uncertain channel from encoder to eavesdropper, is derived which ensures that a bounded estimation error and security are achieved. This condition is also shown to be necessary for a subclass of uncertain wiretap channels. To formulate the condition, the zero-error secrecy capacity of uncertain wiretap channels is introduced, i.e., the maximal r

24 August 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
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MPMohammad Pirani
Mohammad Pirani
ENEhsan Nekouei
Ehsan Nekouei
HSHenrik Sandberg
Henrik Sandberg
KJKarl Henrik Johansson
Karl Henrik Johansson
This article studies the sensor placement problem in a leader–follower networked control system for improving its security against cyber-physical attacks. In a zero-sum game, the attacker selects $f$ nodes of the network to attack, and the detector places $f$ sensors to detect the presence of the attack signals. In our formulation, the attacker’s objective is to have a large impact on a target node in the network while being as little visible as possible to the detector. The detector, however, seeks to maximize the visibility of the attack signals. The effects of the attack signals on both the target node and the detector node are captured via the system $L_2$ gain from the attack signals to the target node and deployed sensors’ outputs, respectively. The equilibrium strategy of the game determines the optimal locations of the sensors. The existence of Nash equilibrium for the single-attack single-sensor case is studied when the underlying connectivity graph is a directed or an undirected tree. We show that, under the optimal sensor placement strategy, an undirected topology provides a higher security level for a networked control system compared to its corresponding directed topology. For the multiple-attack multiple-sensor case, we show that the game does not necessarily admit a Nash equilibrium and introduce a Stackelberg game approach, where the detector acts as the leader. Finally, these results are used to study the sensor placement problem in a vehicle platooning application in the presence of bias injectionattacks.