19 June 2008 in Optimal Control Applications and Methods
10 February 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
In this paper, batteries are used to preserve the privacy of households with smart meters. It is commonly understood that data from smart meters can be used by adversaries to infringe on the privacy of the households, e.g., figuring out the individual appliances that are being used or the level of the occupancy of the house. The Cramér-Rao bound is used to relate the variance of the estimation error of any unbiased estimator of the household consumption from the aggregate consumption (i.e., the household plus the battery) to the Fisher information. Subsequently, optimal policies for charging and utilizing batteries are devised to minimize the Fisher information (in the scalar case and the trace of the Fisher information matrix in the multi-variable case) as a proxy for maximizing the variance of the estimation error of the electricity consumption by adversaries (irrespective of their estimation policies). The policies are chosen to respect the physical constraints of the battery regarding capacity, initial charge, and rate constraints. The results are demonstrated on real power measurement data with non-intrusive load monitoring algorithms.
25 June 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
In this article, we study how to secure distributed filters for linear time-invariant systems with bounded noise under false-data injection attacks. A malicious attacker is able to arbitrarily manipulate the observations for a time-varying and unknown subset of the sensors. We first propose a recursive distributed filter consisting of two steps at each update. The first step employs a saturation-like scheme, which gives a small gain if the innovation is large corresponding to a potential attack. The second step is a consensus operation of state estimates among neighboring sensors. We prove the estimation error is upper bounded if the filter parameters satisfy a condition. We further analyze the feasibility of the condition and connect it to sparse observability in the centralized case. When the attacked sensor set is known to be time-invariant, the secured filter is modified by adding an online local attack detector. The detector is able to identify the attacked sensors whose observation innovations are larger than the detection thresholds. Also, with more attacked sensors being detected, the thresholds will adaptively adjust to reduce the space of the stealthy attack signals. The resilience of the secured filter with detection is verified by an explicit relationship between the upper bound of the estimation error and the number of detected attacked sensors. Moreover, for the noise-free case, we prove that the state estimate of each sensor asymptotically converges to the system state under certain conditions. Numerical simulations are provided to illustrate the developed results.
9 September 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
13 October 2014 in Physical Review E
We determine the maximum amount of work extractable in finite time by a demon performing continuous measurements on a quadratic Hamiltonian system subjected to thermal fluctuations, in terms of the information extracted from the system. The maximum work demon is found to apply a high-gain continuous feedback involving a Kalman-Bucy estimate of the system state and operates in nonequilibrium. A simple and concrete electrical implementation of the feedback protocol is proposed, which allows for analytic expressions of the flows of energy, entropy, and information inside the demon. This let us show that any implementation of the demon must necessarily include an external power source, which we prove both from classical thermodynamics arguments and from a version of Landauer's memory erasure argument extended to nonequilibrium linear systems.
21 June 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
We study the problem of securely estimating the states of an unstable dynamical system subject to nonstochastic disturbances. The estimator obtains all its information through an uncertain channel which is subject to nonstochastic disturbances as well, and an eavesdropper obtains a disturbed version of the channel inputs through a second uncertain channel. An encoder observes and block-encodes the states in such a way that, upon sending the generated codeword, the estimator's error is bounded and such that a security criterion is satisfied ensuring that the eavesdropper obtains as little state information as possible. Two security criteria are considered and discussed with the help of a numerical example. A sufficient condition on the uncertain wiretap channel, i.e., the pair formed by the uncertain channel from encoder to estimator and the uncertain channel from encoder to eavesdropper, is derived which ensures that a bounded estimation error and security are achieved. This condition is also shown to be necessary for a subclass of uncertain wiretap channels. To formulate the condition, the zero-error secrecy capacity of uncertain wiretap channels is introduced, i.e., the maximal r