Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source of ambivalent empirical results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity—variation in true effect sizes across various reasonable experimental research protocols. To provide further evidence on whether competition affects moral behavior and to examine whether the generalizability of a single experimental study is jeopardized by design heterogeneity, we invited independent research teams to contribute experimental designs to a crowd-sourced project. In a large-scale online data collection, 18,123 experimental participants were randomly allocated to 45 randomly selected experimental designs out of 95 submitted designs. We find a small adverse effect of competition on moral behavior in a meta-analysis of the pooled data. The crowd-sourced design of our study allows for a clean identification and estimation of the variation in effect sizes above and beyond what could be expected due to sampling variance. We find substantial design heterogeneity—estimated to be about 1.6 times as large as the average standard error of effect size estimates of the 45 research designs—indicating that the informativeness and generalizability of results based on a single experimental design are limited. Drawing strong conclusions about the underlying hypotheses in the presence of substantive design heterogeneity requires moving toward much larger data collections on various experimental designs testing the same hypothesis.
Scoring in Multi-Event Tournaments How much is a first place worth? Is the athlete who came first once and third twice better than the athlete who came second three times? Different sports value these positions differently: (60, 54, 48) in IBU biathlon, (25, 18, 15) in F1 racing, (8, 7, 6) in Diamond League athletics. Are these choices based on anything? Is there even a rational way to choose a scoring vector of arbitrary length to rank any number of athletes? In “How should we score athletes and candidates: Geometric scoring rules,” authors A.Y. Kondratev, E. Ianovski, and A.S. Nesterov investigate two approaches to how the problem of choosing a scoring vector for a tournament can be reduced to the choice of a single parameter: an axiomatic approach based on eliminating spoilers and an optimization approach based on maximizing the expected quality of the winner. Intriguingly, the vectors generated by the second approach are uncannily similar to those used in real sporting events.
1 February 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research
We study a series of reforms of school admissions mechanisms motivated, among other reasons, by fairness concerns and vulnerability to manipulation. Before the reforms and after, the mechanisms were vulnerable to preference manipulation and induced blocking students: students who miss desired schools despite having higher priority or seats left empty. We demonstrate that some of these reforms improved fairness by adopting mechanisms with fewer blocking students compared to the preexisting ones, while several others did not. We identify preexisting mechanisms where fairness consideration was more of an issue than vulnerability to manipulation and those where it is the reverse.