Alexander S. Nesterov

Alexander S. Nesterov

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Alexander S. Nesterov

Department of Economics and Game Theory Lab, Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russia

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 May 2023 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CHChristoph Huber
Christoph Huber
ADAnna Dreber
Anna Dreber
JHJürgen Huber
Jürgen Huber
MJMagnus Johannesson
Magnus Johannesson
MKMichael Kirchler
Michael Kirchler
FHFelix Holzmeister
Felix Holzmeister
Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source of ambivalent empirical results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity—variation in true effect sizes across various reasonable experimental research protocols. To provide further evidence on whether competition affects moral behavior and to examine whether the generalizability of a single experimental study is jeopardized by design heterogeneity, we invited independent research teams to contribute experimental designs to a crowd-sourced project. In a large-scale online data collection, 18,123 experimental participants were randomly allocated to 45 randomly selected experimental designs out of 95 submitted designs. We find a small adverse effect of competition on moral behavior in a meta-analysis of the pooled data. The crowd-sourced design of our study allows for a clean identification and estimation of the variation in effect sizes above and beyond what could be expected due to sampling variance. We find substantial design heterogeneity—estimated to be about 1.6 times as large as the average standard error of effect size estimates of the 45 research designs—indicating that the informativeness and generalizability of results based on a single experimental design are limited. Drawing strong conclusions about the underlying hypotheses in the presence of substantive design heterogeneity requires moving toward much larger data collections on various experimental designs testing the same hypothesis.

1 November 2024 in Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AKAleksei Kondratev
Aleksei Kondratev
EIEgor Ianovski
Egor Ianovski
ANAlexander S. Nesterov
Alexander S. Nesterov
Scoring in Multi-Event Tournaments How much is a first place worth? Is the athlete who came first once and third twice better than the athlete who came second three times? Different sports value these positions differently: (60, 54, 48) in IBU biathlon, (25, 18, 15) in F1 racing, (8, 7, 6) in Diamond League athletics. Are these choices based on anything? Is there even a rational way to choose a scoring vector of arbitrary length to rank any number of athletes? In “How should we score athletes and candidates: Geometric scoring rules,” authors A.Y. Kondratev, E. Ianovski, and A.S. Nesterov investigate two approaches to how the problem of choosing a scoring vector for a tournament can be reduced to the choice of a single parameter: an axiomatic approach based on eliminating spoilers and an optimization approach based on maximizing the expected quality of the winner. Intriguingly, the vectors generated by the second approach are uncannily similar to those used in real sporting events.

1 February 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AKAleksei Y. Kondratev
Aleksei Y. Kondratev
ANAlexander S. Nesterov
Alexander S. Nesterov

7 January 2024 in Social Choice and Welfare
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ANAlexander Nesterov
Alexander Nesterov
OROlga Rospuskova
Olga Rospuskova
SRSofia Rubtcova
Sofia Rubtcova

15 March 2024 in Economics Letters
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Journal Article
Closed access
ALArtemii Lomakin
Artemii Lomakin
KMKamil Minibaev
Kamil Minibaev
ANAlexander Nesterov
Alexander Nesterov

1 February 2025 in Social Choice and Welfare
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SBSomouaoga Bonkoungou
Somouaoga Bonkoungou
ANAlexander Nesterov
Alexander Nesterov
We study a series of reforms of school admissions mechanisms motivated, among other reasons, by fairness concerns and vulnerability to manipulation. Before the reforms and after, the mechanisms were vulnerable to preference manipulation and induced blocking students: students who miss desired schools despite having higher priority or seats left empty. We demonstrate that some of these reforms improved fairness by adopting mechanisms with fewer blocking students compared to the preexisting ones, while several others did not. We identify preexisting mechanisms where fairness consideration was more of an issue than vulnerability to manipulation and those where it is the reverse.