27 August 2018 in Nature Human Behaviour
1 April 2012 in American Economic Review
To explore why bubbles frequently emerge in the experimental asset market model of Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988), we vary the fundamental value process (constant or declining) and the cash– to–asset value ratio (constant or increasing). We observe high mispricing in treatments with a declining fundamental value, while overvaluation emerges when coupled with an increasing C/A ratio. A questionnaire reveals that the declining fundamental value process confuses subjects, as they expect the fundamental value to stay constant. Running the experiment with a different context (“stocks of a depletable gold mine” instead of “stocks”) significantly reduces mispricing and overvaluation as it reduces confusion. (JEL C91, D14, G11, G12)
1 September 2010 in Experimental Economics
We review bubble measures which are commonly used in the experimental asset market literature. It seems sensible to require that measures of mispricing should (i) relate the fundamental value and price, (ii) be monotone in the difference between fundamental value and price, and (iii) be independent of the total number of periods and the absolute level of fundamental value. We show that none of the measures currently used fulfills all these criteria. To facilitate comparability across different experimental settings with different parameterizations we propose two alternative measures which fulfill all evaluation criteria. The measure for mispricing, RAD (relative absolute deviation), is calculated by averaging absolute differences between the (volume-weighted) mean price and the fundamental value across all periods and normalizing it with the absolute value of the average FV of the market. The measure for overvaluation, RD (relative deviation), is calculated analogously, but uses raw difference between (volume-weighted) mean prices and fundamental values. Hence, it provides information on whether the mispricing stems from over- or undervaluation of the asset.
4 October 2022 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Peer review is a well-established cornerstone of the scientific process, yet it is not immune to biases like status bias, which we explore in this paper. Merton described this bias as prominent researchers getting disproportionately great credit for their contribution, while relatively unknown researchers get disproportionately little credit [R. K. Merton, Science 159, 56–63 (1968)]. We measured the extent of this bias in the peer-review process through a preregistered field experiment. We invited more than 3,300 researchers to review a finance research paper jointly written by a prominent author (a Nobel laureate) and by a relatively unknown author (an early career research associate), varying whether reviewers saw the prominent author’s name, an anonymized version of the paper, or the less-well-known author’s name. We found strong evidence for the status bias: More of the invited researchers accepted to review the paper when the prominent name was shown, and while only 23% recommended “reject” when the prominent researcher was the only author shown, 48% did so when the paper was anonymized, and 65% did when the little-known author was the only author shown. Our findings complement and extend earlier results on double-anonymized vs. single-anonymized review [R. Blank, Am. Econ. Rev. 81, 1041–1067 (1991); M. A. Ucci, F. D’Antonio, V. Berghella, Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. MFM 4, 100645 (2022)].