8 May 2020 in Nature Communications
Population structure is a key determinant in fostering cooperation among naturally self-interested individuals in microbial populations, social insect groups, and human societies. Traditional research has focused on static structures, and yet most real interactions are finite in duration and changing in time, forming a temporal network. This raises the question of whether cooperation can emerge and persist despite an intrinsically fragmented population structure. Here we develop a framework to study the evolution of cooperation on temporal networks. Surprisingly, we find that network temporality actually enhances the evolution of cooperation relative to comparable static networks, despite the fact that bursty interaction patterns generally impede cooperation. We resolve this tension by proposing a measure to quantify the amount of temporality in a network, revealing an intermediate level that maximally boosts cooperation. Our results open a new avenue for investigating the evolution of cooperation and other emergent behaviours in more realistic structured populations.
1 October 2016 in New Journal of Physics
31 May 2021 in Nature Communications
Update rules, which describe how individuals adjust their behavior over time, affect the outcome of social interactions. Theoretical studies have shown that evolutionary outcomes are sensitive to model details when update rules are imitation-based but are robust when update rules are self-evaluation based. However, studies of self-evaluation based rules have focused on homogeneous population structures where each individual has the same number of neighbors. Here, we consider heterogeneous population structures represented by weighted networks. Under weak selection, we analytically derive the condition for strategy success, which coincides with the classical condition of risk-dominance. This condition holds for all weighted networks and distributions of aspiration levels, and for individualized ways of self-evaluation. Our findings recover previous results as special cases and demonstrate the universality of the robustness property under self-evaluation based rules. Our work thus sheds light on the intrinsic difference between evolutionary dynamics under self-evaluation based and imitation-based update rules.
1 April 2019 in PLOS Computational Biology
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties, and social ties between them only serve as the indicator of the existence of interactions. This assumption neglects important information carried by inter-personal social ties such as genetic similarity, geographic proximity, and social closeness, which may crucially affect the outcome of interactions. To model these situations, we present a framework of evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs with edge diversity, where different types of edges describe diverse social ties. Strategic behaviors together with social ties determine the resulting payoffs of interactants. Under weak selection, we provide a general formula to predict the success of one behavior over the other. We apply this formula to various examples which cannot be dealt with using previous models, including the division of labor and relationship- or edge-dependent games. We find that labor division can promote collective cooperation markedly. The evolutionary process based on relationship-dependent games can be approximated by interactions under a transformed and unified game. Our work stresses the importance of social ties and provides effective methods to reduce the calculating complexity in analyzing the evolution of realistic systems. The outcome of an interaction often relies on not only interactants’ strategic behaviors but also genetic and physical relationships between interactants, such as genetic similarity and geographic proximity. Thus when encountering different opponents who use the same strategy, an individual may derive different payoffs. Social ties, acting as carriers of such information, are crucial to biological interactions. However, most prior studies simplify social ties as binary states (i.e., either present or absent) and ignore the information carried. Here we study evolutionary multiplayer games on graphs and introduce different types of edges to describe diverse social ties. We derive a simple rule to predict when a strategic behavior is more successful than the other. Based on this rule, we find that the labor division in eusocial insects could promote prosocial behavior. In addition, when payoff structures in different interactions are relationship-dependent, the condition for the success of one behavior can be obtained by studying interactions described by a unified payoff structure. Our work not only extends established results on the evolution of cooperation on graphs, but also shows the possibility to simplify complex and diverse interactions in real-world systems as simple and unified interactions in theoretical calculations.
17 December 2018 in Physical Review E
How individuals adapt their behavior in cultural evolution remains elusive. Theoretical studies have shown that the update rules chosen to model individual decision making can dramatically modify the evolutionary outcome of the population as a whole. This hints at the complexities of considering the personality of individuals in a population, where each one uses its own rule. Here, we investigate whether and how heterogeneity in the rules of behavior update alters the evolutionary outcome. We assume that individuals update behaviors by aspiration-based self-evaluation and they do so in their own ways. Under weak selection, we analytically reveal a simple property that holds for any two-strategy multiplayer games in well-mixed populations and on regular graphs: the evolutionary outcome in a population with heterogeneous update rules is the weighted average of the outcomes in the corresponding homogeneous populations, and the associated weights are the frequencies of each update rule in the heterogeneous population. Beyond weak selection, we show that this property holds for public goods games. Our finding implies that heterogeneous aspiration dynamics is additive. This additivity greatly reduces the complexity induced by the underlying individual heterogeneity. Our work thus provides an efficient method to calculate evolutionary outcomes under heterogeneous update rules.
17 November 2023 in Nature Communications
Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to the protocol of imitation, leading to a conundrum about how different styles of imitation quantitatively impact the evolution of cooperation. Here, we take a different perspective on the personal and external social information required by imitation. We develop a general model of imitation dynamics with incomplete information in networked systems, which unifies classical update rules including the death-birth and pairwise-comparison rule on complex networks. Under pairwise interactions, we find that collective cooperation is most promoted if individuals neglect personal information. If personal information is considered, cooperators evolve more readily with more external information. Intriguingly, when interactions take place in groups on networks with low degrees of clustering, using more personal and less external information better facilitates cooperation. Our unifying perspective uncovers intuition by examining the rate and range of competition induced by different information situations.