Florent Meyniel

Florent Meyniel

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Florent Meyniel

Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin center

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 October 2015 in Neuron
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SDStanislas Dehaene
Stanislas Dehaene
FMFlorent Meyniel
Florent Meyniel
CWCatherine Wacongne
Catherine Wacongne
Lian-Ping WangLian-Ping Wang
Lian-Ping Wang
CPChristophe Pallier
Christophe Pallier

1 October 2015 in Neuron
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FMFlorent Meyniel
Florent Meyniel
MSMariano Sigman
Mariano Sigman
ZMZachary F. Mainen
Zachary F. Mainen

20 March 2017 in Nature Human Behaviour
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
GLGermain Lefebvre
Germain Lefebvre
MLMaël Lebreton
Maël Lebreton
FMFlorent Meyniel
Florent Meyniel
SBSacha Bourgeois-Gironde
Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde
SPStefano Palminteri
Stefano Palminteri

19 February 2021 in Nature Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CSClaire Sergent
Claire Sergent
MCMartina Corazzol
Martina Corazzol
GLGhislaine Labouret
Ghislaine Labouret
FSFrançois Stockart
François Stockart
MWMark Wexler
Mark Wexler
DPDaniel Pressnitzer
Daniel Pressnitzer
An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250–300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

15 June 2015 in PLOS Computational Biology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FMFlorent Meyniel
Florent Meyniel
DSDaniel Schlunegger
Daniel Schlunegger
SDStanislas Dehaene
Stanislas Dehaene
Learning in a stochastic environment consists of estimating a model from a limited amount of noisy data, and is therefore inherently uncertain. However, many classical models reduce the learning process to the updating of parameter estimates and neglect the fact that learning is also frequently accompanied by a variable “feeling of knowing” or confidence. The characteristics and the origin of these subjective confidence estimates thus remain largely unknown. Here we investigate whether, during learning, humans not only infer a model of their environment, but also derive an accurate sense of confidence from their inferences. In our experiment, humans estimated the transition probabilities between two visual or auditory stimuli in a changing environment, and reported their mean estimate and their confidence in this report. To formalize the link between both kinds of estimate and assess their accuracy in comparison to a normative reference, we derive the optimal inference strategy for our task. Our results indicate that subjects accurately track the likelihood that their inferences are correct. Learning and estimating confidence in what has been learned appear to be two intimately related abilities, suggesting that they arise from a single inference process. We show that human performance matches several properties of the optimal probabilistic inference. In particular, subjective confidence is impacted by environmental uncertainty, both at the first level (uncertainty in stimulus occurrence given the inferred stochastic characteristics) and at the second level (uncertainty due to unexpected changes in these stochastic characteristics). Confidence also increases appropriately with the number of observations within stable periods. Our results support the idea that humans possess a quantitative sense of confidence in their inferences about abstract non-sensory parameters of the environment. This ability cannot be reduced to simple heuristics, it seems instead a core property of the learning process. Learning is often accompanied by a “feeling of knowing”, a growing sense of confidence in having acquired the relevant information. Here, we formalize this introspective ability, and we evaluate its accuracy and its flexibility in the face of environmental changes that impose a revision of one’s mental model. We evaluate the hypothesis that the brain acts as a statistician that accurately tracks not only the most likely state of the environment, but also the uncertainty associated with its own inferences. We show that subjective confidence ratings varied across successive observations in tight parallel with a mathematical model of an ideal observer performing the optimal inference. Our results suggest that, during learning, the brain constantly keeps track of its own uncertainty, and that subjective confidence may derive from the learning process itself. Our results therefore suggest that subjective confidence, although currently under-explored, could provide key data to better understand learning.

28 December 2016 in PLOS Computational Biology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
FMFlorent Meyniel
Florent Meyniel
MMMaxime Maheu
Maxime Maheu
SDStanislas Dehaene
Stanislas Dehaene
The brain constantly infers the causes of the inputs it receives and uses these inferences to generate statistical expectations about future observations. Experimental evidence for these expectations and their violations include explicit reports, sequential effects on reaction times, and mismatch or surprise signals recorded in electrophysiology and functional MRI. Here, we explore the hypothesis that the brain acts as a near-optimal inference device that constantly attempts to infer the time-varying matrix of transition probabilities between the stimuli it receives, even when those stimuli are in fact fully unpredictable. This parsimonious Bayesian model, with a single free parameter, accounts for a broad range of findings on surprise signals, sequential effects and the perception of randomness. Notably, it explains the pervasive asymmetry between repetitions and alternations encountered in those studies. Our analysis suggests that a neural machinery for inferring transition probabilities lies at the core of human sequence knowledge. We explore the possibility that the computation of time-varying transition probabilities may be a core building block of sequence knowledge in humans. Humans may then use these estimates to predict future observations. Expectations derived from such a model should conform to several properties. We list six such properties and we test them successfully against various experimental findings reported in distinct fields of the literature over the past century. We focus on five representative studies by other groups. Such findings include the “sequential effects” evidenced in many behavioral tasks, i.e. the pervasive fluctuations in performance induced by the recent history of observations. We also consider the “surprise-like” signals recorded in electrophysiology and even functional MRI, that are elicited by a random stream of observations. These signals are reportedly modulated in a quantitative manner by both the local and global statistics of observations. Last, we consider the notoriously biased subjective perception of randomness, i.e. whether humans think that a given sequence of observations has been generated randomly or not. Our model therefore unifies many previous findings and suggests that a neural machinery for inferring transition probabilities must lie at the core of human sequence knowledge.