3 April 2023 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
The DNS privacy protection mechanisms, DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH), only work correctly if both the server and client support the Strict Privacy profile and no vulnerability exists in the implemented TLS/HTTPS. A natural question then arises: what is the landscape of DNS Strict Privacy? To this end, we provide the first longitudinal and comprehensive measurement of DoT/DoH deployments in recursive resolvers, authoritative servers, and browsers. With the collected data, we find the number of DoT/DoH servers increased substantially during our ten-month-long scan. However, around 60% of DoT and 44% of DoH recursive resolver certificates are invalid. Worryingly, our measurements confirm the centralization problem of DoT/DoH. Furthermore, we classify DNS Strict Privacy servers into four levels according to daily scanning results on TLS/HTTPS-related security features. Unfortunately, around 25% of DoH Strict Privacy recursive resolvers fail to meet the minimum level requirements. To help the Internet community better perceive the landscape of DNS Strict Privacy, we implement a DoT/DoH server search engine and recommender system. Additionally, we investigate five popular browsers across four operating systems and find some inconsistent behavior with their DNS privacy implementations. For example, Firefox in Windows, Linux, and Android allows DoH communication with the server without the SAN certificate. At last, we advocate that all participants head together for a bright DNS Strict Privacy landscape by discussing current hindrances and controversies in DNS privacy.
20 February 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Webmail, protected by the HTTPS protocol, only works correctly if both the server and client implement HTTPS-related features without vulnerability. Nevertheless, the deployment situation of these features in the webmail world is still unclear. To this end, we perform the first end-to-end and large-scale measurement of webmail service. For the server side, we first build an email address set with a size of 2.2 billion. Then we construct two webmail domain datasets: one contains 21 k domains filtered from the email address set; the other only includes 34 domains but supports more than 75% of the 2.2 billion email addresses. After performing a comprehensive measurement on these two webmail domain datasets, we find that some features are poorly deployed. Furthermore, we also rank servers by analyzing the properties of HTTPS-related features. For the client side, we investigate implement of HTTPS-related features in 50 different combinations of web browsers and operating systems (OSes). We find that even the latest browsers have poor support for some features. For example, Firefox in all OSes does not support CT. Our findings highlight that the full deployment of the security features for the HTTPS ecosystem is still a challenge, even in the webmail service.