Ruixuan Li

Ruixuan Li

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Ruixuan Li

Tsinghua University, Beijing, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 April 2023 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRuixuan Li
Ruixuan Li
XJXiaofeng Jia
Xiaofeng Jia
ZZZhenyong Zhang
Zhenyong Zhang
JSJun Shao
Jun Shao
RLRongxing Lu
Rongxing Lu
GWGuiyi Wei
Guiyi Wei
The DNS privacy protection mechanisms, DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH), only work correctly if both the server and client support the Strict Privacy profile and no vulnerability exists in the implemented TLS/HTTPS. A natural question then arises: what is the landscape of DNS Strict Privacy? To this end, we provide the first longitudinal and comprehensive measurement of DoT/DoH deployments in recursive resolvers, authoritative servers, and browsers. With the collected data, we find the number of DoT/DoH servers increased substantially during our ten-month-long scan. However, around 60% of DoT and 44% of DoH recursive resolver certificates are invalid. Worryingly, our measurements confirm the centralization problem of DoT/DoH. Furthermore, we classify DNS Strict Privacy servers into four levels according to daily scanning results on TLS/HTTPS-related security features. Unfortunately, around 25% of DoH Strict Privacy recursive resolvers fail to meet the minimum level requirements. To help the Internet community better perceive the landscape of DNS Strict Privacy, we implement a DoT/DoH server search engine and recommender system. Additionally, we investigate five popular browsers across four operating systems and find some inconsistent behavior with their DNS privacy implementations. For example, Firefox in Windows, Linux, and Android allows DoH communication with the server without the SAN certificate. At last, we advocate that all participants head together for a bright DNS Strict Privacy landscape by discussing current hindrances and controversies in DNS privacy.

13 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RLRuixuan Li
Ruixuan Li
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
CLChaoyi Lu
Chaoyi Lu
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
JSJun Shao
Jun Shao
To protect user DNS privacy, four DNS over Encryption (DoE) protocols have been proposed, including DNS over TLS (DoT), DNS over HTTPS (DoH), DNS over QUIC (DoQ), and DNS over HTTP/3 (DoH3). Ensuring reachability stands as a prominent prerequisite for the proper functionality of these DoE protocols, driving considerable efforts in this domain. However, existing studies predominantly concentrate on a limited number of DoT/DoH domains or employ a restricted subset of vantage points (VPs). In this paper, we present the first comprehensive worldwide view of DoE service reachability. By collecting data from our 15-month-long scan, we elaborately built a list of 1302 operational DoE domains as measurement targets, 448 of which support IPv6. Then we performed 10M DoE over IPv4 (DoEv4) and 570K DoE over IPv6 (DoEv6) queries from 5K VPs over two months, encompassing 102 countries/regions. Our results reveal that the reachability of DoE services is poor in some countries/regions. Specifically, 592K (5.92%) DoEv4 queries and 28K (4.91%) DoEv6 queries are blocked. In countries/regions with strict Internet control, DoEv4 service blocking often occurs during TCP connection and QUIC version negotiation. Compared to DoEv4, the reachability of DoEv6 services is better. In particular, some DoE blocking policies target only specific IP addresses or DoE protocols, providing clients with the opportunity to access blocked DoE domains. Our study highlights the need for the DNS community to pay attention and improve the reachability of DoE services.

20 February 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRuixuan Li
Ruixuan Li
ZZZhenyong Zhang
Zhenyong Zhang
JSJun Shao
Jun Shao
RLRongxing Lu
Rongxing Lu
XJXiaoqi Jia
Xiaoqi Jia
GWGuiyi Wei
Guiyi Wei
Webmail, protected by the HTTPS protocol, only works correctly if both the server and client implement HTTPS-related features without vulnerability. Nevertheless, the deployment situation of these features in the webmail world is still unclear. To this end, we perform the first end-to-end and large-scale measurement of webmail service. For the server side, we first build an email address set with a size of 2.2 billion. Then we construct two webmail domain datasets: one contains 21 k domains filtered from the email address set; the other only includes 34 domains but supports more than 75% of the 2.2 billion email addresses. After performing a comprehensive measurement on these two webmail domain datasets, we find that some features are poorly deployed. Furthermore, we also rank servers by analyzing the properties of HTTPS-related features. For the client side, we investigate implement of HTTPS-related features in 50 different combinations of web browsers and operating systems (OSes). We find that even the latest browsers have poor support for some features. For example, Firefox in all OSes does not support CT. Our findings highlight that the full deployment of the security features for the HTTPS ecosystem is still a challenge, even in the webmail service.

4 November 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RLRuixuan Li
Ruixuan Li
SXShaodong Xiao
Shaodong Xiao
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
YLYanzhong Lin
Yanzhong Lin
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
JSJun Shao
Jun Shao
Abnormal email bounces seriously disrupt user lives and company transactions. Proliferating security protocols and protection strategies have made email delivery increasingly complex. A natural question is how and why email delivery fails in the wild. Filling this knowledge gap requires a representative global email delivery dataset, which is rarely disclosed by email service providers (ESPs). In this paper, we first systematically reveal the scale and root causes of email bounces, and evaluate the email squatting risk in the real world. Through a 15-month passive dataset from a large ESP, we present a unique global view of 298M emails delivered to 3M receiver mail servers in 169 countries. We find that 38M (12.93%) emails fail to be delivered in the first attempt, about one-third of which could be successfully delivered after retrying, while the rest are permanently undeliverable. Delving deeper into bounce reasons, we observe that poor server reputation and network communication quality are significant factors leading to temporary email bounces. In particular, spam blocklists affect many normal email deliveries. The misconfiguration of authentication mechanisms and email address typos result in many permanently undeliverable emails. More seriously, many email addresses with significant residual value can be exploited by squatting attackers. Overall, we call for the community to revisit email delivery failures, especially to improve standards for email bounce reporting and resolution.

28 October 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RLRuixuan Li
Ruixuan Li
CLChaoyi Lu
Chaoyi Lu
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
YLYanzhong Lin
Yanzhong Lin
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
JSJun Shao
Jun Shao

12 October 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RLRuixuan Li
Ruixuan Li
ELEnlong Li
Enlong Li
MLMingxuan Liu
Mingxuan Liu
BLBaojun Liu
Baojun Liu
Haixin DuanHaixin Duan
Haixin Duan
QPQingfeng Pan
Qingfeng Pan