29 May 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
With the emergence of countless independent blockchain systems in recent years, cross-chain transactions have attracted considerable attention, and lots of solutions have been put forth by both industry and academia. However, most of the existing solutions suffer from either centralization or scalability issues. To mitigate these issues, in this paper, we propose the concept of cross-chain virtual payment channels, which allows two users in different blockchain systems to conduct limitless off-chain transactions with the help of an intermediate node, hence solving the centralization and scalability issues. Furthermore, as the intermediate node is only involved in the channel open and close operations, it further improves the efficiency of cross-chain transactions, and to a certain extent, it even enhances the privacy of the cross-chain transaction. Meanwhile, we also present the first concrete cross-chain virtual payment channel scheme, which only requires one of the blockchain systems supporting the Turing-complete scripting language. The corresponding detailed security analysis in the Universal Composability framework demonstrates that our proposal holds the Consensus on Open, Update, and Close. Finally, we implement and deploy our cross-chain virtual payment channel scheme on the Ethereum and Bitcoin test networks. The extensive experimental results show that our proposal dramatically improves the efficiency of cross-chain transactions, and the advantage becomes more pronounced as the number of transactions increases.
28 March 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) have flourished as one of the most promising solutions to the blockchain scalability problem. Unfortunately, the existing PCN solutions either fail to provide path privacy guarantees or require the not-always-true All-Anonymous-Connected assumption (i.e., an anonymous communication channel always exists for any two participants). To alleviate these problems, we first present a new cryptographic primitive named anonymous multi-hop payment (AMHP), which is an improvement of anonymous multi-hop lock (AMHL). Using AMHP and payment channels, we can have a new PCN solution with path privacy but removing the All-Anonymous-Connected assumption. After that, we present the first AMHP scheme, called AMHL+, by adapting the generic construction of AMHL, but at the cost of high communication overhead. To reduce the communication cost, we further present a new AMHP scheme (named EAMHL+) using bilinear pairing. The communication cost of the EAMHL+ is reduced by 92.3% compared to the AMHL+. The rigorous security analysis demonstrates that the EAMHL+ holds consistency, balance security, and path privacy. Finally, we implement the proposed AMHP schemes using Java. The extensive experimental results show that, though the EAMHL+ requires more computational cost than the AMHL+, it is more efficient than the latter in terms of communication overhead.
3 April 2023 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
The DNS privacy protection mechanisms, DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH), only work correctly if both the server and client support the Strict Privacy profile and no vulnerability exists in the implemented TLS/HTTPS. A natural question then arises: what is the landscape of DNS Strict Privacy? To this end, we provide the first longitudinal and comprehensive measurement of DoT/DoH deployments in recursive resolvers, authoritative servers, and browsers. With the collected data, we find the number of DoT/DoH servers increased substantially during our ten-month-long scan. However, around 60% of DoT and 44% of DoH recursive resolver certificates are invalid. Worryingly, our measurements confirm the centralization problem of DoT/DoH. Furthermore, we classify DNS Strict Privacy servers into four levels according to daily scanning results on TLS/HTTPS-related security features. Unfortunately, around 25% of DoH Strict Privacy recursive resolvers fail to meet the minimum level requirements. To help the Internet community better perceive the landscape of DNS Strict Privacy, we implement a DoT/DoH server search engine and recommender system. Additionally, we investigate five popular browsers across four operating systems and find some inconsistent behavior with their DNS privacy implementations. For example, Firefox in Windows, Linux, and Android allows DoH communication with the server without the SAN certificate. At last, we advocate that all participants head together for a bright DNS Strict Privacy landscape by discussing current hindrances and controversies in DNS privacy.
13 March 2023 in Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications
1 June 2023 in Journal of Information Security and Applications