Xueyang Wang

Xueyang Wang

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Xueyang Wang

Alibaba Group, Shanghai, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 May 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Multi-Scale Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XWXueyang Wang
Xueyang Wang
CKCharalambos Konstantinou
Charalambos Konstantinou
MMMichail Maniatakos
Michail Maniatakos
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri
SLSerena Lee
Serena Lee
SKSteve Kim
Steve Kim
Critical infrastructure components nowadays use microprocessor-based embedded control systems. It is often infeasible, however, to employ the same level of security measures used in general purpose computing systems, due to the stringent performance and resource constraints of embedded control systems. Furthermore, as software sits atop and relies on the firmware for proper operation, software-level techniques cannot detect malicious behavior of the firmware. In this work, we propose ConFirm, a low-cost technique to detect malicious modifications in the firmware of embedded control systems by measuring the number of low-level hardware events that occur during the execution of the firmware. In order to count these events, ConFirm leverages the Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs), which readily exist in many embedded processors. We propose a comparison-based technique to detect malicious modifications in firmwares with simple control-flows. For firmwares with more complex control-flows, we use machine learning techniques to automatically extract the relations among different hardware events. This method significantly reduces the number of pre-stored valid HPC signatures without compromising the detection accuracy. Finally, we reduce the consumption of local resources by implementing a remote-based detection mechanism. We evaluate the detection capability and performance overhead of the proposed technique on various types of firmware running on ARMand PowerPC-based embedded processors. Experimental results demonstrate its practicality and effectiveness.

27 May 2021 in IEEE Journal on Emerging and Selected Topics in Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Wenye LiuWenye Liu
Wenye Liu
Chip Hong ChangChip Hong Chang
Chip Hong Chang
XWXueyang Wang
Xueyang Wang
CLChen Liu
Chen Liu
JFJason M. Fung
Jason M. Fung
KBKanad Basu
Kanad Basu
The last decade has witnessed remarkable research advances at the intersection of machine learning (ML) and hardware security. The confluence of the two technologies has created many interesting and unique opportunities, but also left some issues in their wake. ML schemes have been extensively used to enhance the security and trust of embedded systems like hardware Trojans and malware detection. On the other hand, ML-based approaches have also been adopted by adversaries to assist side-channel attacks, reverse engineer integrated circuits and break hardware security primitives like Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Deep learning is a subfield of ML. It can continuously learn from a large amount of labeled data with a layered structure. Despite the impressive outcomes demonstrated by deep learning in many application scenarios, the dark side of it has not been fully exposed yet. The inability to fully understand and explain what has been done within the super-intelligence can turn an inherently benevolent system into malevolent. Recent research has revealed that the outputs of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) can be easily corrupted by imperceptibly small input perturbations. As computations are brought nearer to the source of data creation, the attack surface of DNN has also been extended from the input data to the edge devices. Accordingly, due to the opportunities of ML-assisted security and the vulnerabilities of ML implementation, in this paper, we will survey the applications, vulnerabilities and fortification of ML from the perspective of hardware security. We will discuss the possible future research directions, and thereby, sharing a roadmap for the hardware security community in general.

14 January 2022 in IEEE Design & Test
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CKCharalambos Konstantinou
Charalambos Konstantinou
XWXueyang Wang
Xueyang Wang
PKPrashanth Krishnamurthy
Prashanth Krishnamurthy
FKFarshad Khorrami
Farshad Khorrami
MMMichail Maniatakos
Michail Maniatakos
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri
This article details how hardware performance counters can help detect malware in a system, along with a case study on power grid infrastructure. —Jeyavijayan “JV” Rajendran, Texas A&M University