24 August 2020 in Journal of Neuroscience
Humans learn quickly which actions cause them harm. As social beings, we also need to learn to avoid actions that hurt others. It is currently unknown whether humans are as good at learning to avoid others9 harm (prosocial learning) as they are at learning to avoid self-harm (self-relevant learning). Moreover, it remains unclear how the neural mechanisms of prosocial learning differ from those of self-relevant learning. In this fMRI study, 96 male human participants learned to avoid painful stimuli either for themselves or for another individual. We found that participants performed more optimally when learning for the other than for themselves. Computational modeling revealed that this could be explained by an increased sensitivity to subjective values of choice alternatives during prosocial learning. Increased value sensitivity was further associated with empathic traits. On the neural level, higher value sensitivity during prosocial learning was associated with stronger engagement of the ventromedial PFC during valuation. Moreover, the ventromedial PFC exhibited higher connectivity with the right temporoparietal junction during prosocial, compared with self-relevant, choices. Our results suggest that humans are particularly adept at learning to protect others from harm. This ability appears implemented by neural mechanisms overlapping with those supporting self-relevant learning, but with the additional recruitment of structures associated to the social brain. Our findings contrast with recent proposals that humans are egocentrically biased when learning to obtain monetary rewards for self or others. Prosocial tendencies may thus trump egocentric biases in learning when another person9s physical integrity is at stake. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT We quickly learn to avoid actions that cause us harm. As “social animals,” we also need to learn and consider the harmful consequences our actions might have for others. Here, we investigated how learning to protect others from pain (prosocial learning) differs from learning to protect oneself (self-relevant learning). We found that human participants performed better during prosocial learning than during self-relevant learning, as they were more sensitive toward the information they collected when making choices for the other. Prosocial learning recruited similar brain areas as self-relevant learning, but additionally involved parts of the “social brain” that underpin perspective-taking and self-other distinction. Our findings suggest that people show an inherent tendency toward “intuitive” prosociality.
17 November 2023 in eLife
Influential accounts claim that violent video games (VVGs) decrease players’ emotional empathy by desensitizing them to both virtual and real-life violence. However, scientific evidence for this claim is inconclusive and controversially debated. To assess the causal effect of VVGs on the behavioral and neural correlates of empathy and emotional reactivity to violence, we conducted a prospective experimental study using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We recruited 89 male participants without prior VVG experience. Over the course of two weeks, participants played either a highly violent video game or a non-violent version of the same game. Before and after this period, participants completed an fMRI experiment with paradigms measuring their empathy for pain and emotional reactivity to violent images. Applying a Bayesian analysis approach throughout enabled us to find substantial evidence for the absence of an effect of VVGs on the behavioral and neural correlates of empathy. Moreover, participants in the VVG group were not desensitized to images of real-world violence. These results imply that short and controlled exposure to VVGs does not numb empathy nor the responses to real-world violence. We discuss the implications of our findings regarding the potential and limitations of experimental research on the causal effects of VVGs. While VVGs might not have a discernible effect on the investigated subpopulation within our carefully controlled experimental setting, our results cannot preclude that effects could be found in settings with higher ecological validity, in vulnerable subpopulations, or after more extensive VVG play.
28 January 2025 in Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science
Researchers should be motivated to adequately power statistical tests because tests with low power have a low probability of detecting true effects. However, it is also often claimed that significant results obtained by underpowered tests are less likely to reflect a true effect. Here, we critically discuss this “low-power/low-credibility” (LPLC) critique from both frequentist and Bayesian perspectives. Although the LPLC critique is first and foremost a critique of frequentist tests, it is itself not consistent with frequentist theory. In particular, it demands that researchers have some information on the probability that a hypothesis is true before they test it. However, such prior probabilities are dismissed as meaningless in frequentist inference, and we demonstrate that they cannot be meaningfully introduced into frequentist thinking. Even when adopting a Bayesian perspective, however, significant results from tests with low power can provide a nonnegligible amount of support for the tested hypothesis. We conclude that even though low power reduces the chances to obtain significant findings, there is little justification to dismiss already obtained significant findings on the basis of low power alone. However, concerns about low power might often reflect suspicions that findings were produced by questionable research practices. If this is the case, we suggest that communicating these issues transparently rather than using low power as a proxy concern will be more appropriate. We conclude by providing suggestions on how results from tests with low power can be critiqued for the correct reasons and in a constructive manner.
2 October 2023 in bioRxiv
Action observation is a fundamental pillar of social cognition. Neuroimaging research has revealed a human and primate action observation network (AON) encompassing fronto-temporo-parietal areas with links to a species’ imitation tendencies and relative lobe expansion. Dogs ( Canis familiaris) have good action perception and imitation skills and a less expanded parietal than temporal lobe, but their AON remains unexplored. We conducted a functional MRI study with 28 dogs and 40 humans and found functionally analogous involvement of somatosensory and temporal brain areas of both species’ AONs and responses to transitive and intransitive action observation in line with their imitative skills. However, activation and task-based functional connectivity measures suggested significantly less parietal lobe involvement in dogs than in humans. These findings advance our understanding of the neural bases of action understanding and the convergent evolution of social cognition, with analogies and differences resulting from similar social environments and divergent brain expansion, respectively.