In the 3 years before the 2008 Financial Crisis, GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (averaged over individual economies) was around 6%, or 2 percentage points above mean growth rates for the preceding 10 years. This period also coincided with significant Chinese FDI flows into these countries, accounting for up to 10% of total inward FDI flows for certain countries in these years. We use growth accounting methods to assess what portion of this elevated growth can be attributed to Chinese inward FDI. We follow Solow (1957), Dennison (1962), and others and use data for individual economies between 1990 and 2008 to calculate Solow residuals for these years for individual economies. We use capital stock data, workforce, and factor share data by country. Capital stock data is unavailable directly and so we use perpetual inventory methods to construct the data. Factor shares come from UN National Accounts data. We then run counterfactual growth accounting experiments for thirteen Sub-Saharan African countries excluding Chinese FDI inflows for 2005-2007 and also 2003-2009. Our individual results vary by year and country, but there are several year/country combinations where Chinese FDI contributed to an additional one half of a percentage point or above to GDP growth. These results suggest that a significant, even if in some cases small, portion of the elevated growth in Sub-Saharan Africa in the three years before the Financial Crisis and also in the two years afterwards (2008-2009) can be attributed to Chinese inward investment.
10 July 2011 in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
In this article we discuss the global negotiations now underway and aimed at achieving new climate change mitigation and other arrangements after 2012 (the end of the Kyoto commitment period). These were initiated in Bali in December 2007 and are scheduled to conclude by the end of 2009 in Copenhagen. As such, this negotiation is effectively the second round in ongoing global negotiations on climate change and further rounds will almost certainly follow. We highlight both the vast scope and vagueness of the negotiating mandate, the many outstanding major issues to be accommodated between negotiating parties, the lack of a mechanism to force collective decision making in the negotiation, and their short time frame. The likely lack of compliance with prior Kyoto commitments by several OECD countries (some to a major degree), the effective absence in Kyoto of compliance/enforcement mechanisms, and growing linkage to non-climate change areas (principally trade) all further complicate the task of bringing the negotiation to conclusion. The major clearage we see that needs to be bridged in the negotiations is between OECD countries on the one hand, and lower wage, large population, rapidly growing countries (China, India, Russia, Brazil) on the other. (JEL codes: F33, F51, F53, Q54, Q56, P28)
24 September 2013 in The Journal of Economic Inequality
In this paper, we present evidence as to the effects of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone on China's capital controls which was initiated in September, 2013. It was a trial to introduce a combination of floating exchange rate and capital account liberalization into China's macro policy mix. We employ three methods to test the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone's impact on capital controls: price spread tests between Chinese Yuan in Hong Kong and Chinese Yuan, Renminbi yield gaps between onshore and offshore Renminbi markets, and Granger causalities in China's money supply and foreign interest rates. All these tests give consistent results suggesting that the impact of China's capital controls is weaker since the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone.