Riddhi Jain Pitliya

Riddhi Jain Pitliya

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Riddhi Jain Pitliya

Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
28 May 2018 in Educational Psychology Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
Ronnel Bornasal KingRonnel Bornasal King
Ronnel Bornasal King
DMDennis M. McInerney
Dennis M. McInerney
RPRiddhi J. Pitliya
Riddhi J. Pitliya

29 March 2024 in Entropy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MAMahault Albarracin
Mahault Albarracin
RPRiddhi J. Pitliya
Riddhi J. Pitliya
TSToby St Clere Smithe
Toby St Clere Smithe
DFDaniel Ari Friedman
Daniel Ari Friedman
KFKarl Friston Friston
Karl Friston Friston
MRMaxwell J. D. Ramstead
Maxwell J. D. Ramstead
In this paper, we unite concepts from Husserlian phenomenology, the active inference framework in theoretical biology, and category theory in mathematics to develop a comprehensive framework for understanding social action premised on shared goals. We begin with an overview of Husserlian phenomenology, focusing on aspects of inner time-consciousness, namely, retention, primal impression, and protention. We then review active inference as a formal approach to modeling agent behavior based on variational (approximate Bayesian) inference. Expanding upon Husserl’s model of time consciousness, we consider collective goal-directed behavior, emphasizing shared protentions among agents and their connection to the shared generative models of active inference. This integrated framework aims to formalize shared goals in terms of shared protentions, and thereby shed light on the emergence of group intentionality. Building on this foundation, we incorporate mathematical tools from category theory, in particular, sheaf and topos theory, to furnish a mathematical image of individual and group interactions within a stochastic environment. Specifically, we employ morphisms between polynomial representations of individual agent models, allowing predictions not only of their own behaviors but also those of other agents and environmental responses. Sheaf and topos theory facilitates the construction of coherent agent worldviews and provides a way of representing consensus or shared understanding. We explore the emergence of shared protentions, bridging the phenomenology of temporal structure, multi-agent active inference systems, and category theory. Shared protentions are highlighted as pivotal for coordination and achieving common objectives. We conclude by acknowledging the intricacies stemming from stochastic systems and uncertainties in realizing shared goals.

4 May 2024 in Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MAMahault Albarracin
Mahault Albarracin
MRMaxwell Ramstead
Maxwell Ramstead
RPRiddhi J. Pitliya
Riddhi J. Pitliya
IHInes Hipolito
Ines Hipolito
LCLancelot Da Costa
Lancelot Da Costa
SMSarah Grace Manski
Sarah Grace Manski
In this paper, we explore the known connection among sustainability, resilience, and well-being within the framework of active inference. Initially, we revisit how the notions of well-being and resilience intersect within active inference before defining sustainability. We adopt a holistic concept of sustainability denoting the enduring capacity to meet needs over time without depleting crucial resources. It extends beyond material wealth to encompass community networks, labor, and knowledge. Using the free energy principle, we can emphasize the role of fostering resource renewal, harmonious system–entity exchanges, and practices that encourage self-organization and resilience as pathways to achieving sustainability both as an agent and as a part of a collective. We start by connecting active inference with well-being, building on existing work. We then attempt to link resilience with sustainability, asserting that resilience alone is insufficient for sustainable outcomes. While crucial for absorbing shocks and stresses, resilience must be intrinsically linked with sustainability to ensure that adaptive capacities do not merely perpetuate existing vulnerabilities. Rather, it should facilitate transformative processes that address the root causes of unsustainability. Sustainability, therefore, must manifest across extended timescales and all system strata, from individual components to the broader system, to uphold ecological integrity, economic stability, and social well-being. We explain how sustainability manifests at the level of an agent and then at the level of collectives and systems. To model and quantify the interdependencies between resources and their impact on overall system sustainability, we introduce the application of network theory and dynamical systems theory. We emphasize the optimization of precision or learning rates through the active inference framework, advocating for an approach that fosters the elastic and plastic resilience necessary for long-term sustainability and abundance.

1 August 2022 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SCSantiago Castiello
Santiago Castiello
RMRalph R. Miller
Ralph R. Miller
JWJames E. Witnauer
James E. Witnauer
DADoriann M. Alcaide
Doriann M. Alcaide
FEFung Ethan
Fung Ethan
RMRobin A. Murphy
Robin A. Murphy
The statistical relation between two events influences the perception of how one event relates to the presence or absence of another. Interestingly, the simultaneous absence of both events, just like their mutual occurrence, is relevant for describing their contingency. In three experiments, we explored the relevance of coabsent events by varying the duration and frequency of trials without stimuli. We used a rapid trial streaming procedure and found that the perceived association between events is enhanced with increasing frequency of coabsent events, unlike the duration of coabsent events, which had little effect. These findings suggest ways in which the benefits of trial spacing, during which both events are absent, could be obtained without increasing total training time. Centrally, this can be done by frequent repeating of shortened coabsent events, each marked by a trial contextual cue. We discuss four potential accounts of how coabsent experience might be processed contributing to this effect: (a) contingency sensitivity, (b) testing effect, (c) reduced associative interference by the context, and (d) reduced encoding interference. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

23 March 2026 in Communications Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SCSantiago Castiello
Santiago Castiello
RPRiddhi Jain Pitliya
Riddhi Jain Pitliya
DLDaniel R. Lametti
Daniel R. Lametti
RMRobin A. Murphy
Robin A. Murphy
People affiliate with others who share their psychological traits. Does the same phenomenon occur with AI instructed to mimic human psychology? Large language models (LLM) were prompted to use language that mimicked anxious symptoms or their absence (Experiment 1; n = 100), extroversion or introversion (Experiment 2; n = 100), and an exact mirror or inverse of participants’ personality (preregistered Experiment 3; n = 100). With full knowledge that they were interacting with an artificial system, participants engaged in written interactions with both LLM versions and then evaluated their engagement. Those with anxiety reported a stronger connection to the LLM that mimicked anxiety, a distinction also reflected in the sentiment of the messages they exchanged. Extroverted participants affiliated more with the AI that mimicked extroversion. Finally, when participants interacted with LLMs that mimicked either their own personality profile or the inverse of their personality (i.e., the opposite pattern of their Big-Five scores), they reported more affiliation with the LLM mimicking their personality; this distinction was also reflected in the sentiment of their messages. Results support affiliation in human-AI interactions based on the linguistic presentation of a shared psychology. We propose that through socioaffective tuning, LLMs might achieve greater human-like correspondence.

7 December 2023 in PsyArXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
DPDarius Parvizi-Wayne
Darius Parvizi-Wayne
LSLars Sandved-Smith
Lars Sandved-Smith
RPRiddhi Jain Pitliya
Riddhi Jain Pitliya
JLJakub Limanowski
Jakub Limanowski
MTMiles R A Tufft
Miles R A Tufft
KFKarl Friston Friston
Karl Friston Friston
Flow has been described as a state of optimal performance, experienced universally across a broad range of domains: from art to athletics, gaming to writing. However, its phenomenal characteristics can, at first glance, be puzzling. Firstly, individuals in flow supposedly report a loss of self-awareness, even though they perform in a manner which seems to evince their agency and skill. Secondly, flow states are felt to be effortless, despite the prerequisite complexity of the tasks that engender them. In this paper, we unpick these features of flow, as well as others, through the active inference framework, which posits that action and perception are forms of active Bayesian inference directed at sustained self-organisation; i.e., the minimisation of variational free energy. We propose that the phenomenology of flow is rooted in the deployment of high precision weight over i) the expected sensory consequences of action and ii) beliefs about how action will sequentially unfold. This computational mechanism thus draws the embodied cognitive system to minimise the ensuing (i.e., expected) free energy through the exploitation of the pragmatic affordances at hand. Furthermore, given the challenging dynamics the flow-inducing situation presents, attention must be wholly focussed on the unfolding task whilst counterfactual planning is restricted, leading to the attested loss of the sense of self-as-object. This involves the inhibition of both the sense of self as a temporally extended object and higher–order, meta-cognitive forms of self-conceptualisation. Nevertheless, we stress that self-awareness is not entirely lost in flow. Rather, it is pre-reflective and bodily. Our approach to bodily-action-centred phenomenology can be applied to similar facets of seemingly agentive experience beyond canonical flow states, providing insights into the mechanisms of so-called selfless experiences, embodied expertise and wellbeing.