FPGAs are being offered in the cloud as accelerator resources that can be shared among multiple users (i.e. tenants). Recently, various approaches have shown that fault attacks launched from one tenant region to another are possible, leading to timing faults or crashes of the FPGA. It is, therefore, important that malicious tenants are limited in their ability to cause such security problems. So far, the existing countermeasures against such attacks check the configuration bitstreams before they are reconfigured. Such offline approaches have various practical limitations, e.g. they may force the tenants to unveil their design secrets. In this paper, we present LoopBreaker, a novel runtime solution that can disable the entire activity of a malicious tenant region, in order to rapidly stop a potential attack before it results in a crash (i.e. Denial-of-Service). We implemented and tested multiple attack types and found that realistic attacks demand at least 12–26 µs to be successful. A partial reconfiguration to overwrite the malicious tenant region demands 200 µs in our realworld implementation, which is too slow to prevent the attack from leading to a crash. Instead, our proposed LoopBreaker method only needs 1.5 µs to stop a malicious tenant, which makes it the first online approach that can successfully stop challenging voltage drop-based attacks from causing a crash.

With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), resource-constrained and power-constrained devices attract more attention. The need for lightweight solutions as alternatives to resource-intensive applications became more urgent. Moreover, as the number of connected devices grew, authenticating them became more challenging. Traditionally, this would be performed by using hash functions and secure memory to store a key, which both come at a high cost. physical unclonable functions (PUFs) emerged as a suitable lightweight alternative to hash functions to authenticate the devices. Using the inherent minute differences between integrated circuits (ICs), they can generate IC-specific responses for input challenges coming from a so-called verifier. Through the years, machine learning (ML) has been used to attack PUFs by modeling them and accurately predicting their response to a given challenge. This stimulated research on ML-resilient PUFs. This resilience came with the significant area and challenge-to-response delay overheads. In this work, we introduce the novel cascaded PUF (CaPUF) and show that it is resilient against state-of-the-art ML-based attacks, i.e., logistic regression (LR) and support vector machines (SVMs). These attacks could not achieve accuracy better than 52% against our CaPUF, which is only as good as flipping a coin. Additionally, our CaPUF requires 89% less area compared to state-of-the-art ML-resilient PUFs.

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been widely considered an attractive security primitive. They use the deviations in the fabrication process to have unique responses from each device. Due to their nature, they serve as a DNA-like identity of the device. But PUFs have also been targeted for attacks. It has been proven that machine learning (ML) can be used to effectively model a PUF design and predict its behavior, leading to leakage of the internal secrets. To combat such attacks, several designs have been proposed to make it harder to model PUFs. One design direction is to use Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) as the building block of the PUF. NVM typically are multi-level cells, i.e, they have several internal states, which makes it harder to model them. However, the current state of the art of NVM-based PUFs is limited to ‘weak PUFs’, i.e., the number of outputs grows only linearly with the number of inputs, which limits the number of possible secret values that can be stored using the PUF. To overcome this limitation, in this work we design the Arbiter Non-Volatile PUF (ANV-PUF) that is exponential in the number of inputs and that is resilient against ML-based modeling. The concept is based on the famous delay-based Arbiter PUF (which is not resilient against modeling attacks) while using NVM as a building block instead of switches. Hence, we replace the switch delays (which are easy to model via ML) with the multi-level property of NVM (which is hard to model via ML). Consequently, our design has the exponential output characteristics of the Arbiter PUF and the resilience against attacks from the NVM-based PUFs. Our results show that the resilience to ML modeling, uniqueness, and uniformity are all in the ideal range of 50%. Thus, in contrast to the state-of-the-art, ANV-PUF is able to be resilient to attacks, while having an exponential number of outputs.

With the rise of the big data, processing in the cloud has become more significant. One method of accelerating applications in the cloud is to use field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to provide the needed acceleration for the user-specific applications. Multitenant FPGAs are a solution to increase efficiency. In this case, multiple cloud users upload their accelerator designs to the same FPGA fabric to use them in the cloud. However, multitenant FPGAs are vulnerable to low-level denial-of-service attacks that induce excessive voltage drops using the legitimate configurations. Through such attacks, the availability of the cloud resources to the nonmalicious tenants can be hugely impacted, leading to downtime and thus financial losses to the cloud service provider. In this article, we propose a tool for the offline classification to identify which FPGA designs can be malicious during operation by analysing the metadata of the bitstream generation step. We generate and test 475 FPGA designs that include 38% malicious designs. We identify and extract five relevant features out of the metadata provided from the bitstream generation step. Using ten-fold cross-validation to train a random forest classifier, we achieve an average accuracy of 97.9%. This significantly surpasses the conservative comparison with the state-of-the-art approaches, which stands at 84.0%, as our approach detects stealthy attacks undetectable by the existing methods.

With the rise of AI, end of Moore's law, and the digitization of public services, the demand for accelerated computing is growing. To address this demand, major cloud service providers like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform have incorporated FPGA instances into their infrastructure with efficient and adaptable resource allocation models. Interest is increasing in multi-tenant FPGAs, which enable multiple users to utilize FPGA resources concurrently, while the FPGA can be split into smaller sections, one per tenant. Nevertheless, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities. For instance, by configuring a malicious circuit in one tenant's section of the FPGA, attacks that cause faults or crash the entire FPGA become feasible, affecting other tenants. By splitting an FPGA into smaller fractions, a single tenant has less potential to cause catastrophic outcomes. However, in this paper, we propose another threat, which is to perform an attack where several malicious tenants coordinate an attack using an unintended covert channel. We practically verify this possibility and introduce such a synchronized and coordinated voltage drop attack from multiple malicious tenants. For synchronization, the malicious tenants use a voltage-based covert channel. Our results show that the communication is robust reaching less than 1% packet error rate and that the attack is successful and avoids state-of-the-art countermeasures.

Emerging non-volatile memory yields, alongside many advantages, technical shortcomings, such as reduced cell lifetime. Although many wear-leveling approaches exist to extend the lifetime of such memories, usually a trade-off for the granularity of wear-leveling has to be made. Due to iterative write schemes (repeatedly sense and write), wear-out of memory in certain systems is directly dependent on the written bit value and thus can be highly imbalanced, requiring dedicated bit-wise wear-leveling. Such a bit-wise wear-leveling so far has only be proposed together with a special hardware support. However, if no dedicated hardware solutions are available, especially for commercial off-the-shelf systems with non-volatile memories, a software solution can be crucial for the system lifetime. In this work, we propose entirely software-based bit-wise wearleveling, where the position of bits within CPU words in main memory is rotated on a regular basis. We leverage the LLVM intermediate representation to adjust load and store operations of the application with a custom compiler pass. Experimental evaluation shows that the lifetime by applying local rotation within the CPU word can be extended by a factor of up to 21×. We also show that our method can incorporate with coarser-grained wear-leveling, e.g. on block granularity and assist achievement of higher lifetime improvements.