30 June 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Security of (semi)-autonomous vehicles is a growing concern, first, due to the increased exposure of the functionality to potential attackers; second, due to the reliance of functionalities on diverse (semi)-autonomous systems; third, due to the interaction of a single-vehicle with myriads of other smart systems in urban traffic infrastructure. Beyond these technical issues, we argue that the security-by-design principle for smart and complex autonomous systems, such as an Autonomous Vehicle (AV) is poorly understood and rarely practiced. Unlike traditional IT systems, where the risk mitigation techniques and adversarial models are well studied and developed with security design principles such as security perimeter and defense-in-depth, the lack of such a framework for connected autonomous systems is plaguing the design and implementation of a secure AV. We attempt to identify the core issues of securing an AV. This is done methodically by developing a security-by-design framework for AV from the first principles. Subsequently, the technical challenges for AV security are identified.
20 March 2025 in ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
Power side-channel attacks exploit the correlation of power consumption with the instructions and data being processed to extract secrets from a device (e.g., cryptographic keys). Prior work primarily focused on protecting small embedded micro-controllers and in-order processors rather than high-performance, out-of-order desktop and server CPUs. In this article, we present Paradise , a general-purpose out-of-order processor with always-on protection, that implements a novel dynamic instruction scheduler to provide obfuscated execution and mitigate power analysis attacks. To achieve this, we exploit the time between operand availability of critical instructions ( slack ) and create high-performance random schedules. Further, we highlight the dangers of using incorrect adversarial assumptions, which can often lead to a false sense of security. Therefore, we perform an extended security analysis on AES-128 using different levels of adversaries, from basic to advanced, including a convolution neural networks–based attack. Our advanced security evaluation assumes a strong adversary with full knowledge of the countermeasure and demonstrates a significant security improvement of 556 × when combined with Boolean Masking over a baseline only protected by masking and 62,500× over an unprotected baseline. The resulting overhead in performance, power, and area of Paradise is 3.2%, 1.2%, and 0.8% respectively. 1
31 May 2025 in ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems
Cryptographic algorithms can be exploited by power side-channel attacks. Thus, it is imperative to perform a thorough pre-silicon security evaluation to minimize these potential threats. Conventional methods using FPGAs and CAD tools for pre-silicon power side-channel evaluation of CPUs can take a long time to complete. In this work, we propose CTScan, a novel platform that uses Coarse-Grained Reconfigurable Arrays (CGRAs) to speedup this evaluation. CTScan first maps the CPU microarchitecture onto the underlying CGRA hardware to mimic the execution patterns. Next, using the CPU instruction trace profiles obtained from a high-level simulator, we translate and then run these traces on the CGRA which allows for the emulated CPU power traces to be obtained for analysis. Our CGRA-based CTScan platform shows an end-to-end speedup improvement of up to 67 \(\times\) speedup over state-of-the-art FPGAs for CPA attack, with comparable correlation to hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proposal that uses CGRAs as a platform for pre-silicon CPU security evaluation. CTScan has been validated against real silicon measurements on the Sakura-X FPGA board and a commercial RISC-V processor (SiFive FE310). Additionally, we present case studies to evaluate the applicability of CTScan when running two commonly used power side-channels.