Security of (semi)-autonomous vehicles is a growing concern, first, due to the increased exposure of the functionality to potential attackers; second, due to the reliance of functionalities on diverse (semi)-autonomous systems; third, due to the interaction of a single-vehicle with myriads of other smart systems in urban traffic infrastructure. Beyond these technical issues, we argue that the security-by-design principle for smart and complex autonomous systems, such as an Autonomous Vehicle (AV) is poorly understood and rarely practiced. Unlike traditional IT systems, where the risk mitigation techniques and adversarial models are well studied and developed with security design principles such as security perimeter and defense-in-depth, the lack of such a framework for connected autonomous systems is plaguing the design and implementation of a secure AV. We attempt to identify the core issues of securing an AV. This is done methodically by developing a security-by-design framework for AV from the first principles. Subsequently, the technical challenges for AV security are identified.

In this work, we present a systematic study of Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) and Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) on structured lattice-based schemes, with main focus on Kyber Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) and Dilithium signature scheme, which are leading candidates in the NIST standardization process for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Through our study, we attempt to understand the underlying similarities and differences between the existing attacks while classifying them into different categories. Given the wide variety of reported attacks, simultaneous protection against all the attacks requires to implement customized protections/countermeasures for both Kyber and Dilithium. We therefore present a range of customized countermeasures, capable of providing defenses/mitigations against existing SCA/FIA, and incorporate several SCA and FIA countermeasures within a single design of Kyber and Dilithium. Among the several countermeasures discussed in this work, we present novel countermeasures that offer simultaneous protection against several SCA- and FIA-based chosen-ciphertext attacks for Kyber KEM. We implement the presented countermeasures within two well-known public software libraries for PQC: (1) pqm4 library for the ARM Cortex-M4-based microcontroller and (2) liboqs library for the Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Plus based on the ARM Cortex-A53 processor. Our performance evaluation reveals that the presented custom countermeasures incur reasonable performance overheads on both the evaluated embedded platforms. We therefore believe our work argues for usage of custom countermeasures within real-world implementations of lattice-based schemes, either in a standalone manner or as reinforcements to generic countermeasures such as masking.

The modern-day computing technologies are continuously undergoing a rapid changing landscape; thus, the demands of new memory types are growing that will be fast, energy efficient and durable. The limited scaling capabilities of the conventional memory technologies are pushing the limits of data-intense applications beyond the scope of silicon-based complementary metal oxide semiconductors (CMOS). Resistive random access memory (RRAM) is one of the most suitable emerging memory technologies candidates that have demonstrated potential to replace state-of-the-art integrated electronic devices for advanced computing and digital and analog circuit applications including neuromorphic networks. RRAM has grown in prominence in the recent years due to its simple structure, long retention, high operating speed, ultra-low-power operation capabilities, ability to scale to lower dimensions without affecting the device performance and the possibility of three-dimensional integration for high-density applications. Over the past few years, research has shown RRAM as one of the most suitable candidates for designing efficient, intelligent and secure computing system in the post-CMOS era. In this manuscript, the journey and the device engineering of RRAM with a special focus on the resistive switching mechanism are detailed. This review also focuses on the RRAM based on two-dimensional (2D) materials, as 2D materials offer unique electrical, chemical, mechanical and physical properties owing to their ultrathin, flexible and multilayer structure. Finally, the applications of RRAM in the field of neuromorphic computing are presented.

In this article, we present the first GPU implementation for FrodoKEM-976 , NewHope-1024, and Kyber-1024 . These algorithms belong to three different classes of post-quantum algorithms: Learning with errors (LWE), Ring-LWE, and Module-LWE. We show the practical applicability of the algorithms in different scenarios using two different implementation approaches. Moreover, we achieve highly efficient realization of computationally expensive operations such as ${\sf NTT}$ (Number Theoretic Transform), matrix multiplication, and Keccak. Since, these are the most common operations in lattice-based cryptographic algorithms, the techniques presented in this article will likely benefit other similar algorithms. Using a ${\sf NVIDIA\ QUADRO\ GV100}$ graphics card, we undertook a detailed experimental study. For NewHope and Kyber we were able to perform approximately 504K and 473K key exchanges per second, demonstrating a speedup of almost 53.1× and 51.05× compared to the reference C implementation. Compared to the optimized ${\sf AVX2}$ versions we obtain speedups of 25.7× and 14.6×, respectively. Further, implementation of FrodoKEM resulted in a speedup of 50.6×, 44.2×, and 36.9× for ${\sf KeyGen}$ , ${\sf Encaps}$ and ${\sf Decaps}$ operations. Compared to its ${\sf AVX2}$ counterpart, we achieved a speedup of about 7.3×, 4.7× and 4.9×, respectively. We also show that using multiple streams resulted in further speedup of about 28–38 percent.

Anupam Chattopadhyay, Santanu Kumar Bhowmik, Abhinaba Roy. Episodes 2020;43:132-44. https://doi.org/10.18814/epiiugs/2020/020008