16 April 2013 in Journal of Supply Chain Management
MRM. Johnny Rungtusanatham
1 May 2017 in Production and Operations Management
17 September 2015 in Decision Sciences
1 January 2015 in Production and Operations Management
1 May 2020 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: We consider two competing electronic waste (e-waste) recovery channels, each of which consists of a collector and a recycler. Collectors obtain donated e-waste and sell the collected items to recyclers or in the secondary market, whereas recyclers process e-waste and sell the recycled material in the commodity market. Each recycler chooses for certification of one of two standards: e-Stewards or Responsible Recycling (R2). E-Stewards requires comparably more responsible handling, thus a higher processing cost, but attracts more e-waste from environmentally conscious donors. Academic/practical relevance: Despite the rapid growth of e-waste, the operations management community still understands little about e-waste processing supply chains. We add to this body of knowledge by capturing three salient features in the e-waste recovery industry: the existence of two recycling standards, the secondary market, and competition both within and between recovery channels. Methodology: We model the problem as a Stackelberg game and characterize the firms’ equilibrium decisions, deriving managerial insights through sensitivity analysis and numerical studies. Results: Competition between recovery channels is a key factor motivating e-Stewards adoption, whereas a recycler always chooses R2 in its absence. Interestingly, when competition exists both within and between recovery channels, recyclers with strong e-waste processing scale economies choose e-Stewards when incurring significantly higher processing costs than with R2. Furthermore, both the total environmental benefit and welfare might be higher when recyclers choose R2. Managerial implications: Policy makers who aim to encourage e-Stewards adoption should (1) lower entry barriers for new recyclers to induce competition, and (2) offer incentive programs to alleviate e-Stewards’ cost disadvantage, though only when recyclers have weak scale economies. Policy makers and nongovernmental organizations, however, should exercise caution in endorsing e-Stewards because R2 actually may generate a higher environmental benefit because of higher recycling volumes.
2 January 2019 in IISE Transactions
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)-based product take-back regulation holds OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturers) of electronics responsible for the collection and recovery (e.g., recycling) of electronic waste (e-waste). This is because of the assumption that recycling these products has a net cost, and unless regulated they end up in landfills and harm the environment. However, in the last decade, advances in product design and recycling technologies have allowed for profitable recycling. This change challenges the basic assumption behind such regulation and creates a competitive marketplace for e-waste. That is, OEMs subject to EPR have to compete with Independent Recyclers (IRs) in collecting and recycling e-waste. Then a natural question is whether EPR achieves its intended goal of increased landfill diversion amid such competition and what its welfare implications are, where welfare is the sum of OEM and IR profits, environmental benefit, and waste-holder surplus. Using an economic model, we find that EPR that focuses on producer responsibility alone may reduce the total landfill diversion and welfare amid competition. A possible remedy in the form of counting IRs collection towards OEM obligations guarantees higher landfill diversion. However, EPR may continue to reduce the total welfare, particularly when OEM recycling replaces more cost-effective IR activity.