Problem definition: We consider two competing electronic waste (e-waste) recovery channels, each of which consists of a collector and a recycler. Collectors obtain donated e-waste and sell the collected items to recyclers or in the secondary market, whereas recyclers process e-waste and sell the recycled material in the commodity market. Each recycler chooses for certification of one of two standards: e-Stewards or Responsible Recycling (R2). E-Stewards requires comparably more responsible handling, thus a higher processing cost, but attracts more e-waste from environmentally conscious donors. Academic/practical relevance: Despite the rapid growth of e-waste, the operations management community still understands little about e-waste processing supply chains. We add to this body of knowledge by capturing three salient features in the e-waste recovery industry: the existence of two recycling standards, the secondary market, and competition both within and between recovery channels. Methodology: We model the problem as a Stackelberg game and characterize the firms’ equilibrium decisions, deriving managerial insights through sensitivity analysis and numerical studies. Results: Competition between recovery channels is a key factor motivating e-Stewards adoption, whereas a recycler always chooses R2 in its absence. Interestingly, when competition exists both within and between recovery channels, recyclers with strong e-waste processing scale economies choose e-Stewards when incurring significantly higher processing costs than with R2. Furthermore, both the total environmental benefit and welfare might be higher when recyclers choose R2. Managerial implications: Policy makers who aim to encourage e-Stewards adoption should (1) lower entry barriers for new recyclers to induce competition, and (2) offer incentive programs to alleviate e-Stewards’ cost disadvantage, though only when recyclers have weak scale economies. Policy makers and nongovernmental organizations, however, should exercise caution in endorsing e-Stewards because R2 actually may generate a higher environmental benefit because of higher recycling volumes.
1 July 2018 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
We consider a manufacturer serving a retailer that sells its product to customers over two periods. Each firm determines its unit price. The retailer orders the product from the manufacturer prior to the beginning of the selling periods. We consider two types of customers: (1) strategic customers who take their future options into account and time their purchases accordingly and (2) myopic customers who consider only their current options. We compare the resulting equilibria for these two scenarios and evaluate the impact of customers’ strategic behavior. We find that strategic customer behavior always benefits the manufacturer. Interestingly, it may also improve the profitability of the retailer and the entire supply chain in some cases. Strategic customer behavior and decentralization are often regarded as detriments to supply chain performance. We find that, however, the combination of these two factors may not result in the worst supply chain performance. When customers are sufficiently patient, a decentralized supply chain that faces strategic customers actually outperforms the supply chain with only one of those factors at play. Finally, we show that when customers are strategic, the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits with price commitment, availability commitment, or quick response can be lower than those when customers are myopic. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0651 .
1 November 2020 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: A manufacturer takes raw material with an exogenous quality distribution to make a traditional product and a coproduct using material of quality above and below a well-established standard, respectively. The market consists of traditional consumers, who are only willing to pay for a product’s consumption value, and some environmentally conscious (i.e., green) consumers, who additionally value the product’s material conservation. In this context, we study the firm’s optimal design of its coproduct, that is, its quality and price decisions. Academic/practical relevance: Motivated by emerging conservation-oriented business practices exemplified by companies such as Taylor Guitars, our study informs resource-dependent firms whether and how to design their product line to leverage a coproduct’s environmental value. Our findings also yield important policy implications regarding the conservation of natural resources. Methodology: We formulate and solve the firm’s challenge as a constrained optimization problem, supplemented with extensive sensitivity analyses and robustness tests. Results: When the material cost is intermediate and consumers are not sufficiently green, the firm should position the coproduct without exploiting its environmental value. Otherwise, the firm should position the coproduct by extracting its environmental value from green consumers, in which case the firm may strategically abandon some traditional consumers by leaving their demand unfulfilled. Managerial implications: Quotas and taxation on material supply in general act as policy substitutes. A greener market may inadvertently result in higher resource consumption and waste. Quotas can mitigate such adverse effects.
20 February 2020 in Operations Management Research