The dominant paradigm for inference in psychology is a null-hypothesis significance testing one. Recently, the foundations of this paradigm have been shake
The feeling of insight in problem solving is typically associated with the sudden realization of a solution that appears obviously correct (Kounios et al., 2006). Salvi and colleagues (2016) found that a solution accompanied with sudden insight is more likely to be correct than a problem solved through conscious and incremental steps. However, Metcalfe (1986) indicated that participants would often present an inelegant but plausible (wrong) answer as correct with a high feeling of warmth (a subjective measure of closeness to solution). This discrepancy may be due to the use of different tasks or due to different methods in the measurement of insight (i.e., using a binary vs continuous scale). In three experiments, we investigated both findings, using many different problem tasks (e.g., Compound Remote Associates, so-called classic insight problems, and non-insight problems). Participants rated insight-related affect (feelings of Aha-experience, confidence, surprise, impasse and pleasure) on continuous scales. As expected we found that, for problems designed to elicit insight, correct solutions elicited higher proportions of reported insight in the solution compared to non-insight solutions; further, correct solutions elicited stronger feelings of insight compared to incorrect solutions.
Exemplar-similarity models such as the exemplar-based random walk (EBRW) model (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997b) were designed to provide a formal account of multidimensional classification choice probabilities and response times (RTs). At the same time, a recurring theme has been to use exemplar models to account for old-new item recognition and to explain relations between classification and recognition. However, a major gap in research is that the models have not been tested on their ability to provide a theoretical account of RTs and other aspects of performance in the classic Sternberg (1966) short-term memory-scanning paradigm, perhaps the most venerable of all recognition-RT tasks. The present research fills that gap by demonstrating that the EBRW model accounts in natural fashion for a wide variety of phenomena involving diverse forms of short-term memory scanning. The upshot is that similar cognitive operating principles may underlie the domains of multidimensional classification and short-term old-new recognition.
12 March 2018 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
We describe and demonstrate an empirical strategy useful for discovering and replicating empirical effects in psychological science. The method involves the design of a metastudy, in which many independent experimental variables—that may be moderators of an empirical effect—are indiscriminately randomized. Radical randomization yields rich datasets that can be used to test the robustness of an empirical claim to some of the vagaries and idiosyncrasies of experimental protocols and enhances the generalizability of these claims. The strategy is made feasible by advances in hierarchical Bayesian modeling that allow for the pooling of information across unlike experiments and designs and is proposed here as a gold standard for replication research and exploratory research. The practical feasibility of the strategy is demonstrated with a replication of a study on subliminal priming.
We formalize and provide tests of a set of logical-rule models for predicting perceptual classification response times (RTs) and choice probabilities. The models are developed by synthesizing mental-architecture, random-walk, and decision-bound approaches. According to the models, people make independent decisions about the locations of stimuli along a set of component dimensions. Those independent decisions are then combined via logical rules to determine the overall categorization response. The time course of the independent decisions is modeled via random-walk processes operating along individual dimensions. Alternative mental architectures are used as mechanisms for combining the independent decisions to implement the logical rules. We derive fundamental qualitative contrasts for distinguishing among the predictions of the rule models and major alternative models of classification RT. We also use the models to predict detailed RT-distribution data associated with individual stimuli in tasks of speeded perceptual classification.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many Governments are instituting mobile tracking technologies to perform rapid contact tracing. However, these technologies are only effective if the public is willing to use them, implying that their perceived public health benefits must outweigh personal concerns over privacy and security. The Australian federal government recently launched the ‘COVIDSafe’ app, designed to anonymously register nearby contacts. If a contact later identifies as infected with COVID-19, health department officials can rapidly followup with their registered contacts to stop the virus’ spread. The current study assessed attitudes towards three tracking technologies (telecommunication network tracking, a government app, and Apple and Google’s Bluetooth exposure notification system) in two representative samples of the Australian public prior to the launch of COVIDSafe. We compared these attitudes to usage of the COVIDSafe app after its launch in a further two representative samples of the Australian public. Using Bayesian methods, we find widespread acceptance for all tracking technologies, however, observe a large intention-behaviour gap between people’s stated attitudes and actual uptake of the COVIDSafe app. We consider the policy implications of these results for Australia and the world at large.