14 August 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Searchable Encryption (SE) is an important technique to guarantee data security and usability in the cloud at the same time. Leveraging Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE), the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Keyword Search (CP-ABKS) scheme can achieve keyword-based retrieval and fine-grained access control simultaneously. However, the single attribute authority in existing CP-ABKS schemes is tasked with costly user certificate verification and secret key distribution. In addition, this results in a single-point performance bottleneck in distributed cloud systems. Thus, in this paper, we present a secure Multi-authority CP-ABKS (MABKS) system to address such limitations and minimize the computation and storage burden on resource-limited devices in cloud systems. In addition, the MABKS system is extended to support malicious attribute authority tracing and attribute update. Our rigorous security analysis shows that the MABKS system is selectively secure in both selective-matrix and selective-attribute models. Our experimental results using real-world datasets demonstrate the efficiency and utility of the MABKS system in practical applications.
12 July 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Vtable reuse attack, as a novel type of code reuse attacks, is introduced to bypass most binary-level control flow integrity enforcement and vtable integrity enforcement. So far, two binary-level defenses (TypeArmor and vfGuard) are proposed to defend against vtable reuse attacks. Both techniques use semantic information as the control flow integrity enforcement policy, i.e., TypeArmor and vfGuard utilize argument register count and dispatch offset at virtual callsite as the signature to check the validity of target functions, respectively. In this paper, we propose layered object-oriented programming (LOOP), an advanced vtable reuse attack, to show that the coarse-grained control flow integrity strategies are still vulnerable to vtable reuse attacks. In LOOP, we introduce argument expansion gadgets and transfer gadgets to, respectively, bypass TypeArmor and vfGuard. We generalize the characteristics of both gadgets and develop a tool to discover them at the binary level. We demonstrated that under the protection of TypeArmor and vfGuard, Firefox, Adobe Flash Player, and Internet Explorer are all vulnerable to LOOP attacks. Furthermore, we show the availability of argument expansion gadgets and transfer gadgets in common software or libraries.
6 April 2018 in Discrete Applied Mathematics