Boris van Leeuwen

Boris van Leeuwen

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Boris van Leeuwen

Department of Economics, Tilburg University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2018 in Management Science
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Journal Article
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BLBoris van Leeuwen
Boris van Leeuwen
CNCharles N. Noussair
Charles N. Noussair
TOTheo Offerman
Theo Offerman
SSSigrid Suetens
Sigrid Suetens
MVMatthijs van Veelen
Matthijs van Veelen
JVJeroen van de Ven
Jeroen van de Ven
Evolutionary explanations of anger as a commitment device hinge on two key assumptions. The first is that it is predictable, ex ante, whether someone will get angry when feeling that he or she has been badly treated. The second is that anger is associated with destructive behavior. We test the validity of these two assumptions. We collected photos of responders in an ultimatum game before they were informed about the game that they would be playing, and we filmed responders with webcams during play. We then showed pairs of photos consisting of one responder who rejected and one responder who accepted (a low offer) to an independent group of observers. We find that observers are better than chance at detecting who rejected the low offer; they do 10% better than random guessing would. We also find that anger at receiving a low offer is associated with rejection.Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2727 .This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

22 February 2019 in Journal of the European Economic Association
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Journal Article
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BLBoris van Leeuwen
Boris van Leeuwen
TOTheo Offerman
Theo Offerman
Arthur SchramArthur Schram
Arthur Schram
We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for status.

20 September 2018 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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BLBoris van Leeuwen
Boris van Leeuwen
ARAbhijit Ramalingam
Abhijit Ramalingam
DADavid Rojo Arjona
David Rojo Arjona
ASArthur Schram
Arthur Schram
We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.

23 December 2020 in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
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Journal Article
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BLBoris van Leeuwen
Boris van Leeuwen
PSPaul Smeets
Paul Smeets
JBJeanne Bovet
Jeanne Bovet
GNGideon Nave
Gideon Nave
JSJonathan Stieglitz
Jonathan Stieglitz
AWAndrew Whitehouse
Andrew Whitehouse
Economic preferences may be shaped by exposure to sex hormones around birth. Prior studies of economic preferences and numerous other phenotypic characteristics use digit ratios (2D : 4D), a purported proxy for prenatal testosterone exposure, whose validity has recently been questioned. We use direct measures of neonatal sex hormones (testosterone and oestrogen), measured from umbilical cord blood ( n = 200) to investigate their association with later-life economic preferences (risk preferences, competitiveness, time preferences and social preferences) in an Australian cohort (Raine Study Gen2). We find no significant associations between testosterone at birth and preferences, except for competitiveness, where the effect runs opposite to the expected direction. Point estimates are between 0.05–0.09 percentage points (pp) and 0.003–0.14 s.d. We similarly find no significant associations between 2D : 4D and preferences ( n = 533, point estimates 0.003–0.02 pp and 0.001–0.06 s.d.). Our sample size allows detecting effects larger than 0.11 pp or 0.22 s.d. for testosterone at birth, and 0.07 pp or 0.14 s.d. for 2D : 4D ( α = 0.05 and power = 0.90). Equivalence tests show that most effects are unlikely to be larger than these bounds. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of prior findings relating 2D : 4D to economic preferences, and highlight the importance of future large-sample studies that permit detection of small effects.

1 March 2022 in Review of Economics and Statistics
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Journal Article
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BLBoris van Leeuwen
Boris van Leeuwen
TOTheo Offerman
Theo Offerman
JVJeroen van de Ven
Jeroen van de Ven
We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.

30 April 2019 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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DCDaniel L. Chen
Daniel L. Chen
AHAstrid Hopfensitz
Astrid Hopfensitz
BLBoris van Leeuwen
Boris van Leeuwen
JVJeroen van de Ven
Jeroen van de Ven
The emotion that someone expresses has consequences for how that person is treated. We study whether people display emotions strategically. In two laboratory experiments, participants play task delegation games in which managers assign a task to one of two workers. When assigning the task, managers see pictures of the workers and we vary whether getting the task is desirable or not. We find that workers strategically adapt their emotional expressions to the incentives they face, and that it indeed pays off to do so. Yet, workers do not exploit the full potential of the strategic display of emotions.