Mark Schopf

Mark Schopf

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Mark Schopf

Department of Economics, University of Hagen, Hagen, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 March 2022 in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GKGilbert Kollenbach
Gilbert Kollenbach
MSMark Schopf
Mark Schopf

19 April 2024 in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AHAchim Hagen
Achim Hagen
MSMark Schopf
Mark Schopf

28 December 2017 in Economics & Politics
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
AVAchim Voss
Achim Voss
MSMark Schopf
Mark Schopf

25 June 2024 in Environmental and Resource Economics
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Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MSMark Schopf
Mark Schopf
This paper analyses the effects of altruism on the formation of climate coalitions in the standard two-stage game of self-enforcing international environmental agreements with identical countries. Altruism implies that each country values, to some extent, every other country’s welfare when deciding on its coalition membership and emissions policy. In the Nash [Stackelberg] game, the fringe [coalition] countries exploit the altruism of the coalition [fringe] countries so that altruism decreases [increases] the coalition size. In any case, global emissions and global welfare are close to the non-cooperative values. However, altruism narrows the gap between the individually optimal emissions and the socially optimal emissions, so altruism increases global welfare. The effects of altruism on the formation of climate coalitions crucially depends on its modelling: If altruism affects the membership decision but not the policy decision, or if each coalition country is more altruistic toward other coalition countries than toward fringe countries, altruism can stabilise large coalitions up to the grand coalition. Finally, altruism can stabilise small coalitions but destabilises large coalitions with asymmetric countries.

9 January 2025 in Environmental and Resource Economics
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Journal Article
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TEThomas Eichner
Thomas Eichner
MSMark Schopf
Mark Schopf
This paper analyzes international environmental agreements in three-stage games consisting of a membership subgame, the signatories’ decision on the intensity of cooperation, and an emissions subgame. Signatories may act as Stackelberg leaders or play Nash. In the Stackelberg game, the highest intensity of cooperation between signatories is optimal. In the Nash game, a moderate or the highest intensity of cooperation is optimal if emissions are strategic substitutes. In this case the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Nash game with optimal cooperation intensity are identical to the equilibrium emissions and the stable coalition of the Stackelberg game with the highest cooperation intensity. Finally, we apply our results to coalition formation games of the literature. In the applied Nash games, optimizing with respect to the cooperation intensity may enlarge the stable coalition up to the grand coalition which implements the first best.

21 August 2019 in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
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Journal Article
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TEThomas Eichner
Thomas Eichner
GKGilbert Kollenbach
Gilbert Kollenbach
MSMark Schopf
Mark Schopf