Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.
27 December 2024 in Environmental Research Letters
Despite the urgent need for ambitious national climate policies to reduce carbon emissions, their implementation lacks stringency. This lack of policy stringency is driven by a complex combination of a country’s numerous politico-economic, institutional and socio-economic characteristics. While extant studies aim at estimating causal effects between a selection of such characteristics and policy stringency, we examine the importance of a comprehensive set of predictors that underlie such empirical models. For this purpose, we employ machine-learning methods on a data set covering 22 potential predictors of policy stringency for 95 countries. Conditional random forests suggest that the most important predictors of policy stringency are of institutional nature: freedom (of press, media, associations, and elections), governmental effectiveness, and control of corruption. Further, accumulated local effects plots suggest that the relationship between some predictors, e.g. freedom or education, and policy stringency is highly non-linear.
19 April 2024 in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management