Inder K. Khurana

Inder K. Khurana

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Inder K. Khurana

University of Missouri

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2008 in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
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Journal Article
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JBJeff P. Boone
Jeff P. Boone
IKInder K. Khurana
Inder K. Khurana
KRK. K. Raman
K. K. Raman
Although investor perceptions of audit quality play a critical role in maintaining systemic confidence in the integrity of financial accounting reports (Levitt [2000]), prior research on the effects of auditor tenure from an investor perspective is relatively sparse. In this study, we investigate whether investors price audit firm tenure for Big Five audits by examining the relation between tenure and the ex ante equity risk premium, that is, the excess of the company-specific ex ante cost of equity capital over the risk-free interest rate. Based on prior research, whereas the “auditor learning” argument predicts that audit quality will change in only one direction (i.e., improve) with tenure, the “auditor-client closeness” argument suggests that audit quality may decrease beyond some (albeit unspecified) length of tenure because of impaired auditor independence and objectivity. Consistent with prior theoretical arguments, we find some evidence of a nonlinear relation between audit firm tenure and the ex ante equity risk premium, that is, we find that the equity risk premium decreases in the early years of tenure but increases with additional years of tenure. These findings persist after we control for well-known risk factors and company characteristics that have been shown in prior research to be related to the cost of equity capital. The implications of our findings are discussed.

27 June 2008 in European Accounting Review
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Journal Article
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JFJere R. Francis
Jere R. Francis
IKInder K. Khurana
Inder K. Khurana
XMXiumin Martin
Xiumin Martin
RPRaynolde Pereira
Raynolde Pereira
This paper investigates voluntary adoptions of International Accounting Standards (IAS) by private enterprises, and builds on prior research which posits that higher quality financial reports through IAS adoption can reduce information asymmetry and facilitate contracting with external parties. Specifically, we pursue the following questions. First, do firm-specific incentives matter in the IAS adoption decision after controlling for country-level institutional factors? Second, does the relative importance of firm vs. country factors vary across institutional settings? Using a sample of 3,722 small and medium-sized private enterprises from 56 countries, we report two primary findings. First, both firm and country factors matter in the voluntary IAS adoption decision. Second, when we focus on sub-samples of countries partitioned by the level of economic development, we find that firm factors dominate country factors in more developed countries, while in less developed countries, country factors dominate firm factors in explaining IAS adoptions. This result is consistent with the argument in Doidge et al. (Journal of Financial Economics, 86(1), pp. 1–39, 2007 Doidge, C. , Karolyi, A. and Stulz, R. 2007. Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(1): 1–39. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar] ) that firm incentives are more important in explaining governance choices (including accounting) in more developed countries where the benefits from better governance are more likely to exceed the attendant costs. Collectively, our results suggest that less developed countries can enhance the benefits from IAS adoptions by developing institutions which facilitate private contracting.

1 January 2015 in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
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IKInder K. Khurana
Inder K. Khurana
CWChangjiang (John) Wang
Changjiang (John) Wang

14 April 2009 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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CBChristof Beuselinck
Christof Beuselinck
PJPhilip Joos
Philip Joos
IKInder K. Khurana
Inder K. Khurana
SMSofie Van der Meulen
Sofie Van der Meulen
In this paper, we examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS reduces firm opacity and contributes to stock price informativeness. Using data from EU countries, we document a V-shaped pattern in stock return synchronicity around IFRS adoption which is consistent with IFRS disclosures revealing new firm-specific information in the adoption period (i.e., a reduction of synchronicity) and subsequently lowering the surprise of future disclosures (i.e., an increase in synchronicity). We also find that mandatory IFRS adoption (1) increases analyst ability to incorporate industry-level information into stock prices and (2) reduces the private information advantage enjoyed by institutional owners. Further, our results are especially driven by firms domiciled in strong enforcement countries, highlighting the importance of enforcement quality for the transparency effects of IFRS. Overall, our study highlights the role of several key elements of the information environment and how these elements interact with accounting standards.

1 October 2001 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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JFJere R. Francis
Jere R. Francis
IKInder K. Khurana
Inder K. Khurana
RPRaynolde Pereira
Raynolde Pereira
Recent research documents that common law countries have stronger investor protection laws and more developed financial markets than civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). This line of inquiry is extended in our study to examine if variations in legal systems also affect accounting and auditing. For a sample of 31 countries, we document that national accounting standards are more timely (accrual-based) and transparent in common law countries, which is consistent with a greater role played by the public disclosure of accrual-based accounting information in corporate governance in these countries. There is also greater demand for auditing as an enforcement mechanism when accounting is more timely and transparent. We also examine if causality could run from high-quality accounting and auditing to the development of financial markets. La Porta et al. (1998) conjecture that high-quality accounting could mitigate the negative effect of weak investor protection on the development of financial markets. Specifically, we examine if those civil law countries that have more timely and transparent accounting, and more auditing, also have more developed financial markets relative to other civil law countries. We find little support that this is case, which raises questions about the rationale for the international harmonization of accounting and the work of the International Accounting Standards Committee, absent fundamental changes in investor protection laws of civil law countries.

1 January 2018 in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
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Journal Article
Closed access
MBMatthew Baugh
Matthew Baugh
JBJeff P. Boone
Jeff P. Boone
IKInder K. Khurana
Inder K. Khurana
KRK. K. Raman
K. K. Raman
SUMMARY: We examine the consequences of misconduct in a Big 4 firm's nonaudit practice for its audit practice. Specifically, we examine whether KPMG's audit practice suffered a loss of audit fees and clients and/or a decline in factual audit quality following the 2005 deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the Department of Justice for marketing questionable tax shelters. We find little evidence that the DPA adversely impacted KPMG's audit practice by way of either audit fees or the likelihood of client gains/losses, suggesting little or no harm to KPMG's audit reputation. We also find that the DPA had no effect on the firm's factual audit quality, even for those audit clients that dropped KPMG as their tax service provider. Collectively, our findings suggest that there was no spillover effect from the DPA to KPMG's audit practice. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.