1 September 2018 in The Accounting Review
Using a large sample of multinational corporations (MNCs), we examine the location of earnings management within the firm. We posit and find that MNCs manage their consolidated earnings through an orchestrated reporting strategy across subsidiaries over which they exert significant influence. Specifically, we find that headquarters' influence on subsidiary earnings management increases with the degree of subsidiary integration and the extent of earnings management opportunities. Most importantly, we provide evidence that MNCs exploit regulatory arbitrage opportunities arising from cross-country differences in institutional quality. We document that, in response to exogenous improvements in the quality of their home-country institutions, MNCs rebalance their reporting strategies by clustering earnings management in subsidiaries from countries with more lenient regulations. Taken together, our findings yield important insights on the drivers of earnings management location within the firm and highlight the need for better cross-country coordination in regulatory design. JEL Classifications: F23; G15; G34; G38; M41; M48.
19 October 2014 in Review of Accounting Studies
14 April 2009 in SSRN Electronic Journal
In this paper, we examine whether mandatory adoption of IFRS reduces firm opacity and contributes to stock price informativeness. Using data from EU countries, we document a V-shaped pattern in stock return synchronicity around IFRS adoption which is consistent with IFRS disclosures revealing new firm-specific information in the adoption period (i.e., a reduction of synchronicity) and subsequently lowering the surprise of future disclosures (i.e., an increase in synchronicity). We also find that mandatory IFRS adoption (1) increases analyst ability to incorporate industry-level information into stock prices and (2) reduces the private information advantage enjoyed by institutional owners. Further, our results are especially driven by firms domiciled in strong enforcement countries, highlighting the importance of enforcement quality for the transparency effects of IFRS. Overall, our study highlights the role of several key elements of the information environment and how these elements interact with accounting standards.
10 December 2007 in SSRN Electronic Journal
We investigate the comparability of accounting earnings for 14 EU countries in the period 1990-2005. Although prior studies have documented international differences in financial reporting properties, there is hardly any large-scale international evidence on the underlying fundamentals driving these differences. The European Union is a particularly interesting setting to study because of the substantial efforts to create a single economic market across countries. We focus on the accruals - cash flow association as in Ball and Shivakumar (2005; 2006) and show that accruals measurement is substantially affected by the business cycle stage and firm specific reporting incentives. Incentives arise from the equity capital market, debt financing and labor markets. These incentives are further intensified by the design of a country's institutional framework, such as stock market development, importance of bank financing and labor union membership. In addition, our results suggest that the mandatory introduction of IFRS in 2005 did not instantly bring about the expected improvement in earnings comparability across Europe. Our results provide important insights for the ongoing debate on standards versus incentives.
1 January 2010 in SSRN Electronic Journal
This study examines the properties of the information contained in analysts’ earnings forecasts for mandatory IFRS adopters in Europe for the period 2003-07. We
1 January 2010 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Using a large sample of multinational corporations (MNCs), we examine the location of earnings management within the firm. We posit and find that MNCs manage their consolidated earnings through an orchestrated reporting strategy across subsidiaries over which they exert significant influence. Specifically, we find that headquarters’ influence on subsidiary earnings management increases with the degree of subsidiary integration and the extent of earnings management opportunities. Most importantly, we provide evidence that MNCs exploit regulatory arbitrage opportunities arising from cross-country differences in institutional quality. We document that MNCs headquartered in jurisdictions with stricter regulations manage earnings through subsidiaries domiciled in countries where regulations are weaker. A difference-in-differences estimation reveals that, in response to exogenous improvements in the quality of their home-country institutions, MNCs rebalance their reporting strategies by clustering earnings management in subsidiaries from countries with more lenient regulations. Taken together, our findings yield important insights on the drivers of earnings management location within the firm and highlight the need for better cross-country coordination in regulatory design.