Triggering receptor expressed on myeloid cell 2 (TREM2), a myeloid cell‐specific signaling molecule, controls essential functions of microglia and impacts on the pathogenesis of Alzheimer's disease and other neurodegenerative disorders. TREM2 is also highly expressed in tumor‐associated macrophages in different types of cancer. Here, we studied whether TREM2 influences glioma progression. We found a gender‐dependent effect of glioma growth in wild‐type (WT) animals injected with GL261‐EGFP glioma cells. Most importantly, TREM2 promotes glioma progression in male but not female animals. The accumulation of glioma‐associated microglia/macrophages (GAMs) and CD31+ blood vessel density is reduced in male TREM2‐deficient mice. A transcriptomic analysis of glioma tissue revealed that TREM2 deficiency suppresses immune‐related genes. In an organotypic slice model devoid of functional vascularization and immune components from periphery, the tumor size was not affected by TREM2‐deficiency. In human resection samples from glioblastoma, TREM2 is upregulated in GAMs. Based on the Cancer Genome Atlas Program (TCGA) and the Chinese Glioma Genome Atlas (CGGA) databases, the TREM2 expression levels were negatively correlated with survival. Thus, the TREM2‐dependent crosstalk between GAMs and the vasculature formation promotes glioma growth.
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have revolutionized the field of computer vision like object detection with their unparalleled performance. However, existing research has shown that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In the physical world, an adversary could exploit adversarial patches to implement a Hiding Attack (HA) which patches the target object to make it disappear from the detector, and an Appearing Attack (AA) which fools the detector into misclassifying the patch as a specific object. Recently, many defense methods for detectors have been proposed to mitigate the potential threats of adversarial patches. However, such methods still have limitations in generalization, robustness and efficiency. Most defenses are only effective against the HA, leaving the detector vulnerable to the AA. In this paper, we propose NutNet, an innovative model for detecting adversarial patches, with high generalization, robustness and efficiency. With experiments for six detectors including YOLOv2-v4, SSD, Faster RCNN and DETR on both digital and physical domains, the results show that our proposed method can effectively defend against both the HA and AA, with only 0.4% sacrifice of the clean performance. We compare NutNet with four baseline defense methods for detectors, and our method exhibits an average defense performance that is over 2.4 times and 4.7 times higher than existing approaches for HA and AA, respectively. In addition, NutNet only increases the inference time by 8%, which can meet the real-time requirements of the detection systems. Demos and the full paper of NutNet are available at: https://sites.google.com/view/nutnet.