11 May 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Error Detection/Correction Codes (EDCs/ECCs) are the most conventional approaches to protect on-chip caches against radiation-induced soft errors. The overhead of EDCs/ECCs is a major concern and is of decisive importance when a higher protection capability is required to tolerate multiple adjacent bit errors (burst errors). This paper proposes the ECC-United Cache (EUC) architecture to improve the efficiency of EDCs/ECCs in L1 caches. EUC architecture extends the data protection granularity from a single word to multiple words by exploiting the parallel cache lines access, which is inherently available in the cache. As compared with the conventional architecture, EUC can be configured to provide: 1) the same protection capability with a significantly lower overhead, 2) a significantly higher protection capability with the same number of check bits, or 3) a trade-off between the former two features. Simulation results show that, when configured to minimize the overhead, EUC reduces the number of check bits by 69\% and 75\% in data-cache and instruction-cache, respectively. When configured to maximize the protection capability, EUC provides fourfold higher burst error detection/correction capability. Moreover, EUC is orthogonal to previous protection schemes and they can be redesigned based on the EUC architecture to further improve their efficiency.
18 December 2017 in IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
Researchers widely employ hardware performance counters (HPCs) as well as debugging and profiling tools in processors for monitoring different events such as cache hits, cache misses, and branch prediction statistics during the execution of programs. The collected information can be used for power, performance, and thermal management of the system as well as detecting anomalies or malicious behavior in the software. However, monitoring new or complex events using HPCs and existing tools is a challenging task because HPCs only provide a fixed pool of raw events to monitor. To address this challenge, we propose the implementation of a programmable hardware monitor in a complete system framework including the hardware monitor architecture and its interface with an in-order single-issue RISC-V processor as well as an operating system. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate how to programmatically implement a shadow stack using our hardware monitor and how the programmed shadow stack detects stack buffer overflow attacks. Our hardware monitor design incurs a 26% power overhead and a 15% area overhead over an unmodified RISC-V processor. Our programmed shadow stack has less than 3% performance overhead in the worst case.