Jian-Cai Wang

Jian-Cai Wang

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Jian-Cai Wang

School of Management Beijing Institute of Technology Beijing People's Republic of China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 October 2017 in International Transactions in Operational Research
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Journal Article
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JWJian‐Cai Wang
Jian‐Cai Wang
YWYao‐Yu Wang
Yao‐Yu Wang
FLFujun Lai
Fujun Lai

25 December 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
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Journal Article
Closed access
YWYao-Yu Wang
Yao-Yu Wang
JZJingjing Zhao
Jingjing Zhao
JWJian-Cai Wang
Jian-Cai Wang
FLFujun Lai
Fujun Lai
Recently, an increasing number of platforms have begun to serve as marketplaces, which allow upstream manufacturers to directly connect with consumers. In this prevalent selling mode, a platform commonly charges manufacturers commissions through the revenue-sharing format or fixed-rent format. By building game-theoretical models, this study investigates the performance differences between the two commission formats and explores the optimal commission strategy of the platform facing competing manufacturers. Our results show that compared to the fixed-rent format, the revenue-sharing format, which leads to lower required per-unit commissions, lower prices, and higher demand, can weaken the platform's dominance. In addition, the competition between upstream manufacturers plays a critical role in the choice of the commission format by the platform. Specifically, when the competition intensity is low, as the commission rate increases, the platform's preference evolves from a pure fixed-rent strategy to a hybrid strategy and then to a pure revenue-sharing strategy. As upstream competition intensifies, the platform's preference for the revenue-sharing format begins to wane. That is, when the competition intensity is moderate, a hybrid strategy is preferred by the platform even if the commission rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, when upstream competition is fierce, the platform should adopt the pure fixed-rent strategy, regardless of the commission rate. Furthermore, we also find that the dominant strategy of both manufacturers is to adopt the revenue-sharing format. However, neither of them can achieve the highest profit in the equilibrium outcome. If a manufacturer wants to win the competition, she must make efforts to induce her competitor to adopt the fixed-rent format while maintaining her own dominant commission choice.

15 February 2023 in Journal of the Operational Research Society
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Journal Article
Closed access
YWYao-Yu Wang
Yao-Yu Wang
YTYue Tan
Yue Tan
JWJian-Cai Wang
Jian-Cai Wang
FLFujun Lai
Fujun Lai
This paper investigates how dominant retailers should choose appropriate markup pricing strategies (a fixed-dollar markup, or a percentage markup), and how their supplier responds by choosing wholesale pricing strategies (a retailer-specific wholesale pricing, or a uniform wholesale pricing). Our results show that, all other things being equal, the uniform wholesale pricing strategy weakens the position of the retailers in the supply chain and thus is more favorable for the supplier. Specifically, when both retailers choose the same markup scheme, it is better for the supplier to choose the uniform wholesale pricing strategy since it can lead a higher profit for himself. The uniform wholesale pricing strategy also benefits the whole channel and the end-consumers, but hurts the dominant retailers. When the two retailers choose different markup schemes, the best choice for the supplier will still be the uniform wholesale pricing scheme if the level of downstream competition is sufficiently high; otherwise, the supplier would prefer the retailer-specific wholesale pricing scheme. The preference of the retailer using fixed-dollar markup pricing is just the opposite as compared to that of the supplier, while the retailer using percentage markup pricing always prefers retailer-specific wholesale pricing. Besides, the uniform wholesale pricing is beneficial to the whole channel. After anticipating the supplier’s reactions, both retailers are better off choosing percentage markup pricing no matter which wholesale pricing strategy the supplier chooses and what the level of competition is. Therefore, the final equilibrium would be the case where the dominant retailers choose the percentage-markup variant and the supplier always responds by adopting the uniform pricing scheme no matter what the level of bcompetition is. This equilibrium enhances the supply chain efficiency and benefits the end-consumers since it leads to the highest channel profits and the lowest retailing prices. Moreover, under this equilibrium, the supplier gets better while the retailers get worse as the level of competition increases.

15 May 2026 in Reliability Engineering & System Safety
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Journal Article
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JWJian-Cai Wang
Jian-Cai Wang
ZQZhengxia Qiu
Zhengxia Qiu
QQQingan Qiu
Qingan Qiu

14 December 2025 in International Transactions in Operational Research
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Journal Article
Closed access
ZGZi‐Han Gong
Zi‐Han Gong
JWJian‐Cai Wang
Jian‐Cai Wang
YWYao‐Yu Wang
Yao‐Yu Wang
DXDan‐Yang Xu
Dan‐Yang Xu

18 May 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
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TJTao Jin
Tao Jin
JSJianting Shi
Jianting Shi
YCYinan Chen
Yinan Chen
JWJiancai Wang
Jiancai Wang