29 May 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Efficient and fair allocation of multiple types of resources is a crucial objective in a cloud/distributed computing cluster. Users may have diverse resource needs. Furthermore, diversity in server properties/capabilities may mean that only a subset of servers may be usable by a given user. In platforms with such heterogeneity, we identify important limitations in existing multi-resource fair allocation mechanisms, notably Dominant Resource Fairness and its follow-up work. To overcome such limitations, we propose a new server-based approach; each server allocates resources by maximizing a per-server utility function. We propose a specific class of utility functions which, when appropriately parameterized, adjusts the trade-off between efficiency and fairness, and captures a variety of fairness measures (such as our recently proposed Per-Server Dominant Share Fairness). We establish conditions for the proposed mechanism to satisfy certain properties that are generally deemed desirable, e.g., envy-freeness, sharing incentive, bottleneck fairness, and Pareto optimality. To implement our resource allocation mechanism, we develop an iterative algorithm which is shown to be globally convergent. Subsequently, we show how the proposed mechanism could be implemented in a distributed fashion. Finally, we carry out extensive trace-driven simulations to show the enhanced performance of our proposed mechanism over the existing ones.
1 August 2019 in Neural Computation
A significant threat to the recent, wide deployment of machine learning–based systems, including deep neural networks (DNNs), is adversarial learning attacks. The main focus here is on evasion attacks against DNN-based classifiers at test time. While much work has focused on devising attacks that make small perturbations to a test pattern (e.g., an image) that induce a change in the classifier's decision, until recently there has been a relative paucity of work defending against such attacks. Some works robustify the classifier to make correct decisions on perturbed patterns. This is an important objective for some applications and for natural adversary scenarios. However, we analyze the possible digital evasion attack mechanisms and show that in some important cases, when the pattern (image) has been attacked, correctly classifying it has no utility---when the image to be attacked is (even arbitrarily) selected from the attacker's cache and when the sole recipient of the classifier's decision is the attacker. Moreover, in some application domains and scenarios, it is highly actionable to detect the attack irrespective of correctly classifying in the face of it (with classification still performed if no attack is detected). We hypothesize that adversarial perturbations are machine detectable even if they are small. We propose a purely unsupervised anomaly detector (AD) that, unlike previous works, (1) models the joint density of a deep layer using highly suitable null hypothesis density models (matched in particular to the nonnegative support for rectified linear unit (ReLU) layers); (2) exploits multiple DNN layers; and (3) leverages a source and destination class concept, source class uncertainty, the class confusion matrix, and DNN weight information in constructing a novel decision statistic grounded in the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Tested on MNIST and CIFAR image databases under three prominent attack strategies, our approach outperforms previous detection methods, achieving strong receiver operating characteristic area under the curve detection accuracy on two attacks and better accuracy than recently reported for a variety of methods on the strongest (CW) attack. We also evaluate a fully white box attack on our system and demonstrate that our method can be leveraged to strong effect in detecting reverse engineering attacks. Finally, we evaluate other important performance measures such as classification accuracy versus true detection rate and multiple measures versus attack strength.
1 July 2014 in Journal of Advanced Research
We propose a method for detecting anomalous domain names, with focus on algorithmically generated domain names which are frequently associated with malicious activities such as fast flux service networks, particularly for bot networks (or botnets), malware, and phishing. Our method is based on learning a (null hypothesis) probability model based on a large set of domain names that have been white listed by some reliable authority. Since these names are mostly assigned by humans, they are pronounceable, and tend to have a distribution of characters, words, word lengths, and number of words that are typical of some language (mostly English), and often consist of words drawn from a known lexicon. On the other hand, in the present day scenario, algorithmically generated domain names typically have distributions that are quite different from that of human-created domain names. We propose a fully generative model for the probability distribution of benign (white listed) domain names which can be used in an anomaly detection setting for identifying putative algorithmically generated domain names. Unlike other methods, our approach can make detections without considering any additional (latency producing) information sources, often used to detect fast flux activity. Experiments on a publicly available, large data set of domain names associated with fast flux service networks show encouraging results, relative to several baseline methods, with higher detection rates and low false positive rates.
13 April 2021 in Neural Computation
Backdoor data poisoning attacks add mislabeled examples to the training set, with an embedded backdoor pattern, so that the classifier learns to classify to a target class whenever the backdoor pattern is present in a test sample. Here, we address posttraining detection of scene-plausible perceptible backdoors, a type of backdoor attack that can be relatively easily fashioned, particularly against DNN image classifiers. A post-training defender does not have access to the potentially poisoned training set, only to the trained classifier, as well as some unpoisoned examples that need not be training samples. Without the poisoned training set, the only information about a backdoor pattern is encoded in the DNN's trained weights. This detection scenario is of great import considering legacy and proprietary systems, cell phone apps, as well as training outsourcing, where the user of the classifier will not have access to the entire training set. We identify two important properties of scene-plausible perceptible backdoor patterns, spatial invariance and robustness, based on which we propose a novel detector using the maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) statistic. We detect whether the trained DNN has been backdoor-attacked and infer the source and target classes. Our detector outperforms existing detectors and, coupled with an imperceptible backdoor detector, helps achieve posttraining detection of most evasive backdoors of interest.
28 April 2008 in ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
We present a simple, deterministic mathematical model for the spread of randomly scanning and bandwidth-saturating Internet worms. Such worms include Slammer and Witty, both of which spread extremely rapidly. Our model, consisting of coupled Kermack-McKendrick (a.k.a. stratified susceptibles-infectives (SI)) equations, captures both the measured scanning activity of the worm and the network limitation of its spread, that is, the effective scan-rate per worm/infective. The Internet is modeled as an ideal core network to which each peripheral (e.g., enterprise) network is connected via a single access link. It is further assumed in this note that as soon as a single end-system in the peripheral network is infected by the worm, the subsequent scanning of the rest of the Internet saturates the access link, that is, there is “instant” saturation. We fit our model to available data for the Slammer worm and demonstrate the model's ability to accurately represent Slammer's total scan-rate to the core.