Zhen Xiang

Zhen Xiang

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Zhen Xiang

School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 February 2020 in Proceedings of the IEEE
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DMDavid Miller
David Miller
ZXZhen Xiang
Zhen Xiang
GKGeorge Kesidis
George Kesidis
With wide deployment of machine learning (ML)-based systems for a variety of applications including medical, military, automotive, genomic, multimedia, and social networking, there is great potential for damage from adversarial learning (AL) attacks. In this article, we provide a contemporary survey of AL, focused particularly on defenses against attacks on deep neural network classifiers. After introducing relevant terminology and the goals and range of possible knowledge of both attackers and defenders, we survey recent work on test-time evasion (TTE), data poisoning (DP), backdoor DP, and reverse engineering (RE) attacks and particularly defenses against the same. In so doing, we distinguish robust classification from anomaly detection (AD), unsupervised from supervised, and statistical hypothesis-based defenses from ones that do not have an explicit null (no attack) hypothesis. We also consider several scenarios for detecting backdoors. We provide a technical assessment for reviewed works, including identifying any issues/limitations, required hyperparameters, needed computational complexity, as well as the performance measures evaluated and the obtained quality. We then delve deeper, providing novel insights that challenge conventional AL wisdom and that target unresolved issues, including: robust classification versus AD as a defense strategy; the belief that attack success increases with attack strength, which ignores susceptibility to AD; small perturbations for TTE attacks: a fallacy or a requirement; validity of the universal assumption that a TTE attacker knows the ground-truth class for the example to be attacked; black, gray, or white-box attacks as the standard for defense evaluation; and susceptibility of query-based RE to an AD defense. We also discuss attacks on the privacy of training data. We then present benchmark comparisons of several defenses against TTE, RE, and backdoor DP attacks on images. The article concludes with a discussion of continuing research directions, including the supreme challenge of detecting attacks whose goal is not to alter classification decisions, but rather simply to embed, without detection, ``fake news'' or other false content.

16 December 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZXZhen Xiang
Zhen Xiang
DMDavid Miller
David Miller
GKGeorge Kesidis
George Kesidis
With wide deployment of deep neural network (DNN) classifiers, there is great potential for harm from adversarial learning attacks. Recently, a special type of data poisoning (DP) attack, known as a backdoor (or Trojan), was proposed. These attacks do not seek to degrade classification accuracy, but rather to have the classifier learn to classify to a target class t* whenever the backdoor pattern is present in a test example originally from a source class s*. Launching backdoor attacks does not require knowledge of the classifier or its training process--only the ability to poison the training set with exemplars containing a backdoor pattern (labeled with the target class). Defenses against backdoors can be deployed before/during training, post-training, or at test time. Here, we address post-training detection in DNN image classifiers, seldom considered in existing works, wherein the defender does not have access to the poisoned training set, but only to the trained classifier itself, as well as to clean (unpoisoned) examples from the classification domain. This scenario is of great interest because e.g., a classifier may be the basis of a phone app that will be shared with many users. Detection may thus reveal a widespread attack. We propose a purely unsupervised anomaly detection (AD) defense against imperceptible backdoor attacks that: 1) detects whether the trained DNN has been backdoor-attacked; 2) infers the source and target classes in a detected attack; 3) estimates the backdoor pattern itself. Our AD approach involves learning (via suitable cost function minimization) the minimum size/norm perturbation (putative backdoor) required to induce the classifier to misclassify (most) examples from class s to class t, for all (s,t) pairs. Our hypothesis is that nonattacked pairs require large perturbations, while the attacked pair (s*, t*) requires much smaller ones. This is convincingly borne out experimentally. We identify a variety of plausible cost functions and devise a novel, robust hypothesis testing approach to perform detection inference. We test our approach, in comparison with the state-of-the-art methods, for several backdoor patterns, attack settings and mechanisms, and data sets and demonstrate its favorability. Our defense essentially requires setting a single hyperparameter (the detection threshold), which can e.g., be chosen to fix the system's false positive rate.\enlargethispage8pt

1 July 2021 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZXZhen Xiang
Zhen Xiang
DMDavid J. Miller
David J. Miller
GKGeorge Kesidis
George Kesidis

13 April 2021 in Neural Computation
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZXZhen Xiang
Zhen Xiang
DMDavid Miller
David Miller
HWHang Wang
Hang Wang
GKGeorge Kesidis
George Kesidis
Backdoor data poisoning attacks add mislabeled examples to the training set, with an embedded backdoor pattern, so that the classifier learns to classify to a target class whenever the backdoor pattern is present in a test sample. Here, we address posttraining detection of scene-plausible perceptible backdoors, a type of backdoor attack that can be relatively easily fashioned, particularly against DNN image classifiers. A post-training defender does not have access to the potentially poisoned training set, only to the trained classifier, as well as some unpoisoned examples that need not be training samples. Without the poisoned training set, the only information about a backdoor pattern is encoded in the DNN's trained weights. This detection scenario is of great import considering legacy and proprietary systems, cell phone apps, as well as training outsourcing, where the user of the classifier will not have access to the entire training set. We identify two important properties of scene-plausible perceptible backdoor patterns, spatial invariance and robustness, based on which we propose a novel detector using the maximum achievable misclassification fraction (MAMF) statistic. We detect whether the trained DNN has been backdoor-attacked and infer the source and target classes. Our detector outperforms existing detectors and, coupled with an imperceptible backdoor detector, helps achieve posttraining detection of most evasive backdoors of interest.

13 February 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XLXi Li
Xi Li
DMDavid Miller
David Miller
ZXZhen Xiang
Zhen Xiang
GKGeorge Kesidis
George Kesidis
Data Poisoning (DP) is an effective attack that causes trained classifiers to misclassify their inputs. DP attacks significantly degrade a classifier's accuracy by covertly injecting attack samples into the training set. Broadly applicable to different classifier structures, without strong assumptions about the attacker, an unsupervised Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)-based mixture model defense against “error generic” DP attacks is herein proposed that: 1) addresses the most challenging embedded DP scenario wherein, if DP is present, the poisoned samples are an a priori unknown subset of the training set, and with no clean validation set available; 2) applies a mixture model both to well-fit potentially multi-modal class distributions and to capture poisoned samples within a small subset of the mixture components; and 3) jointly identifies poisoned components and samples by minimizing the BIC cost defined over the whole training set, with the identified poisoned data removed prior to classifier training. Our experimental results, for various classifier structures and benchmark datasets, demonstrate the effectiveness of our defense under strong DP attacks, as well as its superiority over other DP defenses.

1 May 2013
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
YWYun Wang
Yun Wang
ZXZhen James Xiang
Zhen James Xiang
PRPeter J. Ramadge
Peter J. Ramadge
Recently, methods of screening the lasso problem have been developed that use the target vector x to quickly identify a subset of columns of the dictionary that will receive zero weight in the solution. Current classes of screening tests are based on bounding the dual lasso solution within a sphere or the intersection of a sphere and a half space. Stronger tests are possible but are more complex and incur a higher computational cost. To investigate this, we determine the optimal screening test when the dual lasso solution is bounded within the intersection of a sphere and two half spaces, and empirically investigate the trade-off that this test makes between screening power and computational efficiency. We also compare its performance both in terms of rejection power and efficiency to existing test classes. The new test always has better rejection, and for an interesting range of regularization parameters, offers better computational efficiency.