Konstantinos Voudouris

Konstantinos Voudouris

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Konstantinos Voudouris

Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ACAlan Chan
Alan Chan
RSRebecca Salganik
Rebecca Salganik
AMAlva Markelius
Alva Markelius
CPChris Pang
Chris Pang
NRNitarshan Rajkumar
Nitarshan Rajkumar
TMTegan Maharaj
Tegan Maharaj
Research in Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics (FATE)1 has established many sources and forms of algorithmic harm, in domains as diverse as health care, finance, policing, and recommendations. Much work remains to be done to mitigate the serious harms of these systems, particularly those disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. Despite these ongoing harms, new systems are being developed and deployed, typically without strong regulatory barriers, threatening the perpetuation of the same harms and the creation of novel ones. In response, the FATE community has emphasized the importance of anticipating harms, rather than just responding to them. Anticipation of harms is especially important given the rapid pace of developments in machine learning (ML). Our work focuses on the anticipation of harms from increasingly agentic systems. Rather than providing a definition of agency as a binary property, we identify 4 key characteristics which, particularly in combination, tend to increase the agency of a given algorithmic system: underspecification, directness of impact, goal-directedness, and long-term planning. We also discuss important harms which arise from increasing agency – notably, these include systemic and/or long-range impacts, often on marginalized or unconsidered stakeholders. We emphasize that recognizing agency of algorithmic systems does not absolve or shift the human responsibility for algorithmic harms. Rather, we use the term agency to highlight the increasingly evident fact that ML systems are not fully under human control. Our work explores increasingly agentic algorithmic systems in three parts. First, we explain the notion of an increase in agency for algorithmic systems in the context of diverse perspectives on agency across disciplines. Second, we argue for the need to anticipate harms from increasingly agentic systems. Third, we discuss important harms from increasingly agentic systems and ways forward for addressing them. We conclude by reflecting on implications of our work for anticipating algorithmic harms from emerging systems.

28 February 2025 in Behavior Research Methods
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
KVKonstantinos Voudouris
Konstantinos Voudouris
BSBen Slater
Ben Slater
LCLucy G. Cheke
Lucy G. Cheke
WSWout Schellaert
Wout Schellaert
JHJosé Hernández-Orallo
José Hernández-Orallo
MCMatthew Crosby
Matthew Crosby
The Animal-AI Environment is a unique game-based research platform designed to facilitate collaboration between the artificial intelligence and comparative cognition research communities. In this paper, we present the latest version of the Animal-AI Environment, outlining several major features that make the game more engaging for humans and more complex for AI systems. These features include interactive buttons, reward dispensers, and player notifications, as well as an overhaul of the environment’s graphics and processing for significant improvements in agent training time and quality of the human player experience. We provide detailed guidance on how to build computational and behavioural experiments with the Animal-AI Environment. We present results from a series of agents, including the state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning agent Dreamer-v3, on newly designed tests and the Animal-AI testbed of 900 tasks inspired by research in the field of comparative cognition. The Animal-AI Environment offers a new approach for modelling cognition in humans and non-human animals, and for building biologically inspired artificial intelligence.

27 October 2024 in PsyArXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
MBMarcel Binz
Marcel Binz
EAElif Akata
Elif Akata
MBMatthias Bethge
Matthias Bethge
FBFranziska Brändle
Franziska Brändle
FCFred Callaway
Fred Callaway
ESEric Schulz
Eric Schulz
Establishing a unified theory of cognition has been a major goal of psychology. While there have been previous attempts to instantiate such theories by building computational models, we currently do not have one model that captures the human mind in its entirety. Here we introduce Centaur, a computational model that can predict and simulate human behavior in any experiment expressible in natural language. We derived Centaur by finetuning a state-of-the-art language model on a novel, large-scale data set called Psych-101. Psych-101 reaches an unprecedented scale, covering trial-by-trial data from over 60,000 participants performing over 10,000,000 choices in 160 experiments. Centaur not only captures the behavior of held-out participants better than existing cognitive models, but also generalizes to new cover stories, structural task modifications, and entirely new domains. Furthermore, we find that the model’s internal representations become more aligned with human neural activity after finetuning. Taken together, Centaur is the first real candidate for a unified model of human cognition. We anticipate that it will have a disruptive impact on the cognitive sciences, challenging the existing paradigm for developing computational models.

30 January 2026 in Artificial Intelligence
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LZLexin Zhou
Lexin Zhou
PCPablo A.M. Casares
Pablo A.M. Casares
FMFernando Martínez-Plumed
Fernando Martínez-Plumed
JBJohn Burden
John Burden
RBRyan Burnell
Ryan Burnell
Jose Hernandez-OralloJose Hernandez-Orallo
Jose Hernandez-Orallo

1 November 2025 in Journal of Comparative Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KVKonstantinos Voudouris
Konstantinos Voudouris
BFBenjamin G. Farrar
Benjamin G. Farrar
LCLucy G. Cheke
Lucy G. Cheke
MHMarta Halina
Marta Halina
Philosophers of science and mind have paid increasing attention to the field of comparative psychology. Two recurring points of discussion in the literature are the methodological value of Morgan's Canon and the distinction between associative and cognitive processes. Although the existing literature regularly makes claims about the beliefs and attitudes of comparative psychologists, there are few empirical studies verifying these claims. This article fills this gap by presenting and analyzing the views of over 200 comparative psychologists on Morgan's Canon and the associative-cognitive distinction. We found that while there is some agreement between the claims in the existing literature and the views of the practitioners surveyed here (e.g., that Morgan's Canon is a parsimony principle), there are also surprising points of divergence (e.g., practitioners do not view the associative-cognitive distinction as a version of Morgan's Canon). We intend for this study to inform existing philosophical and theoretical work on perennial questions regarding how to study animal minds and behavior. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

23 August 2020 in PsyArXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
BFBenjamin George Farrar
Benjamin George Farrar
KVKonstantinos Voudouris
Konstantinos Voudouris
NCNicola Clayton
Nicola Clayton
Animal cognition research often involves small and idiosyncratic samples. This can constrain the generalizability and replicability of study’s results and prevent meaningful comparisons between samples. However, there is little consensus about what makes a strong replication or comparison in animal research. We apply a resampling definition of replication to answer these questions in Part 1 of this article, and, in Part 2, we focus on the problem of representativeness in animal research. Through a case study and a simulation study, we highlight how and when representativeness may be an issue in animal behavior and cognition research, and show how the representativeness problems can be viewed through the lenses of, i) replicability, ii) generalizability and external validity, iii) pseudoreplication and, iv) theory testing. Next, we discuss when and how researchers can improve their ability to learn from small sample research through, i) increasing heterogeneity in experimental design, ii) increasing homogeneity in experimental design, and, iii) statistically modeling variation. Finally, we describe how the strongest solutions will vary depending on the goals and resources of individual research programmes and discuss some barriers towards implementing them.