1 August 2016 in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
2 August 2013 in Synthese
3 September 2022 in Social Epistemology
Knowledge brokers are among the main channels of communication between scientists and the public and a key element to establishing a relation of trust between the two. But translating knowledge from the scientific community to a wider audience presents several difficulties, which can be accentuated in times of crisis. In this paper we study some of the problems that knowledge brokers face when communicating in times of crisis. During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, we collected interviews with Italian experts that played a major role as knowledge brokers in the local media. We asked them questions about five main topics: the features and role of science communicators; the use of language in communicating science; the importance of the relation of trust with the public; the peculiarity of communicating in a context of emergency; the problem of disagreement among experts, and its public perception and communication. The goal of this paper is to understand, through the words of knowledge brokers themselves, what they consider as best practices (and obstacles) to create trust between scientists and the public. Our empirical work can inform normative accounts of what knowledge brokering should be about.
8 April 2022 in Social Epistemology
Moral philosophers, when arguing in favor of curbing climate change, tend to take for granted that ignorance about climate change is culpable. Existing data on knowledge and beliefs on climate change, however, show a concerning amount of false beliefs. Few studies have investigated the culpability of those who exhibit ignorance about climate change. As a result, this paper focuses on ignorance about climate change arising from encounters with pseudoscience. In this paper, we will present the extant data relating to climate change, which shows how distinguishing between science and pseudoscience may pose a challenge to the untrained eye. We will apply the existing theories on epistemic responsibility to the case of ignorant agents who encounter pseudoscience. We will first focus on the conditions that make their ignorance culpable, by referring to epistemic vices. Afterwards, we will explore the conditions for being excused, by analyzing the infosphere that surrounds climate change. We will argue that, in topics like climate change, there is a significant effort from interested parties in producing and disseminating hard-to-detect pseudoscience and disinformation. This significantly influences the attribution of blame to ignorant agents, as epistemically virtuous persons might end up with false beliefs without being blameworthy for them.
3 July 2015 in Journal of Economic Methodology
In this paper, I consider the problem of selecting and justifying a lost of principles of expertise as part of a methodology of expert judgment in economics. I argue that a methodology of expertise, trying to list and justify a number of principles of expertise, is in need of a theoretical background against which to select, evaluate, and weight each of the principles. I explain by means of case studies why problems arise for lack of such background, using the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee and the Council of Economic Advisors as examples. I then make a proposal for a categorization in ‘types of committees’ and ‘types of expertise,’ and use it to evaluate some of the principles of expertise that have been previously suggested in the philosophical and economic literatures.